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201. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
James R. Greenwell A Probabilistic Justification for Abortion
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There appear to be two major areas of uncertainty in the abortion dispute, namely the status of the fetus with respect to personhood and the validity of the doctrine of the double effect, or which of several moral principles takes priority in cases of conflict. This paper attempts to show that one can accept the uncertainty on these issues and yet reach a plausible view on the morality of abortion. This is done by consideration of the various possible combinations of controversial factors and which combinations indicate abortion to be right and which wrong. Probabilities of rightness and wrongness are then generated for several kinds of cases where abortion is usually desired. The conclusion of the paper is that in the absence of certainty in the basic issues, we can make a decision on the strength of the probabilities, in which case abortion is justified in those cases where it has usually been requested.
202. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Mary B. Mahowald On Humans and Butterflies: A Response to Becker
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This article responds to a recent proposal for determining where human life begins on the basis of histological and morphological development of the organism. After examining possible interpretations of the term "human" and relations between "human life," "human being" and "human becoming," I argue that metamorphosis is not a fit analogue for human development. On biological grounds the proposed "metamorphic definition" of "human being" is judged unacceptable.Alternative proposals are then considered, viz., conception, quickening, viability, live birth and personhood. Prom a non- biological standpoint, only the last survives as a candidate for a human being/human becoming boundary. However, every developmental event, including histological and morphological completion of the organism, remains pertinent to moral discourse and decisions concerning human life.
203. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Philip J. Neujahr Subjectivity
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In this article I attempt to sketch a Kantian view of personal identity. Making use of Kant's distinction between perception and conception as necessary components of experience, I argue that experience requires the existence over time of a subject, and that this persisting subject is a condition of experience and hence is transcen- dentally distinct from any object of experience, including the subject's body. This also implies that consciousness, or the appearance of the world to the subject, cannot identified with a brain process or any other object, and thus that central state materialism must be false. The view of subjectivity which emerges from this analysis bears some resemblance, I believe, to Kant's doctrine of the transcendental self. After this very abstract analysis I present a thought-experiment which attempts to illustrate the difference between subjectivity and any objective fact, and to show more clearly the status of the subject as a necessary condition of experience.
204. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Willis Doney Some Recent Work on Descartes: A Bibliography
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In Descartes; A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), I published a bibliography of works in English relating to Descartes. This is a Supplement to that bibliography and contains references to works in English that have appeared since 1966 through 1975 or that inadvertently were not included in the original bibliography. The Supplement is in three parts: (A) Translations and Reference Works, (B) Books, and (C) Articles. In (C), I have also included chapters of books that can be read independently and that may be of interest to students of Descartes. There were of course borderline cases in which I had to decide whether an article contained enough material about Descartes to be included in the bibliography. On the whole, I believe I have followed a rather liberal policy in making these decisions.
205. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Carl F. Cranor Respect for the Law: An Evaluation
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The aim of this paper is to try to clarify the nature and justification of respect for the law. In section I, I try to clarify the nature of respect for a legal system and distinguish it from related concepts. In the next section, I consider problems justifying the attitude of respect toward a legal system. In section III, I discuss the extent to which one has duties to behave respectfully toward and to try to adopt an attitude of respect toward a reasonably just legal system. One consequence is that it is difficult to show that one has a duty to obey the law because it is respect-worthy. In the last section, I sketch further consequences of preceding sections and suggest that respect for the law properly understood is neither the boon of oppression nor the bane of conscientious moral agents.
206. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
H. A. Nielsen Some Wrinkles in the Religious Uses of 'To Believe'
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The Kantian logic of science has shaped much of the critical-historical tradition of scripture analysis, partly by canonizing a specific set of limits defining the possible and, correspondingly, limits to what a human being may defensibly believe in the way of historical reports. Residual inexplicable incidents are regarded as mythical or unhistorical in that tradition. However, by training a Wittgensteinian lens on certain religious applications of the verb 'to believe' we can begin to notice a rainbow of diverse and finely shaded uses, none of them privileged. The fact that some of these make no connection with the canonical sense of 'to believe' puts in serious question the recent tendency to employ the category 'myth' in scripture scholarship.
207. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
George Ellard The Language of Politics
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This paper deals with Marx's claim that he has presented a scientific or non-ideological account of social problems. Having explained what an ideology is for Marx, I criticize those of his followers who view possible understandings of the world as self- inclosed language games which can offer no justification for their validity except by appealing to the rules of the particular language game in question. To show that Marx would be dissatisfied with the relativism implicit in the more contemporary position, I compare his analysis of history to Hegel's Phenomenology and argue that the latter work is useful in understanding why one particular mode of thought is seen as non-perspectival or scientific.
208. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
John R. Catan, Giovanni Reale Aristotle, the Immobile Mover: Translation, Introduction, and Commentary
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This is a translation of II Motore Immobile (Metafisica, libro XII), Traduzione intégrale, introduzione e commento by Giovanni Reale (Editrice La Scuola, Brescia, 4th Ed. 1971)- The author offers a unitary reading of the famous twelfth book of Aristotle's Metaphysics. The book is intended for students who wish to read the text itself of Aristotle’s, so that the introduction and commentary to the text and the summaries of the entire Metaphysics as well as the twelfth book gives the student ample material to read the text intelligently. The work is aware of the current state of Aristotelian studies but does not intrude them into the commentary, because they should be reserved for more specialized work which the author has completed.
209. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Elizabeth Smith Ultimate Principles
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The purpose of this paper is to consider the frequently held view that since obligation is a rule-dependent concept it can be explicated by reference to rules. H.L.A. Hart's attempt to explicate the normative character of a legal system in terms of rules is examined and it is shown that (A) the notion that obligation is rule-dependent necessitates that there be an ultimate rule in the legal system, that (B) if obligation is rule-dependent and there is an ultimate rule in the legal system it is mysterious, indeed unintelligible how rules themselves can oblige and (C) the attempt to capture the normative character if the legal system fails. The appeal of this analysis of obligation is traced to the tempting but ill-founded supposition that rationality always consists in applying a general rule to a specific case.
210. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Richard A. O'Neil On Rawls' Justification Procedure
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The paper is a defense of the moral methodology of John Rawls against criticisms by R.M. Hare and Peter Singer. Rawls is accused of intuitionism and subjectivism by Hare and of subjectivism and relativism by Singer, I argue that Rawls does not rely on intuitions as such, but on judgments on which there is a consensus. This does not commit Rawls to subjectivism for what is required for objectivity in ethics as in science is simply a rational justification procedure for principles, which Rawls provides. Moreover, an appeal to a moral consensus at some point is inescapable. Finally, concerning the charge of relativism, I point out that Rawls includes in his justification procedure only those judgments on which there is a consensus among competent judges. Though there is the possibility that conflicting sets of judgments may be equally valid for different societies in the unlikely case that there is nothing invariant in the judgments of competent judges, this is a relativism we can accept.
211. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
David L. Rouse Marx's Materialist Concept of Democracy
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Marx called his philosophical position a materialism; he was concerned, however, with social life, not with matter as the ultimate constituent of the universe. His materialism is a thesis about the relation between the forms which social life takes and the content which constitutes that life. Traditional materialisms are unable to address themselves to the particular concerns of Marx. Consequently, an alternative source must be found in order to explicate his materialism. Using Aristotle’s distinction between form and matter from the central books of the Metaphysics, I show how Marx’s materialism is a corrective to the formal determinism of Hegel.
212. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Richard A. Hogan Soul in the Charmides: An Examination of T. M. Robinson's Interpretation
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T.M. Robinson, in Plato's Psychology, concludes that an examination of the Charmides shows that soul is (1) a cognitive principle, (2) a moral principle, (3) to be equated, together with the body, with the self or person, (4) related to the body by "mutual entailment." I argue that (4) is not implied by the text and that Robinson's interpretation rests upon illegitimately pressing an analogy presented therein, and that even if the analogy could be pressed, that Robinson's view (which seems to embody a confusion over the nature of 'entailment') would still not be defensible, I argue further that (3) depends upon an unjustifiable equation of 'self' with 'whole man.' I accept (and present additional evidence for) (1) and (2) as true of soul in the sense I take to be implied by the text. But the evidence for (1) and (2) further damages Robinson's claims (3) and (4).
213. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
James W. Lamb Basic Actions and Doing Actions Basically
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Writers on action theory have said much about the notion of basic action but little about that of doing an action basically. In my paper I set forth a definition of basic action, then argue that neither it nor the definitions of various other philosophers captures the distinct notion of doing an action basically, and finally propose a definition of this latter notion.
214. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Steven Lee A Confusion in Popper's Philosophy of Social Science
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This paper argues that there is a confusion or inconsistency in Popper's claiming both that the social sciences should adopt the principle of methodological individualism and that they should maintain a unity of method with the natural sciences. Conjointly with the argument and in an appendix, a survey of Popper's philosophy of social science is presented. First, Popper's individualism is given an exegesis and elaboration, being characterized by me as 'the autonomy position'. Second, suggesting unity of method requires minimally the general application of the principle of faisIflability, I show the failure of two arguments apparently suggested by Popper that falslflability entails individualism. To fill the lacuna I then propose other arguments for individualism Popper may have had in mind. But finally, I show the inconsistency by arguing that individualism must on Popper's own assumptions be regarded as an empirical rather than a metaphysical position, thus rendering its stipulation by Popper as methodological incompatible with the application of falslflability.
215. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Kenneth W. Rankin The Trinitarian Vision of P. F. Strawson
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Along with more frequently discussed theses, Strawson in his Chapter on Persons has maintained that the perceptual experience of the same subject could be causally dependent upon a multiplicity of bodies. But (1), without drastic revision, his effort to show in illustration that the visual experience of one subject might causally depend upon three different bodies is too fraught with difficulty to lend coherent support. (2) When the difficulties are removed by revision, the truth of the thesis depends upon the truth of a particularly implausible variety of dualistic representa- tionalism. (3) Constructive measures are required to ensure its consistency with Strawson's more salient claim 'that a necessary condition of states of consciousness being ascribed at all is that they should be ascribed to the very same things as certain corporeal characteristics'. (4) The thesis is inconsistent with Strawson's defense of the possibility of Group Persons.
216. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Michael R. Neville The Notion of Interest in Kant's Critique of Judgement
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Kant's definition of "interest" in terms of a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction (in Section 2 of the third Critique) builds upon, yet goes beyond, his previous notion of interest as a rational principle of action (in the ethical writings). This paper seeks to show, through textual exegesis and reference to Kant's general principles, how that newer definition is meant to encompass two broad categories of interest which underlie the whole Critical philosophy — (I) human interests which find their fulfillment in actions upon the world, and (II) human interests which find their fulfillment elsewhere than in such external actions — as well as how that newer definition plays a unifying role in the filling out of Kant's system.
217. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 2
Ronald C. Hoy Science and Temporal Experience: A Critical Defense of C. D. Broad's Theory of Temporal Cognition
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Temporal consciousness is philosophically problematic because it appears to have features that cannot be analyzed in a way compatible with the fundamental view of time as a one-dimensional order of events. For example, it seems to be a manifest fact of experience that within a strictly present state of consciousness one can be immediately aware of a succession of events, yet the standard view of time denies that successive events can co-exist, so how can they be given together in a present perceptual state? Such puzzles have occasionally led philosophers to reject scientific or mathematical theories of time. Some time ago C. D. Broad developed a largely unappreciated theory of temporal cognition to cope with these puzzles. In this paper the evolution of Broad’s theory is traced, and it is defended from the misinterpretations of later critics. Finally, it is suggested that a modification of Broad’s theory, which frees it from the trappings of sense-data epistemology, shows it to be compatible with sane current naturalistic approaches to experience that also would need to account for temporal experience within the framework of scientific time.
218. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Ken Siegel Is Every Possibility Actualized in an Infinite Period of Time?
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It has often been thought that the existence of an infinite amount of time implies the realization of all possibilities. However, it can be proved that it is not true that for any T, if T is an infinite period of time, then every possibility is actualized in T. The proof works for any sense of 'possibility' in which there are possibilities that cannot be actualized simultaneously.It still might be argued that if there is an infinite amount of time, then each possibility is actualized sometime (during some infinite period of time, though not all). In particular it might be claimed that if there is an infinite amount of time, then there is an uninterrupted infinite period of time; and (P*) for any T, if T is an uninterrupted infinite period of time, then every possibility is actualized in T. However, it can also be shown that (P*) is not necessarily true.For it to be actually true, some very strong Principle of Universal Random Change must be true.
219. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
Jane Lipsky McIntyre Locke on Personal Identity: A Re-Examination
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In this paper I offer an analysis, reconstruction and defense of Locke's account of personal identity. I begin with a detailed analysis of Locke's use of the term 'conscious' in its historical context. This term, which plays a central role in Locke's theory, had senses in the seventeenth century which it does not have today. In the light of this analysis, an interpretation of continuity of consciousness as the ancestral of memory is given. It is argued that this interpretation of Locke's theory of personal identity does not involve an ontological commitment to immaterial substances, and Locke is defended against the historically important criticisms of Butler and Reid. In the conclusion I suggest that the account of the individuation of persons implicit in Locke's discussion of personal identity is similar to the account of contextual individuation given by Hintikka.
220. Philosophy Research Archives: Volume > 3
David T. Ozar Social Rules and Patterns of Behavior
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In this paper I clarify the distinction between actions performed under a social rule and a mere pattern of behavior through an examination of two distinctive features of actions performed under a social rule. Developing an argument proposed by H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of Law, I first argue that, where a social rule exists, there nonconformity/conformity to the pattern of behavior set down in the rule count as good reasons for criticism/commendation of actions covered by the rule. Secondly I argue that, where a social rule exists, nonconformity/conformity to the pattern set down in the rule must be taken account of (at the risk of self-contradiction) in judging actions covered by the rule commendable or subject to criticism. This in turn means that, where a social rule exists, there can be no genuine exceptions to the rule because the notion of a genuine exception to a social rule makes no sense.