According to James Van Cleve, the principle with which Kant is concerned in the first analogy follows from the view that existence statements are properly made only with quantifiers and have to be expressible in the form ‘∃ xFx’. This thesis is extremely surprising and of great potential importance. It rests on the conviction that two more basic principles can be derived from the relevant view about existence statements. The first of these more basic principles is that there can be no coming to exist ex nihilo or ceasing to exist in nihilo; the second is that there cannot be a series of modes not grounded in an ultimate subject. This paper outlines the relevant view about existence statements, traces the argument provided by Van Cleve in support of his thesis, and concludes that the argument rests on adubious assumption that ‘Everything exists’ either means or entails ‘Everything always exists’.

The World abounds with infinite crimes, technogenic accidents, acts of nature, etc. And very often, speaking about infringement of laws, use a word "anarchy". In consciousness of one people this concept associates with fear, personifies something mad, uncontrollable, and not giving in to the control. In consciousness ofothers - it means permissiveness, impunity for any acts and even crimes. The philosopher, in my opinion, is the avocate of a historical value and validity. And consequently it is necessary to observe these principles in relation to any concept or the theory. The philosophical, political doctrine of anarchism sets as the purpose clearing of the person of pressure of any authorities and any forms of economic, political and spiritual authority. Aspiration to anarchy as thementality, meets already at cinics and in early christianity, and also in chiliastic sects of the Middle Ages. Occurrence of the philosophical theory of anarchism connect with names of German thinker Max Shtirner (Caspar Shmidt's pseudonym, 1806–1856), French philosopher Pierre-Joseph Prudon (1809 – 1865) and the largest theorists of this doctrine of Michail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin. Humanistic value as a red string passes through all political doctrine of anarchism and, in my opinion, should be presented fairly in order to prevent substitution of concepts and with the purpose of observance of historical honesty.

Nothing is as complex as the world – but soon we must master this complexity to be able to live in it. Our means to do so are the languages. However, they are so manifold and so differently in vocabulary, structure and in the way linked with the world that it is difficult to ascribe to them a common relation. Noam Chomsky’s empirical search for a deep structure grammar had no success. For Leibniz our actual world is infinitely complex, beginning with the monad and its subordinated “worlds in the worlds”. Thus exactly our problem constellation of today can already be found there–namely how to master infinite complexity by languages. But what connects these languages? This will be discussed from (1) the representational function of signs concerning the connection between res / signum / notio / idea, via (2) the Ars characteristica and its formal-linguistic sign systems; the next step counts (3) for the natural languages and their functions, marked above all by an adaptation to new problems. The last step deals with the functions of languages, finally leading to the unity of reason.

What is actual being? The empiricist answers that only what is given to sensation is actual. The rationalist answers that the given to sensation is not actual being but the reasonable connection of the world is a genuine actuality. Kant shows his commitment to empiricism by arguing that only the given to sensation exists.Sensation as an ultimate criterion for actuality is the base of Kant’s critique of the traditional metaphysics. If sensation is proved to be problematic as a criterion for actuality, Kant’s empirical critique of the traditional metaphysics is undermined. This paper will show that in criticizing Kant’s critique of the traditional metaphysics, we can not do so on the basis of an empirical distinction between dream and actuality. On the basis of Hegel’s explanation of the rational actuality,I will show further that the criterion for distinction between dream and actuality is the reasonable connection of the states of affairs.

The goal of this paper is to set out the structure and order of Leibniz’s discussion of the so-called “static shift,” in his correspondence in Clarke. The immediate point of this exercise is to determine precisely how Leibniz puts to use his two famous principles – the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) and the Principleof Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) – in constructing, and defending his relational view of space, while providing a refutation of Absolute Space. In specific, it is to set out an interpretation of this argument contrary to the generally accepted one – here represented by Chernoff – about the use of the PII.

It could be said that after Hegel’s, Philosophy in the world begun its downturn, falling in chaos during more than one hundred years. The Science study the specific thing replaced the philosophy as the King position in human’s knowledge. But, in fact, the science was born by philosophy. From 19th century, people could study the specific object by way of science, not philosophy. Of course, the best way to study the specific thing is the science. But, to study the onto, science does not work. The onto is the target object of philosophy. The specific object is not the target study object of philosophy! The object for philosophy is the onto. But, in 19th and 20th century, people did not know this very well, viewing all the specific thing was studied very well by science, the scholars of philosophy were very upset. this is because they did not know the target object of philosophy is the onto, not the specific object. If they want to get a kind of specific object in nature to be the object of philosophy, of course, they would get defeated by the science, which was really the history. Finally, some got a field, called the phenomena, then, the phenomenology begun, but the phenomenology is not philosophy. Now, the human have got very large achievement in study of nature object. as per ontology and cognition logic, the onto is the root basis of every object, but, to get to know the specific object is the correct way for to get to know the onto. Now, with theachievement of study various object, philosophy could get new progress in study the onto. Following is the abstract explain why the phenomenology is not philosophy. From the very beginning of philosophy, people know the reality, the onto is hided in the phenomena, philosophy’s task is to find out the essence, the reality hided in the phenomena. At the time about early 20th century, there came out a kind of philosophy, called Phenomenology, ever developed ardently during last century for several decades, even now, it is still there, continue split philosophy, bring confusion to philosophy. Philosophy was produced by study the essence of object, especially the onto of everything. but in Phenomenology, there is no essence or the onto hided in the nature, it regard the phenomena as the study object, it deny the onto exists. The onto is the target object of philosophy over the past 2000 more years, but the phenomenology deny the onto, then, how could the phenomenology still regard itself as “philosophy”? Obviously, the phenomenology is not philosophy. Of course, the onto is there, longlive with the nature, the sun, the space. To get to know the onto, is the long live study for human. So, the phenomenology is wrong, at least wrong in the regard of the philosophy. Because of phenomenology’s ridiculous study object and theme, it produced various kinds of ridiculous answer and explain, by its main study such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and latter, The structuralism, post structuralism and post modernism ect.. Finally, philosophy was split, falling apart in everything, it seemed any kind thing or phenomena could produce a kind of philosophy, what more ridiculous is any kind of phenomena ever expected to explain the nature the world the space by its several points of view about itself. this make philosophy look like garbage, loss the glory it ever had. Now, it is high time to say that the phenomenology, since it deny the essence and the onto in the nature, is not philosophy. It shall not be called as philosophy. philosophy’s target object is the onto, which is the root basis of everything, the root theory in the space.

En contraste d’avec la pensée de Spinoza, pour qui la foi n’est qu’un phénomène extérieur et étrange, une notable exception à sa théorie du salut par le control des passions et l’amour intellectuelle à Dieu et par Dieu que l’homme de connaissance peut atteindre seulement grâce à la véritable philosophie, on analyse ici très brièvement la compréhension que de la foi nous proposent, en ayant l’expérience intérieure, surtout Descartes mais aussi Pascal. Pour le premier la foi relève de la volonté, à qui la grâce incline d’embrasser le message révélé à peu près comme la perception claire et distincte incline au jugement dans l’acte deconnaissance. Pour Pascal la foi et la connaissance sont de l’ordre, toutes deux, du coeur, qui comme on sait a des raisons que la raison ne connait pas.

It is untrue that, as Hegel said in 1807 in the Phänomenologie, «the wounds of the spirit heal and leave no scar behind; what is done is not indelible, but is reassumed by the spirit» (GW 9, 360) since the ground of reality, that reality which, as indicated by Kant, seems to be submerged in evil (Ak. VI), refuses to be tamed by concepts. Disappearance without remnant, that dissolution (Verschwindung) mentioned by Hegel would suppose that there is no remnant of evil, thatits effects in history-such as the Jacobin terror with its macabre liturgy of severed heads referred to in the above passage of the Phänomenologieare nothing more than moments to be sublate (aufgehoben), part of a necessary process. There is no remnant to be explained. All is revealed: Offenbarung der Tiefe. The relationship between Hegel and Schelling has in this topic, the problem of evil and its meaning in history (Geschichte), one of its key points: in Schelling one can see a hollow which constitutes a pathway to the problem of finitude and evil, studied in depth in the Freiheitsschrift of 1809, partly as a response to the critics expressed by Hegel in the Phänomenologie. While Hegel reduced evil to an abstract negation, to be overcome through a determinated negation as a sign ofthe reason in history, in Schelling evil would remain a permanent possibility that can never be dissolved (verschwinden) or overcome (aufgehoben) any way.

1. The definition of subjective materialism: Subjective materialism is not a simple definition, it is a new system of both the conception of the world and the methodology. The definition and the comprehension of the subjective materialism can be much many, but I can definite it with a simple definition after I have grasped it’s core guiding principle: actually, the subjective materialism is a system of both the conception of the world and the methodology which create and illumination the equation material (information)=idea (information) in a materialistic way. 2. The background and condition of subjective materialism come into being: The human society has developed in a information age, but the materialist philosophy still stay in the 19th century of industrial society, which has not fully reflected the spirits of our times and is more difficult to lead the development trend of world philosophy. Materialist philosophy needs to develop. 3. The theory sources of subjective materialism: First of all, subjective materialism is the result of the development of western philosophy, including the modern western philosophy theory. Second, subjective materialism is also undoubtedly a result of development of Marxist philosophy. Third, the subjective materialism is also the result of ancient oriental philosophy. If the subjective materialism must be a definition of western philosophy, then the thinking of “Rune” must be the product of oriental philosophy. 4. Meanings of the new philosophy: Subjective materialism philosophy must be different from modern west philosophy and postmodern philosophy. And it’s essential meaning is rebuild the philosophy and put the metaphysics in our view once again. So, both the conception of the world and the methodology of “Rune” structure are the completely subversion to all the monism philosophy, and are the completely new structure system of philosophy ontology.

I try to show that Berkeley's theory of ideas is not a variant of Locke's. We can find such an interpretation of Berkeley in Thomas Reid. So, we could call this interpretation a 'traditional interpretation'. This traditional interpretation has an influence still now, for example, Tomida interprets Berkeley in this line (Tomida2002). We will see that this traditional interpretation gives a serious problem to Berkeley (section 1). And I am going to present an argument against this traditional interpretation (section 2).

1) Gaukroger estimates that there exist two irreconcilable theses in the Cartesian method in the Rules. The first thesis concerns the problem of the cognitive grasp of inference, the other the problem of the method of discovery. Descartes, by integrating deduction as a simple object of intuition, rejects the psychologicalinterpretation of inference, and elevates deduction to the status of a necessary condition of knowledge. On the other hand, the problem of the method of discovery requires that inference produces a new truth as its conclusion. Descartes takes the algebraic solution of equations as the model of this method. But this orientation leads Descartes to deny all cognitive function operating in the inference of synthetic form. Thus, according to Gaukroger, these two theses tendto be opposed, calling into question the unity of the method. 2) We admit the cognitive analysis of Gaukroger on the Cartesian inference. However, Gaukroger does not see the importance of “the natural power of the mind” in the Rules. Indeed, the cognitive role of inference is always understood by Descartes, in light of this natural power. Thus, the main role of the method is to teach ways of increasing this power. Descartes tries to pose, by the algebraic treatment of questions, an analogy between the mathematical order and the order of the operations of the mind, enabling him to discover pure schemes of these operations. And, It is by theses schemes that the mind exercise itself in order to increase its natural power. For this reason, we must reconsider Gaukroger’s thesis that Descartesassimilates literally the method of discovery and algebraic solution, as well as his thesis of the inconsistency of the Cartesian method.

We know the history of philosophy as Arabian, English, American, Greece, Indian, Chinese, Korean, German, Russian, French, Japanese… But it is surprisingly that we do not use more common concept as "national philosophy", which may be included in notions "regional" and "world" philosophy. The other words common to all mankind. As the President of Independent Republic of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov emphasized, "It is important to understand the life giving, deep sources of national culture, East philosophy which serve at vigorous stimulus of rapid progress and renovation". We suppose that the main part of philosophy is human life, man's coming to be and evolution as a subject of interaction with the world. Any philosophy is the philosophy of a man, His life. A man belongs tosome nationality, nation and mankind. The nature is definite geographic midst for a man. Each nationality, nation has its own history and specific outlines – style of life, way of life, traditions, nation interests, psychology, ideas, values, culture. It is common and typical for all nations and it imposes an imprint at all sides of realityas well as philosophy.

Spinoza’s stance against “bad” universals is well known but his own view on “good” universals is not obvious. In this paper we examine the ontological status of general terms in Spinoza against the background of his metaphysical ontology. We then move onto his view of universals in his discussions of the three kind of knowledge. I argue that Spinoza’s view may be best characterized as trope-conceptualism. Universals are, considered in things themselves, nothing but tropes, i.e., fully particularized properties of individual objects. In particular, I claim that what Spinoza calls “attributes” in his grand scheme of ontology are tropes, of which we can have “adequate” ideas. Spinoza’s theory is a lot more delicate and sophisticated than is usually construed.

Subjective Materialism, this new theory has been elaborated thoroughly in the academic book of Philosophy System of Post-modern materialism which was published by Heilongjiang peoples Publishing House in 2003.This article means to open a door to innovation and development of the modern philosophy ofmaterialism in the 21st century.

1.Философская мысль ХХI века постепенно преодолевает часто встречающееся смешение двух понятий. С одной стороны,ЭстетическиЭпистемическое как феномен с ведущей ролью "Эпистемического" по отношению к "Эстетическому", что характерно, прежде всего, для традиционных представлений "Западной Культуры". А с другой, ЭпистемическиЭстетическому, соответственно, наоборот, присущ стиль,стимулирующий лишь “растущую варваризацию самого эмоционального состояния, становящегося чистым бурлением предоставленного самому себе чувства”. 2. На основе данного различия проводится сравнительное переосмысливание философских идей М.Хайдеггера и Ж.Бодрийяра с позиций сегодняшнего дня. На трёх разных для каждого, но сравнимых по основным достижениям, этапах творческой деятельности указанных ведущих мыслителей на грани ХХ и ХХI веков: Раннем, Среднем и Позднем. 3. Применительно к идеям модерна, постмодерна и постмодернизма в мире ХХI века сталкиваются два подхода, правда, амбивалентных, но всё же явно противостоящих друг другу. Для М.Хайдеггера главное – это «введение опоры на «эстетическое, но всё же при сохранении эпистемческого в качестве основы». Для Ж.Бодрийяра, наоборот, главное – это «введение в качестве основы «эстетического», но всё же при сохранении некоторой опоры на «Эпистемческое. 4. Появляется возможность выявить и философски переосмыслить с позиций XXI века проблему Интенсификации Эстетизации Эпистемического, или, в более решительной форме, неуклонного Наступления «ЭстетическиЭпистемологического » на « ЭпистемологическиЭстетическое ».

In comparing humans and animals, we may use humans as the standard to measure animals, or conversely, animals as the standard to measure humans. While most philosophers have adopted the former approach, David Hume is among those few who use the comparison with animals as means to throw light on human nature. I focus on Hume’s treatment of human and animal reason. The cognitive processes and states that Hume holds to be common to humans and animals may be called situated, that is, embedded in the process of guiding actions that is actually going on and consequently relative to the agent’s current position in space-time. Hume’s treatment of causal reasoning underlines the centrality of situated cognition in the workings of human, as well as animal minds. Taking situated reasoning and beliefs as the paradigm of human cognition enables us to look from an alternative point of view, at the features supposedly unique to human cognition, like the use of general words and concepts. Thus we can find a confirmation of the practical import of general words and concepts in Hume’s account of the obligation of promises, where words play an essential role in extending our control over objects and actions beyond what is present and particular into what is absent or not yet actualized. This is also a confirmation of how deeply our cognitive abilities in general are rooted in our practical needs.

Kant points out the pleasure of the universal communicability of the judgment of taste in the 7th passage of § 9 in the Critique of Judgment. He promises to discuss the subject in a transcendental context further after discussing the Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments. However, he seems to limit his discussion only in an empirical context, neglecting his own commitment. I differentiate the kind of pleasure (which Kant mentioned in the 7th passage) from the intrinsic pleasure of the pure judgment of taste. The latter refers the pleasure in 'the harmonious play of the cognitive powers' stimulated by 'the merely formal purposiveness of a representation of an object'. It seems to have been overlooked that the pleasure of the universal communicability is independent from the intrinsic pleasure of the pure judgment of taste. My goal is to define the another feeling of pleasure by focusing on the analysis of the § 42 where Kant discussesthe possibility of one's interest combined with a pure judgment of taste. I come to the conclusion that another feeling of pleasure is a sort of practical pleasure. It is an interested pleasure in fulfilling the notion of generalizability of one’s state of mind, which is relevant to a moral judgment. Therefore, such pleasure is not actually common to everyone, as Kant insists in § 42, but restricted to those who have already developed the moral interest.

The purpose of the present essay is to explain how the basic notions of Modern philosophy, forming Descartes’ optimistic attitude towards knowledge and human relations, were altered in order to be critically implemented into Vico’s more sober teaching. Several decades after Descartes took up the fight against skepticism, an Italian thinker, Giambattista Vico, critically approached the Cartesian project of Modernity. While Descartes believed that the essence of a human being consists in applying reason properly and using free will according to its guidance in order to achieve the greatest success in science, mathematics, and philosophy, Vico insisted that human imagination and ingenuity ought to be directed to the humanities and legal studies and should aim at practical results. This was the eighteenth century Humanistic reply to Descartes.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a brief sketch of Fichte’s account of the self and discuss it as significant contribution to the modern theory of the selfhood. This discussion focuses on thinkers’ Jena projects of Wissenshaftslehre, including the 1794/95 Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre and Wissensftslehre novo methodo (1796/1797). For Fichte, the Jena period is a time of profound search for the ground and structure of his philosophical system. He finds such ground in a uniquely formulated conception of the self. Furthermore, beginning with the self as a direct intuition and ending with the self as a necessary idea, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre become an immense description of the development of the selfhood. Providing a conceptual outline of the main points of Fichte’s account of the self, the paper shows it as a unique philosophical result that is key to the emergence of post-Kantian German idealism.