If the problem of evil is one of justifying how a perfect God could create evil, then there is no problem of evil in early Chinese thought, but my claim in this paper is that the problem of evil is one manifestation of a deeper problem, which is the conflict between the world and human values and desires. This deeper problem appears in early Chinese thought in ways analogous to the problem of evil in theistic traditions. Daoists respond to this problem with a call to harmonize with heaven by overcoming conventional values and desires. Mencius, a Confucian, offers a more complex response, in which it is natural to cultivate virtue and certain desires even though nature itself is indifferent to them. My paper focuses on this Confucian response.

The idea of a philosophical Other as comparativists have often historically used it to signify radical alterity, although sometimes a remedy and correction for the erroneous generalizations which originate from a presupposition of human sameness, merely shifts the center of philosophy's unchallenged assumptions in at least two ways. First, the notion of a philosophical Other avoids an explicit characterization of how one recognizes that one is philosophizing in the sphere of this Other and of what "otherness" is philosophically interesting. Second, the notion of a philosophical Other is unable to capture and describe the dynamic, ever-changing relations that serve to demarcate philosophical traditions or spatio-temporal webs of thinkers in the first place. For the sake of the comparative project of exposing the comparativist's own culturally-embedded assumptions, comparative methodology should allow for the possibility of analyzing more than one place where similarities and differences can present themselves at the same time. In short, comparativists would serve their own interests better if they began to approach their projects in recognition of a complex, limitless, and dynamic array of sameness and difference, instead of with premature assumptions of radical alterity.

In Anbetracht der jüngsten biotechnologischen Forschung, die das Klonen des Menschen konkret in Aussicht stellt, wird im Folgenden die Haltung der buddhistischen/ Traditionen, soweit sich diese bisher dazu geäußert haben, zu Fragen des "therapeutischen" und "reproduktiven" Klonens vorgestellt und diskutiert. Bestimmte Aspekte der buddhistischen Ethik und Anthropologie führen dazu, dass aus Sicht buddhistischer Ethiker das Klonen des Menschen eine insgesamt weniger dramatische Herausforderung darstellt. Aus ihrer Sicht wird durch die Idee und mögliche Praxis des reproduktiven Klonens kein normatives "anthropologisches" Prinzip wie jenes der menschlichen Natur, des Geschöpfseins oder der menschlichen Identität bedroht. Dennoch stehen auch buddhistische Ethiker dem Klonen skeptisch gegenüber, wenn z.B. durch den Vorgang Lebewesen in großer Zahl verletzt und getötet werden. Dass hingegen die traditionellen europäischen Wertvorstellungen der .Natur der Person' auch in den philosophischen Diskurs mit einfliessen, zeigt ein komparativer Blick auf die bioethischen Argumente von Jürgen Habermas (2001). Der Vergleich beider Positionen zeigt, dass es lohnt, in Bezug auf Techniken, die derzeit sowohl in Asien, wie Europa und den USA entwickelt werden, kulturübergreifende Perspektiven einzubringen, durch die mögliche Grunddifferenzen wie auch ethische Grundübereinstimmungen besser sichtbar werden.

This paper focuses on the philosophical analysis of interculturality. Globalization involves the problem of the universal and its relation to the particular in cultures. In some interpretations, universality is sharply opposed to particularity (Arjun Appadurai's theory of "break" in culture). In contrast to this, there are authors who allow for both particular and universal, focusing on their interrelation. Roland Robertson shows that diversity and multiculturality do not exclude forms of cultural unity. The analysis involves the current debate regarding the term "intercultural philosophy" (Ram Adhar Mall, Franz Wimmer). Intercultural philosophy raises questions about philosophy itself, and involves the revision of the whole concept of philosophy. It brings to the forefront the problem of the interrelations between the cultural-specific and the universal in philosophy. For some philosophers, the notion intercultural seems to be incompatible with philosophy as universal knowledge. However, the adherents of interculturality develop a broader and more pluralistic concept of philosophy, viewed as embedded in certain cultural and philosophical traditions while dealing with perennial questions and aiming to give universally valid answers. Two main paradigms of interculturality are distinguished: one is Raimundo Panikkar's "intercultural-interreligious paradigm"; the other is the "intercultural-liberation paradigm" developed by Raul Fornet-Betancourt. At the heart of this analysis is Fornet- Betancourt's concept of the intercultural transformation of philosophy. It is related to interculturality, or the dialogue of cultures. It challenges the Eurocentric philosophical historiography and claims the necessity of the reconstruction of the history of ideas in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, thus creating a new view of the history of philosophy. The concept of intercultural dialogue is also considered as a "regulative idea" in creating an alternative to current globalization.

Muhammad Iqbal propounds a much wider view of knowledge and the universe than does Immanuel Kant. According to him, the fundamental pattern of knowledge remains the same whether we are dealing with the perceptual type of knowledge of everyday life or with a special type of knowledge called mystic or religious knowledge. This insight was not within the purview of Kant, who was working his way through specific limitations imposed by his Western legacy. Iqbal, no doubt, drew inspiration from his Muslim legacy as bequeathed by thinkers like al-Farabi, according to whom higher thought (or 'intellect' as he called it) "rises to the level of communion, ecstasy, and inspiration". It was under the inspiration of Muslim Sufis and thinkers that he could enlarge his vision regarding the knowledge of man. In fairness to Kant, however, it may be said that Iqbal accepted his epistemic model in toto and extended its application beyond the pale of sensible and empirical knowledge into the non-sensible realm of entities with which religion deals - a venture which, if accepted, will extend human knowledge beyond its present limits into various directions and dimensions.

The term 'culture' has more than one meaning in different contexts. The paper attempts to show certain consequences, resulting from the ambiguous use of the term 'culture', for the protection of human rights, by comparing the use of the term in the Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation (UNESCO 1966), with its use in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It examines the meanings of the term 'culture' used in the UNESCO Declaration and the impact of this understanding on the protection of the relevant right or rights.

According to philosophical naturalism, the main anti-naturalism in philosophy derives from Kant and depends on transcendental arguments, which are invalid or polemically toothless. Many of naturalism's characteristic features follow from this repudiation of Kantian method. Anti-naturalists should be aware that the rationale for naturalism depends on this attack on their own position. There remains for philosophy a distinctively philosophical role that depends on the indexical element in our thought, the role of elaborating a scientific worldview.

Far from having overcome the human, all too human essence of knowledge the West has replaced its modern objectifying subjectivity by what may be called a postmodern subjectifying subjectivity. The modern will to power and its drive for controlling the Other has given way to a postmodern form of 'unavailability', a key concept in the ethical reflections of the Christian Socratic philosopher Gabriel Marcel. This paper attempts to highlight the degree to which fundamental features of Postmodernity, from instrumental technology to fragmented temporality and decentered subjectivity are infiltrating our existential condition. It is argued that one of the most striking symptoms of such a phenomenon is unavailability, especially in the artistic sphere.

The powerful images of the events^ of 9/11 have made an indelible impression on the world psyche. It has given rise to a pervasive rhetoric in practically all fields attempting to explain, interpret and understand the underlying causes and world changing consequences of the events. In a post-modern and secular world it has led to a refocusing on the religious fervour and ideals at work in established religions and in movements that are ostensibly devoid of all religious motivation, such as expansive globalization and American free enterprise capitalism. I argue that similar ideological and "religious" notions are at work in the conflict of worldviews represented by this historical event. In order to substantiate this claim and an identification of the ideological sources of the malaise at work in the world requires a clear distinction between religion, myth and ideology and the legitimate role played by constitutive root metaphors in culture, science and society. Root metaphor analysis reveals the underlying 'war of worlds' at work in the foundational symbolizations of the world (Gibson Winter, 1981) which function as fundamental building blocks of the "cultural cosmologies" of society (Harrington, 1995, 360). It is not only religious convictions that shape the world but the choices of metaphors by scientists, educators and politicians are not random and innocent but fraught with root metaphorical notions as religious as those of their ostensibly secular counterparts and thus laden with frameworks that dramatically alter the perception of phenomena and the behaviour and actions of groups. Harrington's (1995) analysis of the role of holism in the shadow of the Third Reich shows this very clearly. Recognition of the presence and influence of root metaphors of an ideological nature will contribute to the dies-enchantment with their allure. This paper attempts to develop a methodology on the basis of which it is possible to distinguish between the legitimate function of root metaphors in science and society and their hypostatization.

Hajime Tanabe (1885-1962), the Kyoto- School philosopher of modern Japan, attempts to interpret Aristotle's ontology as being involved in the logic of self-identical being without self-negative conversion in action from his own dialectical perspective. For Tanabe, the eternal essence or Form is to be mediated by the dynamic character of matter, i.e., the temporality pertinent to the changing movement. For Aristotle, however, the essence or pure activity as the principle of being is devoid of such a dynamic mediation, but is rather regarded as the past being, i.e., what it should be originally and eternally. In other words, for Aristotle, evil and matter are the lacks of goodness and the eternal Form that are identical with the essence of the individual substance. Evil is to be self-negatively mediated to goodness in free action through conversion in Tanabe's perspective. Movement pertaining to matter is not simply an incompletion of pure activity, but is rather self-negatively converted into the activity as the transcendent principle of the dialectical unification of time and eternity, matter and Form, evil and Goodness. The individual existence has freedom to unify the self-contradistinctive opposed moments, i.e., subjective action and objective being in a way of mutually negating conversion. The difference between Tanabe and Aristotle lies in that for Tanabe practice is relevant to the future, whereas for Aristotle contemplation is concerned with eternity as invariable and imperishable being since the past. While Aristotle's logic is confined to the self-identity of being in contemplation, Tanabe's logic is structured by the triadic elements of individuality, species as the relative universal, and genus as the absolute universal in terms of the negative conversion in action.

The golden mean metaphor is suggested as a key to understanding the universal and the particular in moral philosophy since finding metaphorical links provides a way of seeing different traditions in a manner that does not erect absolute boundaries. The choice of the golden mean is made keeping in mind that all cultures recognize the worth of moderation. The prime reason for that lies in human nature which sets human beings apart from all the other living creatures by a goal-oriented activity. As a rational being endowed with will, a human person cannot move toward a goal without adopting a certain strategy of actions. An instinct for self-preservation and astute prudence, personal experience and that of one's own ancestors are all prompting a human being to moderate and commensurate in dispositions and actions for an optimal attainment of the goals. Yet, the same principle is concretized in a particular cultural context (Ancient Greek, Indian, Chinese, Muslim and Russian cases are considered). Along with cultural distinctions, situational, temporal factors are of importance: much depends on whether it is the human person guided by own free will or a certain driving force, public, government, etc., outside and above defines the content of the golden mean.

The paper is an attempt to understand the nature of political religion using Russian Orthodoxy as an example. Political religion is different from the use of religion for political purposes: from "public religions" seeking to be a part of a pluralistic society; from "civic religion" (sacralization of political processes and institutions) and from fundamentalism. Contrary to fundamentalism, political religions aim not at revitalizing the past, but at addressing the most vital issues of modernity. Politicization of Orthodoxy in Russia may seem unlikely due to obvious political passivity of the Russian Orthodox Church and to the fact that people in Russia are rather religiously indifferent and theologically ignorant. But the paper demonstrates that political activity is typical not for the leaders of an institutionalized religion but for a religiously minded intelligentsia. Global experience also shows that politicization is most likely to occur in an area where people have just returned to their semi-forgotten religious beliefs and where the majority of population does not observe the rituals and does not know the fundamentals of religion. Growing number of people who identify themselves as Russian Orthodox, having, at the same time, no sufficient knowledge of this religion provokes the emergence of mediatory ideologies, which are Pan-Slavism (the idea of a union of all Orthodox Slavic nations) and Eurasianism (the idea of a union between the Orthodox and the Islamic world). From the fundamentalist viewpoint both ideologies should be defined as heretic. Pan- Slavism is heretic because it views Orthodoxy as a kind of Slavic tribal religion and strips Orthodoxy from its universalism. Eurasianist vision of Orthodoxy is so broad that any difference between "Orthodoxy" and "non-Orthodoxy" disappears.

One of the common targets that contemporary feminists are critical of concerning the problem of the body is Rene Descartes' mind and body relation. Feminist scholars can identify at least three lines of investigation of the body in contemporary thought that may be regarded as legacies of the Cartesian view, which treat the body as primarily an object for: 1) the natural sciences, particularly for the life sciences, biology, and medicine; 2) as an instrument or a machine at the disposal of consciousness or allocating an animating, willful subjectivity; and 3) as a vehicle of expression of private thoughts and feelings; that is, as fundamentally passive and transparent. Recently, feminist scholars are seriously thinking of a new conceptual model that can displace Cartesian dualism and that can emancipate notions of the body from Cartesian dominant mechanistic models and metaphors. In this light, this paper turns to a Confucian theory of the body for revelation and the case of Mencius is introduced, in which the mind is regarded as the major component of the body and a coherent model is adopted. Can we then conclude to ask in what ways the reclaiming of the body in the Contemporary Western discussion may learn from the Confucian ideas of the body...?

In this paper I examine the relevance of Maurice Merleau- Ponty's criticism of what he labels "objective thinking", in the light of contemporary political discussions. I compare his critique of the mutually exclusive categories of objective thinking, with Edward W. Said's analysis of Orientalism and its dichotomies between Orient and Occident as constitutive of highly material relationships of power. Especially after the 9.11 events, reasoning in terms of dichotomies between East and West, islam and civilization/freedom and so on has been prevalent in the discourse of politicians, journalists as well as intellectuals. Is there something that Merleau- Ponty's philosophy can teach us here? I claim that his view of the interdependency of language on the one hand, understanding and thinking on the other, is of highest importance here, since it shows that we have to undermine the established discourse from the inside, working out the complex differences of reality at the same time as forgin out new less rigid categories.

Perspicuous representation, Wittgenstein offers, is not another methodology, but it consists in seeing the connections. The Wittgensteinian perspicuous representation is therapeutic. The method he suggests for philosophy is the same method he suggests for social sciences. In both of these cases, he tries to get us to see the confusions we become entangled in when philosophizing and theorizing. In both of these disciplines he warns us not to advance explanatory, metaphysical theories. In this paper, I connect Wittgenstein's this concern with his critique of Frazer. In criticizing Frazer Wittgenstein adopts the important part of Spengler's view. Nonetheless, there are differences between the views of Wittgenstein and those of Spengler; this paper aims to show similarities as well as these differences. The first part of the paper briefly summarizes Frazer's views. The second part focusses on Wittgenstein's critique of Frazer regarding science. The third part gives an account of his critique concerning method of social sciences and philosophy. The last part concentrates on Wittgenstein's critique of Frazer regarding the tolerance towards alternative forms of life.

In this paper I shall be looking at the state of science before and after the 17th century especially with regard to the question of the nature of scientific knowledge, specifically scientific paradigms. I will argue that some of the major differences between modern science and pre-modern science are due to (i) methodological changes, (ii) the rise of paradigmatic monism in modern science as opposed to paradigmatic pluralism in pre-modern science, (iii) the integration of science with technology after the 17th century. These changes, I maintain, also redefine the role of scientific knowledge in society and culture, and bring in its wake certain problems and challenges, which in turn elicit different types of responses. Pre-modern science, I argue, are admirably suited to play a cultural and religious role, partly because of a lack of a pragmatic criterion of knowledge, and the emphasis on rational coherence. This makes enchantment of nature through science, possible. However, with the further evolution of science, especially the introduction of the experimental method and the emphasis on empiricism in the 17th century, scientific knowledge now has to conform to different criteria of knowledge -pragmatic in partleading to 'paradigmatic monism' and the consequent loss of enchantment in our conception of nature. The rise of the new science beginning in the 17th century thus brings in its wake a new set of epistemological and cultural challenges which were met with in different ways. I will then comment on the different types of responses made against the rise of the new science.