Computational simulations are now useful tools in experimental life. Their novelty and continuous development make it very difficult to understand their epistemic relevance. In this paper a first evaluation of them is presented through a parallel between thought experiments and computational simulations. Both simulations that play the role of actual experiment and also simulations that are part of experiments will be under scrutiny, since both of them are important in the understanding of contemporary experiments. But simulations as parts of actual experiments can especially show a new face in the complex relation theory-experiment.

In this paper I examine the roles that experiment plays in science. Experiment can test theories, but it can also call for a new theory. Experiment can also provide hints about the mathematical form of a theory. Likewise it can provide evidence for the existence of the entities involved in our theories. Finally, it may also have a life of its own, independent of theory. I will illustrate these roles using episodes from the history of contemporary physics. I will also discuss an epistemology of experiment, a set of strategies that provides grounds for reasonable belief in experimental results.

In most of the proposals about metonymy it is argued that it is a figure of signification or trope that exploits a figurative or transferred meaning. These proposals lose sight of what the examples that we normally consider metonymy have in common, to wit, that they are understood if we complete the metonymic noun phrase and not if we substitute it by another. It is in this sense that we understand that referential metonymy is a case of ellipsis and, thus, a figure of language or scheme whose mechanism of interpretation is intimately related to the mechanism of retrieval of expressions.

Kripke argued for the existence of necessary a posteriori truths, and tried to explain why some of them seem to be contingent. His main explanation motivated two philosophical proposals: (i) the attempt - linked to some interpretations of two-dimensionalism - to analyse the epistemic concept of a priori truth using metaphysical modal concepts; (ii) the argument for psychophysical dualism worked out by Kripke relying on his explanation of the appearances of contingency. I point out several difficulties for (i), and argue that (ii) can oe blocked because of the existence of alternative accounts of the phenomenon.

The main aim of this paper is to evaluate the Implicature Theory for epistemic contexts, as an attempt to save the validity of the Principle of Substitution in those contexts. I defend that Recanati 's arguments against the Implicature Theory are not conclusive because they are based on inadequate examples and on unclear interpretations of Grice's writings. I then argue that the mixing up of theories of meaning and attitude ascription with the classical intuitions held by Fregeans against Russellians in these contexts does not give promising results.

One of the main problems of Lewis' approach to the conventionality of language is the so-called "probLem of the meaning without we ". In this paper consider the possible solutions to this problem and conclude that in order to avoid this objection Lewis' proposal must be substantially modified.

Presuppositions are well known phenomena. One way of treating them is as partial 'meaning-functions '. There is an attractive argument that holds that in order to explain the contrast between such sentences as "John came into the room" and "That bastard John came into the room" it is required to make our semantic theory essentially more complex. This argument appeals to the fact that contrasts such as the ones just mentioned play a role in the validity of logical inferences. In this paper I argue that these contrasts can be accounted for by appealing to presuppositions. In order to defend this view we will have to offer a characterization of logical consequence that applies to sentences that involve presuppositions.

Peirce claims that there is but one primary logical relation, that of illation or logical consequence. The present paper is devoted to show the influence of this viewpoint in Peirce's conception of logic. After a brief presentation of Peirce's membership in the tradition of language as calculus, it examines his pioneering work in modal logic and other systems of logic. The last section attemps to summarize his doctrine of logic as a normative science.

Putnam's Model- Theoretic Argument has been generally held as invalid. In this work, attention is addressed to two broad facts understated by critics and commentators: (i) there are, at least, two different model-theoretic arguments. One is directed against realism and the other is directed to naturalistic semantics. The general rejection affects the former, but it is open to discussion if it affects the latter; (ii) on the other hand, the model-theoretic argument construed as a reductio argument has not - prima facia - ontological consequences, but only restrains our methodology to deal with the intentional realm.

En este artículo reevaluamos la tesis de la relatividad lingüística tomando corno referencia la vision de la mente que Fodor ha venido ofreciendo. Partiendo de su argumento clásico a favor del lenguaje del pensamiento, veremos como el desarrollo de su tesis de la modularidad y de su mas reciente teoria psicosemántica (el atomismo informacional), permiten compatibilizar su posición con, al menos, una variedad de relatividad, la relatividad léxica. Así mismo, examinaremos su ultimo argumento en favor de la prioridad explicativa del pensamiento, basado en la composicionalidad que éste exhibe, a diferencia del lenguaje.This paper reevaluates the thesis of linguistic relativity in the context of Fodor’s views on the nature of mind. We begin with Fodor’s classical argument for the language of thought, and follow the development of his ideas as he adds a general account of the structure of mind (the modulariry thesis) and a psychosemantical theory (informational atomism). Finally, we examine his most recent altempt to support the explanatory prioriry of thought, based on the compositionaliry that thought, but not language, exhibits. We argue that Fodor’s position is compatible a variety of lexical relativiry.

Este trabajo constituye una revisión de los contenidos, orientación y objetivos de una parte significativa de los manuales de lógica elemental de las décadas de 1960 y 1970 redactados por autores españoles. En concreto, analizamos los prólogos, los rudimentos prerios, y la presentación de los distintos cálculos gue aparecen en tales obras. EI estudio de la semántica, los contenidos metatcóricos o las extensiones de Ia lógica elemental quedan para una segunda etapa de esta investigacion.This work is a critical examination of contents, orientation, and goals of a significative portion of elementary spanish logic textbooks in the 60’s and 70’s. It is centered on an analysis ofprefaces, preliminaries and the different kinds of calculi appearing in these books. Topics, like semantics, metatheory or extensiones of elementary logic, are left for futrher analysis.

Se revisan varios libros publicados recientemente que corresponderían al campo de la epistemología politica. Sus autores pertenecen a tradiciones tan distintas como los Estudios sobre la Cieneia, Sociologia del Conocimiento, Epistemología, Filosafia de la Cieneia o Economía. La convergencia en este tema es el dato más significativo, habida cuenta de las bien conocidas controversias contemporaneas sabre Ia ciencia. EI nucleo central de los trabajos es la relación entre ciencia y democracia.We review a few volumes appeared in the last years about the topic of Political Epistemology. The authors came from different traditions such as Science Studies, Sociology of Science, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science or Economics. This convergence is the most meaningful fact, given the well-known controversies in the general field of science. the hard core of the reviewed volumes is the relationship between science and democtratic studies.

Los dos grandes problemas del enfoque supervaluacionista para la vaguedad son determinar cuáles son las precisificaciones admisibles y la vaguedad de orden superior ilimitado. Apelando al uso de los términos vagos por la comunidad lingüística competente puede dividirse de forma tajante la extension de un término precisando en qué casos se aplica definidamente, en cuáles se aplica indefinidamente y en cuales es indeterminado si se aplica. Esto produce dos órdenes de vaguedad, con lo que se bloquean los argumentos sorites. Finalmente se indaga qué semántica resulta más adecuada para una vaguedad de segundo orden. La vaguedad se basa en una indeterminación determinada en la aplicación de ciertos términos por parte de los hablantes nativos.The two main problems for the supevaluationationist approach to vagueness are deciding which precifications are admissible and unlimited higher-order vagueness. Resorting to the use of vague terms by the competent linguistic community the extension of a term can be sharply divided, making precise in which cases it applies definitely, when it applies indefinitely and when it is undetermined whether it applies. This produces two orders of vagueness, and as a result sorties arguments are blocked. Finally, it is enquired what semantic fits better to second order vagueness. Vagueness is based on a determined indeteminacy concerning the application of certain terms by native speakers.