Responding to criticism of my Vital Conflicts in Medical Ethics, this article corrects misrepresentations and answers objections. The core of the debate is the moral category of “direct killing” as opposed to “indirect.” The article argues that critics beg the question by simply presupposing, instead of argumentatively defending, the very physicalist understanding of “directness” which the book has shown to be untenable. This article clarifies the intentional meaning of “direct” and what it means to choose something as a means; it also argues that this does not imply a subjectivist conception of morality, and refutes objections to the view that the moral evil of killing is constituted by its opposition to justice. It finally shows why this is essentially an argument against proportionalism and in defense of the core teaching of Veritatis splendor. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 (Autumn 2011): 519–540.

There are two competing accounts for a theory for human action proposed by Catholic theologians working within the received moral tradition today: a hylomorphic account and an intentional account. In this article, the author compares each of the rival theories for its ability to explain both the structure and morality of the human acts surrounding the elective termina­tion of the pregnancy of a woman with pulmonary arterial hypertension. This scenario of PAH is a superb test case to compare the explanatory power of the two rival action theories. The author’s analysis reveals that the hylomorphic account is the superior account, which can explain better not only the norma­tive conclusions of the Catholic moral tradition but also our lived experience as acting persons in a world governed by cause-and-effect relationships. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 (Autumn 2011): 503–518.

What insights into Church teaching can be drawn from the biblical account of Abraham and Sarah’s experience with surrogate pregnancy? When Sarah’s maid, Hagar, conceives Abraham’s son Ishmael, negative conse­quences ensue. Hagar’s contempt for Sarah incites Sarah’s jealousy. Sarah’s abuse of Hagar leads Hagar to run away. Abraham is forced to banish Hagar and his son Ismael. These unhappy repercussions arise from the fact that surrogacy violates God’s plan for marriage and for the dignity of the human person. Although reproductive technologies continue to advance, human nature remains the same. The lessons learned from Abraham, Sarah, Isaac, Hagar, and Ishmael’s experience with surrogacy can be profitably applied to Church teaching on marriage and reproductive technologies. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 (Autumn 2011): 443–451.

By analogy to justifications offered for craniotomy by Catholic moralists (e.g., Germain Grisez and Rev. Martin Rhonheimer), a recent instance of casuistry (by the moral theologian M. Therese Lysaught) attempts to apply double-effect reasoning and, separately, the concept of a vital conflict to justify dilation and curettage in order to preserve the life of a pregnant woman. This paper examines and rejects these bases for justifying craniotomy and D&C. It concludes with a consideration of Pope John Paul II’s discussion of moral martyrdom in Veritatis splendor. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 (Autumn 2011): 453–463.

Many churches are being asked to support new environmental initiatives, including those of the new food movement. In today’s cultural environment, it requires courage even to raise a question about programs to save the planet, protect helpless animals, or feed developing nations. Yet it is important for Christians to be aware of the agenda behind these initiatives, which looks to creation not for visible signs of God’s power and divinity but with a view to immortalizing the earth itself as the source of life. It sees man not as uniquely made in the image and likeness of God, with the responsibility for stewardship over His creation, but as an animal himself, co-equal with other animals. Environmentalism has become in effect a new religion, with the food movement its frontier mission. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 (Autumn 2011): 465–475.

As the notion of artificial moral agency gains popularity among ethicists, it threatens the unique status of the human person as a responsible moral agent. The philosophy of ontocentrism, popularized by Luciano Floridi, argues that biocentrism is too restrictive and must yield to a new philosophical vision that endows all beings with some intrinsic value. Floridi’s macroethics also regards more sophisticated digital entities such as robots as accountable moral agents. To refute these principles, this paper turns to the thought of Karol Wojtyla, who argued cogently for an intimate correlation between personal action (actus personae) and moral agency. By examining the distinguishing characteristics of personal action, we can ascertain the necessary conditions of moral agency and demonstrate why artificial entities do not meet those condi­tions. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 (Autumn 2011): 479–501.