Modern science provides the philosophy of religion with new perspectives and bodies of evidence for researching religion. Anthropology, for example, is helpful when we consider the relation of language and religion, and recent research in the philosophy of religion has been occupied with problems created by the distinctively religious uses of language. Language and action based on the assumptions of Western culture could, however, be obstacles to grasping the essence of the faith in other contexts. I argue that methodological pluralism should be employed by philosophers, theologians, and writers, because human and religious experience is irremediably pluralistic.

The distinction between hard and soft facts has been used by compatibilists to argue that God's divine foreknowledge is not incompatible with human free will. The debate over this distinction has ignored the question of the justification of divine knowledge. I argue that the distinction between hard and soft facts is illusory because the existence of soft facts presupposes that justification exists. Moreover, if the hard fact /soft fact distinction collapses, then God justifiably knows all future events, and human beings cannot possess free will.

This paper traces the philosophical sources of one of the central Christian doctrines concerning deity-the doctrine of the Trinity - from the classical Greek period through to Justin Martyr (114¬ 165 C.E.). A key figure in this continuous line of thought is the Greek Middle Platonic philosopher Numenius of Apamea (fl. ca 150 C.EJ, who followed the Platonic tradition of Xenocrates of Chalcedon (d. 314 B.C.E.).

James's philosophy of religion reveals a great deal about his general philosophical position. Moreover, it provides insights concerning the epistemic priority of experience and feeling, the role of faith in the justification of belief, the nature of religious truth, and the limits of philosophic rationality. This essay tries to explain what it means, on James's view, to see the world in religious terms, and defends his pragmatic argument regarding the justification of belief.

What do theodicies do? This paper argues that we can evaluate and respond to theodicies more effectively if we ask, as pragmatists, what problems we are trying to solve, whether we solve them effectively, and whether these are the problems we should be addressing. Some maintain that, beyond defending religious beliefs, theodicies also address deep emotional needs. I argue that we would do better to abandon theodicies of hidden meaning, acknowledge honestly that bad things happen, and seek comfort and meaning by bringing about whatever good is possible in the situation.

Many philosophers of religion are unaware of research done on comparative religions, and continue to use language and to address issues that distort the nature of human religious endeavor. Despite work by Cantwell Smith, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgensteinians, and their critics, these scholars continue to confuse faith with (propositional) belief, and miss the significance of the dynamic nature of religious culture in historic context. In this paper, I defend Walter Kaufmann's view that religion addresses an essential human ontological need, on the grounds that it makes sense of the immense diversity of religious expression and endeavor.

This paper seeks to address the relationship between two key areas of contention figuring in the communicative realities in which language is used and the morality of action: the role of silence and the role of power and the lack thereof. It is proposed that action per se becomes problematic under practical manifestations of silence such as inarticulacy (which is aggravated by major asymmetries in the global politics of language) and ignorance, and that even when action is possible, deciding on what would constitute morally right action under such circumstances remains a question. Furthermore, another key hindrance to action for greater justice and equality is constituted by lack of empowerment. This paper presents the view that a beginning towards answering such questions can be made on the basis of the recognition of the universality of human creativity, in the domains of both language and constructive action, and the fundamental universality of human morality with culture- and communityspecific modes of putting that morality into practice.

By analysis of the connection between the "lower" man and the "higher" man within the human person, I have endeavored to show their "coincidence" in the unfolding of the novum or a good conscience. I have also endeavored to show that it can be aroused by the discovery of "homo absconditus" or of "Deus Absconditus." In this way we become able to approach the Divine. Moreover, in each infrastructure there appears the tendency towards "personalization" by "right" of its reality or existence within the personal human being.

I argue contra Larry Laudan and Robert Nozick that valuable goals that are impossible (i.e., ideal goals) can be rational, if they are approachable without a known limit. It is argued that Laudan proscribes as irrational impossible goals because he holds a confused scheme for means/ends rationality. Moreover it is argued that it is counterintuitive to hold ideal goals to be irrational. On the other hand I argue that Nozick's generalization of utility theory so as to admit symbolic utilities will allow the characterization of ideal goals as rational.

One of the most influential ideas in recent discussions in political philosophy and philosophy of values has been Isaiah Berlin's value pluralism. Given that different ways of living embody different applications of values, it is really difficult to talk about objectivity in the domain of morals. But if we reject the existence of criteria that allow us to judge among different moral proposals, we are led to recognize the prejudiced character of our convictions: their ethnocentric character. In my opinion, this weakens our commitment to those convictions, to the extent that we are not obliged to follow them. At the same time, if that incommensurability is at the root of any interpretation of values, we cannot choose between different ways of understanding pluralism and we cannot evaluate the pluralistic model itself. Saying that some sort of pluralism is good for us if, for us, some sort of pluralism is good, is only proposing an empty tautology. In the end I will argue that we can accept the existence of a sort of moral equilibrium that can allow us to talk of moral progress.

Values are essentially interpretive: they can, even must be interpreted and can and should be understood as (somehow socially or personally standardized) interpretive constructs of a specific kind and according to different types to be distinguished and classified within an hierarchical typology. There is a special connection between values and actions as well as their characteristic of being related to their ascription to persons, goods, events etc. This connection is indeed covered, borne or carried out by interpretation. In fact, any ascription of a value concept or predicate whatsoever is dependent on a structure and hierarchy of normative and in part descriptive schemes of at times conventional and dispositional scheme-interpretations. Generally speaking, the thesis is that the methodological model of interpretive constructs (scheme-interpretationism) can be thoroughly applied to the concept and usage of values. Social values are then in this sense socially originated, institutionally sanctioned or standardized interpretational constructs of a social character, notably for social comparisons in using and establishing preferences for a kind of (limited) uniformity and expectability and predictability of social behavior and actions.

This paper examines a famous argument for the Buddhist doctrine of anatta ("no self) according to which nothing possesses self-nature or substantial reality. The argument unfolds during a debate between the monk Nagasena and King Milinda (Menandros). Nagasena's challenge to the King is that he demonstrate the substantial reality of the chariot in which he arrived at their meeting when said chariot is (i) not identical to any one of its proper parts, (ii) not identical to the mereological sum of its proper parts, and (iii) not identical to anything wholly distinct from its parts. After presenting the argument and defending it against a plausible objection, I argue that it cannot be taken to show that persons lack self-nature.

Applied to evaluative properties the supervenience thesis is customarily understood as expressing two intuitions: (i) the idea that there is some kind of dependence between the (supervenient) value of an object and some (or all) of the natural properties of the object; (ii) the idea that if you assert that x is valuable and if you agree that y is relevantly similar to x, with regard to natural properties, you must be prepared to assert that y too is valuable. It is argued that the influential account of supervenience by R. M. Hare is problematic in that it only expresses the latter but not the former intuition. Two solutions to this problem are outlined, one of which ought to be endorsable by a prescriptivist such as Hare.

This paper compares and contrasts Nietzsche's conceptualization of the "artistic Socrates" with Kierkegaard's vision of the "knight of faith". The paper argues that Nietzsche and Kierkegaard attempted to transcend the rational-ethical sphere of human action in favor of a more spontaneous, yet deeper understanding of the universe. Nietzsche believes that the thread of causality and the principle of sufficient reason, embodied as they are in the personality of Socrates, are not capable of explaining our existence in its entirety. Hence he suggests the tragic insight and the subsequent artistic worldview as a remedy. Nietzsche's vision is encapsulated in his eulogy of madness and humor as manifestations of an artistic worldview with the tragic insight. The paper argues that Kierkegaard deals with the same problem that Nietzsche faces in that he also wants to incorporate the recognition of the world beyond rational comprehension into our understanding of the Universe. Hence, both philosophers are attempting to comprehend what is beyond human comprehension. The paper claims that Kierkegaard is more successful in this endeavour because he introduces the virtue of the absurd as an organizing principle of the irrational space (space beyond the Grenzenpunkte). With a movement of infinite resignation the knight of faith renounces the world and moves beyond the Grenzenpunkte, but then with a movement of faith he embraces back the world he renounced. The theme that captures the condition of the knight of faith is anxiety and fear, rather than madness and humor as it was with Nietzsche. The paper concludes by emphasizing Kierkegaard's vision for offering a more comprehensive understanding of the Universe and of the human agency and action operating within it.

The aim of my paper is to represent Zygmunt Bauman's formulation of personal identity and to present its cultural weight today. Bauman defines a post-modern personal identity as opposed to the modern personal identity. These conceptions of identity express views of man and the world held in two different periods—modernity and postmodernity. In modernity man is perceived as a being who in accordance with his "volitions" and "ideas" creates (and controls) the world and himself. In post-modernity man is seen as a being who in the face of the defeat of the modern project refuses to create himself, in other words refuses to create his personal identity. This paper presents the poor structural integration of personal identity in the context of its creation. The author of this paper perceives philosophical considerations relating to personal identity as parallel to philosophical investigations relating to the nature of truth.

The official explanations the US gave for the September 11th terrorist attacks are not in fact explanatory, and there has been popular condemnation of those who attempt to offer causal explanations for the attacks. This paper is an investigation of the difficulty people have with finding and accepting explanations for acts they strongly condemn. Using research in the philosophy of mind and moral psychology, I distinguish between explanations for actual immoral behavior and explanations for fictional immoral behavior. The difficulty with accepting the existence of an explanation for an immoral action is based on the difficulty we have identifying with the immoral person. Fiction gives us the narrative required to engage in this imagination, and thus facilitates the construction of explanations. I conclude that rather than being immoral to construct an explanation for the terrorist attacks, it is the first step toward fighting terrorism.