The paper presents four stages of author’s epistemological experience: Roman Ingarden’s autonomous theory of knowledge, the anti-naturalistic theory of knowledge by Roderick Chisholm, the naturalistic epistemology by Alvin Goldman, and the epistemology of classical problems of truth and skepticism. The conclusion is the following: epistemology should make use of human knowledge results, especially cognitive sciences and reflect on the problem of truth, the challenge of skepticism, the possibility of knowledge and human cognitive condition (science, religion, art). The social role of the epistemologist is not to resolve all these existentially important questions but to be an expert (to know the state of discussion and to deliver his/her opinions).

I argue that philosophical reflection on cognition and knowledge should not be shaped into an epistemological theory in a strict sense. It ought to be understood as a hermeneutic study of the social and dynamic (historical) nature of cognition.

The fundamental—from the philosophy of science point of view—question of the growth of scientific knowledge implicates epistemological investigations of the creation context in science. In the paper I am arguing this thesis.

It is shown that the program of naturalizing of epistemology, that is, the program of the whole substitution of epistemology for sciences or for the humanities is not realizable. Naturalized epistemology includes metaphysical (in Kant’s sense: synthetic, speculative, a priori) claims which save its partly autonomous philosophical status. The result presented in the paper does not exclude the naturalizing program. It leads, instead, to a modified, attenuated version of it—such one which permits to open epistemology by transferring it in multi-facet vivid philosophical investigations juxtaposed with science and the humanities. The postulated attenuated version of naturalizing does not result in destroying epistemology as a special philosophical domain of investigations, not substitutable for sciences.

The paper presents a survey of traditional problems tackled by epistemology throughout its history, especially its meta-theoretical inclination as well as the old dilemma of its normative versus descriptive nature. I sketch the prevailing models of epistemological normativity (epistemic values such as truth, falsity, justification, or evidence etc.), and show how they function, what their essence and genesis are, how they change and what influences them. I also consider the utility of epistemology for science, education and practice in respect of its critical disposition toward cognition, knowledge, and communication. Finally, I outline some perspectives epistemology could open if it would really analyze and predict the complex and manifold human cognitive phenomena.

Epistemology, confronted with a rapid development of individual branches of science, has been pressed to establish its own status and position as well as to define its relation with science. The multiple perspectives on this issue can be grouped into two major positions: integrism (postulates a close co-existence between epistemology and science) and separatism (argues in favour of a full independence of science and epistemology).In the paper I analyse the two views and try to prove that the debate between integrism and separatism cannot be resolved, as the two approaches belong to different and incompatible philosophical traditions: analytical and transcendental. In the article these issues are examined, and arguments in favour of the separatist view are offered. It is argued for the clear separation of epistemology from science.

A woman’s perspective, or the so called feminist standpoint, needs to be incorporated into a theory of cognition to highlight its particular stance, to counter the present tendency to expect special advantages in cognition connected with gender specific (feminine) experience, which though not yet sufficiently recognized, is often neglected or denied to women.The most clarified stances, however, are not claiming the right to universality, considering the rather important anthropological/contextual differences between the subject/s of knowledge concerning race, ethnicity and sexual orientation. If ever to look for pragmatic justifications feminist epistemology needs to be a philosophical discipline, in order to indicate new ways/directions through a detailed critique of traditional knowledge and science, as well as present new goals and methods, especially for particular disciplines with anthropological problems.The humanitarian mission in the project of “imprinting women into the process and result of cognition” one can consider as simply an additional factor justifying the development of philosophical particularism in gynocentric studies following the democratization of recent formulations and institutions regarding knowledge/cognition.

The paper discusses basic philosophical assumptions of the new conception of scientific research which tends to possibly complete automation of research. The theoretical underpinnings of reliable inquiry sets a framework for a comprehensive spectrum of attainable solutions to a research problem formulated in the framework given the theoretical assumptions and available evidence. The framework is general, but the success criteria are adjustable to a domain of inquiry. Research on causal dependencies in macroeconomics seems a successful application of the framework.

I investigate the relationship between traditional philosophical epistemology and cognitive science. I start my considerations with the following questions: does the development of cognitive science require any revision of epistemology, akin to the revision required in some areas analytic philosophy after the emergence of quantum physics? Does cognitive science continue philosophical epistemology or is the complete break with traditional philosophical approaches?

I discuss the limits of Ingarden’s phenomenology of perception from a naturalistic perspective. Ingarden did not propose any proper method of the realization of the applied theory of perception (critics of perception). This situation enables to apply empirical data from cognitive neurosciences. The applied procedure shows that basic components of the phenomenology of perception are not valid.

In this paper I make a distinction between some characteristic features of human activity which not only challenge the possibility of being explained (reduced) in terms of cause and effect relationship, or by universal regularities, but which assign an element of interpretation and understanding to every human activity. My aim is to demonstrate that it is not the understanding that is submitted to scientific explanation but that every scientific explanation contains the component of interpretation and is evaluated from the viewpoint of our everyday, pre-reflexive being in the world and commonly (often implicite) accepted contexts and assumptions. In other words, we have to constantly refer to the existing background—a network of unspecifiable beliefs and practices. I would like to point out, after Charles Taylor and Hubert Dreyfus, that the responsible epistemology of the humanities must overcome a series of assumptions of modern and contemporarycognitive theory which appeared to be surprisingly congruent with the classic thinking paradigm concerning natural sciences. Last but not least, I would like to prove, relying upon involved epistemology or hermeneutic proto-epistemology, the possibility of mutual symbiotic relationship between the perspective of natural sciences and the humanities.

The issue of infinity appeared in cosmology in the form of a question on spatial and time finiteness or infinity of the universe. Recently, more and more talking is going on about “other universes” (different ones from “our”), the number of which may be infinite. Speculations on this topic emerged in effect of the discussions on the issue of the anthropic principle, and the so-called inflation scenario. In truth, this kind of speculations are hardly recognized as scientific theories, however, they may be included in a sort of “scientific fringe” fulfilling a beneficial heuristic function.All of the speculations regarding numerous universes boil down to the juggling of probabilities, i.e. to the applying of the theory of probability to the universes’ set. However, without probabilistic measure being introduced onto this “set” (as it is not known whether it is a set in a technical sense of this term)—and there is no knowledge at all as to how to do this—such considerations may not go beyond a vague intuition.The producing of other universes usually results from an assumption that the disturbing of original circumstances, of values of physical constants, or of other parameters characterizing the universe is possible. On the other hand, the idea of the final theory seems to assume that the mathematical structure of this theory should be rigid, i.e. that the disturbing of its parameters leads on to the very same structure. This would have eliminated the possibility of the existence of other universes.The idea of infinite number of universes sometimes has an anti-theological undertone: there is no need for assuming purposeful acting of the Creator, since all possibilities are fulfilled. The reaction of a theologian may be as follows: Just the same, God may create just a single universe, as much as an infinite number of universes. What’s more, one may risk saying that God is not interested in nothing that may be short of infinity.

Discussions on original sin conduced over the last 50 years yield the conclusion that the second half of the 20th century brought about the most far-reaching changes in the perception of original sin since the times of St. Augustine. In spite of these profound changes, the matter in question continues to give rise to controversies. Thus, Alfred Vanneste considers the omission of monogenism in the Catechism of the Catholic Church 2 to be a gross oversight on the part of the drafting committee. During deliberations on the transformations of modern culture, an issue may arise, which implied that the notion of human nature encumbered with the weakness of original sin is one of the truths of highest empirical confirmation. It should be noted, however, that an immense diversity of standpoints In expressing his truth exist.

The time of mechanics is the eternal and unchangeable time of Parmenides, it is Plato’s idea of time, whereas the time of thermodynamics is Heraclitus’ flowing time, Thomas Aquinas’ time measured by various phenomena. I once wrote [2] that people who are not used to a physicist’s way of thinking are (at best) confused by the idea of a symmetrical time of mechanics. Physicists on the other hand often believe that the time of thermodynamics (irreversibility) does not really exist, and is merely an illusion. It seems therefore that both of these aspects of time, the time of mechanics and the time of thermodynamics, should be treated as complementary, in anticipation of a future “theory of everything” which will somehow reconcile them.

The paper consists of two parts, outlined in the title.I. In the historical science time appears as an element of the historian’s workshop. The historian collects source information, evaluates them and assigns respective dates. Only on the ground of thus “processed” sources may he reproduce the past: events and longer development processes, setting them in time. This dated time is understood colloquially as something objective, which runs one way and may be measured.II. A historian who studies the past reality depends on the extent to which those sources are preserved. As a result of their interpretation, with the use of increasingly excellent research methods, he reproduces that reality. He must carry out an ongoing selection of historical facts found. This exposes him to temptations of such selection of those facts so as to adjust the historical knowledge to serve well the national interests, his own political opinions, etc. In this way the historian exerts influence on social awareness, which may consists of various myths and stereotypes, which sometimes lead to negative social behaviors: aggression, chauvinism, etc. Therefore, for researcher honesty’s sake and in the sense of moral responsibility, he must be careful to be as impartial as possible in his work.

In his classic essay Man and Time, Roman Ingarden outlines two contradictory experiences of time. The paper presents and investigates them.

Despite changeability of the world, the human mind also ponders on those quantities that remain constant over time. This was the case in ancient times, in the middle ages, and the same applies in modern physics. This paper discusses i.a. Zenon paradoxes, the principle of inertia, and the Emma Noether theorem, ending with the modern, so-called Zeno’s quantum effect. The foot-notes concern the ancient “Achilles” paradox, spot speed, as well as some of the facts taken out of the life-history of Emma Noether, as well as the example of applying her theorem.