“To see is to imagine. And to imagine, is to see.”Perception and Imaginary in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accords such a phenomenological and ontological priority to perception that this privilege might lead him to minimize the importance of theimaginary in our relationship with the world. In fact, in the work published during his life, the theme of the imaginary does not occupy a large place, and its conceptual elaboration remains little visible. A reading of his posthumous publications and of his unpublished papers leads to a more subtle landscape, inwhich the philosopher destabilizes our common oppositions between real and imaginary, as well as those between the imaginary and truth. From themanuscripts from the end of the 1940s on, Merleau-Ponty expands his inquiry into perception in two complementary directions: the intuition of a form of coextensivity between perceptive life and imaginary life, but also between perception and expression. These intuitions, never disavowed, would continueto deepen up through the late unpublished ontological works. They find a guiding thread in the contestation of Sartre’s separation between the real andthe imaginary, and they open out onto the outline of a complex link between truth, imagination, and expression. Merleau-Ponty pretended to approve of thework of The Imaginary all that which is actually moving beyond it, in the direction most opposite to this essay’s own aims: “To see is to imagine. And toimagine is to see.” This split with Sartre finds one of its pivots in the phenomenological characterization of vision as a surpassing of the observable, a surpassing that would touch on an essential dimension of being and of truth.“Vedere è immaginare. E immaginare, è vedere”.Percezione e immaginario in Merleau-PontyMerleau-Ponty accorda alla percezione una tale priorità, fenomenologica e ontologica, che questo privilegio potrebbe condurre a minimizzare l’importanzadell’immaginario nel nostro rapporto al mondo. Di fatto, nell’opera pubblicata in vita, il tema dell’immaginario non occupa un grande spazio, e la suaelaborazione concettuale resta poco visibile. La lettura delle pubblicazioni postume e degli inediti conduce a un disegno più sottile, che vede il filosofo destabilizzare le nostre comuni opposizioni fra reale e immaginario così come quelle fra immaginario e verità. A partire dai manoscritti della fine degli anniQuaranta, Merleau-Ponty allarga la sua indagine sulla percezione in due direzioni complementari: verso l’intuizione di una forma di co-estensività fravita percettiva e vita immaginaria, ma altresì fra percezione e espressione. Mai smentite, queste intuizioni vanno approfondendosi fino ai tardi inediti“ontologici”. Esse trovano un filo conduttore nella messa in causa della separazione operata da Sartre fra reale e immaginario, e sfociano nell’abbozzodi un legame complesso fra verità, immaginario e espressione. Merleau-Ponty finge di “ratificare” il lavoro de L’Immaginario, in realtà sorpassandolo nelladirezione il più possibile opposta allo sforzo compiuto da questo stesso saggio: «edere è immaginare. E immaginare è vedere». Questo distanziarsi da Sartretrova uno dei suoi “cardini” nella caratterizzazione fenomenologica della visione come superamento dell’osservabile, un superamento che riguarderebbeuna dimensione essenziale dell’essere come della verità.

Merleau-Ponty, Theatre and Politics.Virtue and Plasticity of the ImaginaryWe will attempt, starting from a course given at the Sorbonne and devoted to the work of the actor, to develop the meaning of the theatrical metaphor in the political philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. Even if the presence of the theater in his philosophy does not seem evident at first glance, it is possible to negotiate his political thought from the metaphor of the theater. This metaphor even allows us to clarify the meaning of a well known expression from the Preface of Signs: “virtue without resignation.” We will then construe the concept of the “plasticity of the imaginary” so as to show how a reflection on the theater opens up a certain understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s ethics.Merleau-Ponty, teatro e politica.Virtù e plasticità dell’ immaginarioA partire da un corso tenuto alla Sorbona e consacrato al mestiere dell’attore, proveremo a sviluppare il senso della metafora teatrale nella filosofi a politica diMerleau-Ponty. Anche se la presenza del teatro nella sua filosofi a non sembra a un primo approccio evidente, è possibile attraversare il suo pensiero politico proprio a partire dalla metafora del teatro. Quest’ultima permette di chiarire il significato di un’espressione ben nota della fine della Prefazione a Segni: quella di «virtù senza alcuna rassegnazione». Si elabora allora il concetto di «plasticità dell’immaginario» per mostrare come la riflessione sul teatro offra a una determinata comprensione dell’etica merleau-pontiana.

M. Merleau-Ponty and F. H. Jacobi’s Revelation against Kantian IntellectualismThe goal of this article is to shed light on the neglected connection between Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961). It will be shown through certain themes –I) being in the world, II) description, III) reflexion, IV) revelation and the V) primacy of perception – how Merleau-Ponty echoes Jacobi’s criticism of German Idealism during the Pantheist Quarrel, particularly towards Immanuel Kant’s intellectualist stance, two centuries prior to the Phénoménologie de la perception. Through a historical and philological lens, this article aims to specifically demonstrate how Merleau-Ponty and Jacobi share a common ontology against Kantian intellectualism.La rivelazione di M. Merleau-Ponty e F. H. Jacobi contro l’intellettualismo kantianoL’obiettivo di questo articolo è chiarire la trascurata relazione tra Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) e Maurice Merlau-Ponty (1908-1961). Attraverso l’analisi di alcune tematiche – l’essere nel mondo, la descrizione, la riflessione, la rivelazione –, mostreremo come nella filosofia di Merleau-Ponty riecheggi la critica all’idealismo tedesco formulata da Jacobi all’epoca della disputa sul panteismo e diretta, in particolar modo e con due secoli di anticipo rispetto alla Fenomenologia della Percezione, alle posizioni intellettualiste di Kant. Grazie ad una lettura storica e filologica, questo articolo tenta di dimostrare come Merleau-Ponty e Jacobi condividano un’ontologia comune in opposizione all’intellettualismo kantiano.

The Chiasm of the Visible and the Imaginary.Sketches for a Phenomenological Approach to PhotographyIn the digital age today, photographic images appear more and more through a virtual space; their appearance takes place more and more throughan “immaterial medium”. This renders the status of a photographic image more ambiguous, if not more enigmatic. Is a photograph merely a journalistic tool?Is photographic activity primarily mimetic which is meant to fulfill the function of unconcealment of the truth of the given state of things in the world? Or thistruth function can only be fulfilled by the assistance of the viewer’s gaze and the viewing subject’s narrative which is deployed not only according to whatis visible and present, but also according to what is invisible and absent on the surface of the photograph itself? If such is the case, doesn’t a photographalso comprise a hermeneutical and even deconstructive dimension? On the other hand, photography is more and more considered as a kind of artwork inits own right as it can awaken pleasure, imagination and emotion: in short, a photograph is a work which exhibits an affective intentionality. What is therelation between the representational, artistic, affective and critical functions of a photograph? Is there any tension between these functions? This articleattempts to answer some of these problems from a phenomenological approach.Il chiasma del visibile e dell’immaginario.Lineamenti di un approccio fenomenologico alla fotografiaOggi, nell’era digitale, le immagini fotografiche ci vengono incontro sempre più spesso attraverso un medium immateriale. Lo statuto ontologico diun’immagine fotografica diviene così sempre più ambiguo, se non propriamente enigmatico. Una foto è un semplice strumento d’informazione ? L’attivitàfotografi ca è prioritariamente mimetica? La sua funzione principale è quella di rivelare la verità di un certo stato di cose nel mondo? Oppure questa funzionedi veridizione ha bisogno, per realizzarsi, del contributo dello sguardo del soggetto che contempla la fotografia, dell’apporto di un discorso che investe non solo ciò che è visibile e presente, ma anche ciò che è invisibile e assente dalla superficie fotografica? La fotografia, in altri termini, non comporta sempre una dimensione ermeneutica o decostruttiva ? D’altra parte, la fotografia viene sempre più considerata come un’opera d’arte in senso pieno, come un’opera che si fa portatrice di un’intenzionalità affettiva, capace di risvegliare la nostra immaginazione e le nostre emozioni. Quale rapporto sussiste tra le diverse funzioni che una fotografia può svolgere, ad esempio quella rappresentativa, quella artistica, quella affettiva, quella critica? L’articolo cerca di rispondere ad alcuni di questi problemi a partire dall’approccio fenomenologico di Merleau-Ponty.

Dans cet article, je présente le principe d’irréductibilité de Bruno Latour et je démontre dans quelle mesure cette thèse de l’irréduction amène à la défense d’une ontologie relationnelle, autrement dit, une ontologie basée sur la réalité des relations qui composent notre monde, de même que sur une conception relative et graduelle des modes d’existence. Par ailleurs, je propose de tirer les conséquences de ce positionnement ontologique pour l’étude des interactions et, plus généralement, des phénomènes communicationnels.In this paper, I present Bruno Latour’s principle of Irreducibility, and I explain the extent to which his thesis leads to the defense of a relational ontology, that is, an ontology based on the reality of the relations that compose our world, as well as on a gradual and relative view of modes of existence. I then draw the consequences of this ontological positioning for the study of interaction and, more generally, communicative phenomena.

Les relations entre les travaux de Latour et la sémiotique de Greimas ont été explicites depuis les années 1970. Le présent article est consacré à la manière dont Latour reprend et fait évoluer la théorie sémiotique de l’énonciation, depuis « A Relativistic Account of Einstein’s Relativity » et « Petite philosophie de l’énonciation » jusqu’à l’Enquête sur les modes d’existence, où il utilise la théorie de l’énonciation pour fonder sa théorie des modes d’existence. Sera ainsi retracée l’évolution de la théorie de l’énonciation, tant chez Latour qu’en sémiotique. Nous montrerons que dans les deux cas, on peut décrire cette évolution comme un mouvement de l’énonciation énoncée vers l’énonciation pratique.Since the late 1970s, Latour’s work has had close ties with Greimas’ semiotics. This article is devoted to Latour's further consideration and development of the semiotic theory of enunciation, beginning with « A Relativistic Account of Einstein’s Relativity » and « Petite philosophie de l’énonciation » all the way up to the Inquiry Into Modes of Existence, where he uses the theory of enunciation to establish his theory of modes of existence. The evolution of the theory of enunciation is charted through both Latour’s work and semiotic theory. We argue that in both cases this evolution can be described as a movement from uttered enunciation to practical enunciation.

Cet article cherche à réévaluer le rapport de Bruno Latour à la philosophie à travers le motif de la cartographie dans son oeuvre. Si les cartes y constituent d’abord des exemples particulièrement frappants de la production scientifique de vérité, ses derniers écrits suggèrent un rôle beaucoup plus central pour la cartographie. La pensée latourienne, dans le cadre du réchauffement climatique, appelle en effet une philosophie cartographique, basée sur la notion de territoire, et développant à la fois une méthode « ambulatoire » et un projet conceptuel qui consiste à résister à ce que Whitehead appelait la « bifurcation de la nature ».This article seeks to reassess Latour’s relation to philosophy through an examination of the many references to cartography in his work. Whereas in his early writings maps were treated as striking examples of the way science produces truth, his latest writings ascribe a more central function to cartography. During this time of global warming, Latour’s thinking calls for a cartographic philosophy rooted in the notion of territory, which develops both an “ambulatory” method and a conceptual project of resistance to what Whitehead called the “bifurcation of nature”.

S’appuyant sur trois enquêtes de terrain qui portent sur le façonnage d’êtres numériques (algorithmes, bases de données, objets numérisés), le présent article traite des relectures méthodologiques que l’on peut faire de trois contributions de Latour à l’enquête ethnographique. 1. Il montre que l’accent mis sur les séquences d’action permet d’engager une enquête systématique qui rend compte de trajectoires. 2. Il avance que le concept d’actant sensibilise à l’éventail des entités agissantes qui infléchissent ces trajectoires, de même qu’au peuplement de situations apparemment inoccupées. 3. Il soutient que les concepts d’association, de traduction et de médiation permettent de connecter différentes situations et actions localisées. Ultimement, ces trois apports éclairent les agencements et les réagencements.Rooted in three fieldwork studies that examine the shaping of digital information (algorithms, databases, digitized objects), this article discusses new methodological readings of three of Latour’s contributions to ethnographic inquiry. 1. It shows that focusing on sequences of action allows one to engage in a systematic investigation that accounts for trajectories. 2. It proposes that the concept of actant makes one aware of the whole set of active entities that influence these trajectories on the one hand, and the populating of apparently empty situations on the other. 3. It maintains that the concepts of association, translation, and mediation make it possible to connect various localized situations and actions. Ultimately, these three contributions shed light on arrangements and rearrangements.

Cet article se propose d’explorer différentes conceptions de la notion de porte-parole dans le travail de Bruno Latour, ainsi que les enjeux de communication et représentation qu’elles soulèvent du point de vue d’une approche rhétorique de la communication. En tant que maître de la traduction, diplomate ou partie prenante du cercle politique, le ou la porte-parole est essentiellement un médiateur par qui un collectif peut se former et agir publiquement. Nous proposons d’étayer notre discussion par un examen des expérimentations et mutations récentes de la figure du porte-parole politique dans les mouvements sociaux horizontaux, tel que Occupy, et les organisations horizontales telle que la CLASSE.This article explores different conceptions of the notion of spokesperson in Bruno Latour’s work, as well as the issues of communication and representation these conceptions raise for a rhetorical approach to communication. As a master of translation, a diplomat, or a key component of a political circle, the spokesperson is essentially a mediator through whom a collective establishes itself and acts publicly. We further develop our discussion of these different conceptions by examining recent experiments and changes in the figure of the political spokesperson in horizontal social movements such as Occupy, and horizontal organizations such as CLASSE.

De Nous n’avons jamais été modernes jusqu’à l’Enquête sur les modes d’existence, Latour s’est toujours positionné sur le terrain de l’anthropologie, articulant une anthropologie comme méthode d’enquête avec une anthropologie comme objet de l’enquête. Rappelant les thèses de Foucault qui décrivent l’homme de la modernité comme « doublet empirico-transcendantal », et s’appuyant sur une lecture de Kant qui privilégie l’antinomie liberté-déterminisme, cet article montre que la modernité est passée d’une dominante anthropologique disjonctive séparant les êtres à une dominante conjonctive dans laquelle ils se situent sur un continuum allant de l’hétéronomie à l’autonomie, où nature et culture s’entrelacent…. Loin de rompre avec la modernité, la pensée de Latour serait on ne peut plus moderne, radicalisant le passage de la disjonction vers la conjonction, mais s’empêtrant dans les antinomies de sa propre radicalité.Beginning with We Have Never Been Modern up to An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, Latour has always positioned himself in the field of anthropology, articulating anthropology both as a method of inquiry and as the object of inquiry. Through recourse to Foucault's claim that modernity’s human is an “empiricaltranscendantal doublet”, and based on a reading of Kant that champions the freedom-determinism antinomy, this article shows that modernity has shifted from a “disjunctive” anthropological trend that separates beings into a conjunctive trend that locates them on a continuum going from heteronomy to autonomy, where nature and culture intertwine…. Far from breaking with modernity, Latour’s thinking could not be more modern, since it radicalizes the shift from disjunction to conjunction, though at the cost of tangling up in the antinomies of its own radicalism.

Malgré l’extrapolation parfois violente qu’opère Hegel, son traitement des découvertes physiologiques de Bichat montre à quel point il demeure soucieux de penser la compatibilité entre sciences empiriques et sciences spéculatives ou philosophiques. Loin de déduire un concept de la nature a priori indépendamment de toute considération pour les travaux de son temps, Hegel est au contraire un lecteur attentif des sciences en plein essor. Son système doit ainsi se comprendre à l’aune d’un dialogue constant avec les sciences dans lequel la philosophie se nourrit des nouvelles découvertes scienti 􀏔iques tout en jetant une lumière nouvelle sur celles-ci. C’est un tel phénomène, résultat du dialogue qu’entretient Hegel avec Bichat, que j’expose ici en m’intéressant à la distinction bichatienne entre vie organique et vie animale et la manière dont Hegel reprend cette distinction en lui conférant une dimension résolument speculative.Despite the sometimes violent extrapolation carried out by Hegel, the way he treats Bichat’s physiological discoveries shows the extent to which he is concerned about the compatibility between the empirical sciences and the speculative/philosophical sciences. Far from deducing an a priori concept of nature with no consideration for the works of his time, Hegel is on the contrary an attentive reader of the burgeoning science. His approach must therefore be understood as a constant dialogue with science. Through this dialogue, philosophy draws on new scienti􀏔ic discoveries while simultaneously interpreting them in a new light. It is such a phenomenon, resulting from the dialogue between Hegel and Bichat, that I examine here, with a particular interest in the distinction between organic life and animal life, as held by Bichat, and the way Hegel takes this distinction and confers on it a resolutely speculative dimension.

Cet article présente une analyse du thème de la religion dans l’oeuvre de Bruno Latour. Certains commentateurs affirment que la présence persistante du thème n’est qu’une manifestation de la piété catholique résiduelle de Latour et, ce faisant, mettent en cause l’ontologie pluraliste qu’il défend. M’inscrivant en faux face à ces critiques, je suggère que ce thème a constitué un argument dominant dès les premières étapes de sa carrière. Latour propose deux définitions de la religion. La première, que j’ai nommée « la Religion », a vocation à fermer le monde pluriel. La seconde, que Latour nomme « religion comme mode d’existence », ou [REL], est une expression de ce monde pluriel et, pour cette raison, peut être qualifiée de « rationnelle ». Si on perd de vue cet aspect, on risque de se priver du potentiel de critique de la situation de la modernité séculière que nous offre sa pensée.This paper examines the theme of religion in the work of Bruno Latour. Some critics have suggested that the persistent presence of this theme is an indication of a residual Catholic piety on the part of Latour and hence that it calls into question the pluralist ontology he advocates. However, I will argue that this theme has been a concern from the earliest stages of his career. In fact, Latour identifies two forms of religion as operating in the world. The first, which I will name “Religion,” serves to close down the plurality of the world. The second, which Latour himself names “religion as a mode of existence,” or [REL], is an expression of the plural world, and can be called rational for this reason. If this point is not well understood, the potential of Latour’s work for a critique of the situation of secular modernity risks being missed.

Quand Bruno Latour introduit le « monde commun » dans son oeuvre à la fin des années 1990, ce syntagme est déjà fort connu en théorie politique où il circule largement depuis la parution en 1958 du magnum opus d’Hannah Arendt The Human Condition. Or, Latour ne se réclame pas d’Arendt quand il traite du monde commun et, s’il la mentionne à l’occasion, c’est toujours pour s’en distancer. En analysant les conceptualisations respectives de Latour et d’Arendt, le présent article vise à montrer qu’il existe bien un monde commun entre ces deux penseurs que tout semble éloigner.When Bruno Latour introduces the “common world” in his work at the end of the 1990s, this phrase is already well known in political theory thanks to the 1958 publication of Hannah Arendt’s magnum opus The Human Condition. Strangely enough, when he addresses the common world Latour does not claim to be a follower. If he mentions Arendt from time to time, it is always to distance himself from her. Through the analysis of the respective conceptualisations of Latour and Arendt, the present article aims to show that a common world does exist between these two authors who seemingly stand so far apart from one another.

Bruno Latour reconnaît l’influence de Gilbert Simondon sur son oeuvre, en particulier quant à sa compréhension de la technique. Latour semble ainsi réaliser en grande partie le programme de « non-anthropologie » de Simondon. Mais une apparente contradiction existe dans le traitement de l’énonciation par Latour : sa compréhension de la matérialité et des modes d’existence semble prendre le détour de la sémiotique. Cela a mené certains critiques à mettre en doute son approche de la matérialité. Toutefois, vue à travers la lentille de l’influence que Simondon a eue sur Latour, il est possible de relire la théorie latourienne de l’énonciation en comprenant la communication comme passage de l’action d’un être à l’autre, et la signification de cette action comme résultat de sa participation à un processus de constitution des êtres. Latour est donc résolument un penseur du décentrement de l’humain.Bruno Latour recognizes the influence of Gilbert Simondon on his work, especially with respect to his understanding of technique. Latour appears, in that sense, to actualize a large proportion of Simondon’s “non-anthropology”. Yet, what appears to be a contradiction remains in his treatment of enunciation: indeed, his understanding of materiality seems to take the detour of semiotics. This has led some critics to question his approach to materiality. However, seen through the lens of Simondon’s influence on him, it is possible to revisit Latour’s theory of enunciation and to understand communication as the passage of action from one being to the next, and signification as the outcome of action’s participation to the constitution process of a being. This way, Latour is a thinker resolutely committed to de-centering the focus of research away from human beings.

Les auteurs se penchent ici sur le droit comme « mode d’existence » des Modernes, tel que décrit par Bruno Latour dans son Enquête sur les modes d’existence (EME). Ils complètent dans un premier temps la cartographie de ce mode [DRO] et retracent le rôle joué par celui-ci dans l’Enquête de Latour. Dans un deuxième temps, ils s'interrogent sur les croisements et les harmoniques que génère ce mode [DRO] avec d’autres modes d’existence, notamment celui que Latour appelle [ORG] – le mode d’organisation éthique, sociale, commerciale. Ils articulent alors les difficultés posées par ces croisements et ces harmoniques, mais aussi ses aspects prometteurs pour l’avènement d’un nouveau droit de la Terre.The authors here reflect on the law as one of the modes of existence of the Moderns, as described in Bruno Latour’s An Inquiry into the Modes of Existence (AIME). They first seek to complete the cartography of this mode [LAW] and to retrace the role played by [LAW] in Latour’s Inquiry. Second, they reflect on the crossings and harmonics at play between [LAW] and other modes of existence, notably [ORG]—the mode of the ethical, social or commercial organization. They then articulate the difficulties posed by these crossings and harmonics, but also their promising aspects for the advent of a new law of the Earth.

La théorie du langage adoptée par Latour dans ses enquêtes tourne le dos au « linguistic turn » et revient à une conception « descriptive » du langage. Cet article vise à questionner cette hypothèse à partir d’une enquête sur son rapport au langage. L’absence de référence à la théorie des actes de langage constitue un point d’entrée à ce questionnement.The theory of language adopted by Latour turns away from "linguistic turn" and comes down to a "descriptive" conception of language. This article seeks to question this hypothesis from a survey of its relationship to language. The lack of reference to the theory of speech acts constitutes a starting point to the issue.