Transcendental theology is, as a return to the subject, an attempt to take experience seriously, because transcendental method explores the full range of the conditions of the possibility of experience. For Rahner, transcendental theology is theological anthropology. This study explores his method also in relation to transcendental experience of God.

The correct understanding of the concept of heart in Rahner consists in a recognition that the highest performance of a finite spirit comprises affective, cognitive, and volitional consciousness in a functional union that could be called the heart-mind. Rather than privilege cognition and volition and then consider feelings and moods as separate and purely subjective phenomena, we must recognize the intentionality of certain higher affective responses, i.e., those that have become integrated into the highest operational synthesis of a person who is developing as an adult in matters ethical and mystical. The highest actions of such a person are intersubjective faith, love, and hope.

The viabiliry of Rahner’s “transcendental method” in the light of challenges posed by contemporary hermeneutics is explored through an analysis of what Rahner relatively early called “transcendental hermeneutics.” In tum, this is shown to be based upon Rahner’s understanding of how the trinitarian Word and Spirit interrelate.

The mid-twentieth century stalemate between neoscholastic and progressive theologians can be broken by recovering and reappropriating Aquinas’s fundamental insight about the supernatural. This paper hopes to contribute to this aim by a reading of Rahner’s theology of grace. Rahner is in basic accord with Aquinas in his emphasis on the primacy of uncreated grace and in his conception of the relation of nature and grace, but not with respect to his notion of the experience of grace, with his dependence on the conceptualities of transcendental idealism.

The primary subject of this study is the assessment ofJohann B. Metz’s judgment that Karl Rahner’s transcendental anthropology abstracts from concrete experience and succumbs to a kind of Idealist tautology. Secondarily consideration is given to the broader range of similar criticisms of Rahner’s construal of the God-human relation.

I outline Spinoza’s development of the concept of conatus in the Ethics, and attempt to define its role in his metaphysics. In light of this, I critique the theory based on the identification by modern physics of certain radioactive substances, e.g., curium. These substances, I argue, are by definition unstable individuals whose essences include finite durations (half-lives). As such, they are in direct contradiction to Spinoza’s metaphysics. I then advance and critique several defenses Spinoza might make for his theory of conatus.

I argue that we can arrive at a better understanding of the Ethics and why Spinoza wrote it by viewing it through certain ideas expressed in his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. These ideas are: 1) personal remarks, 2) the method and most perfect method, 3) true ideas, 4) false ideas, 5) definitions.

My discussion of Hegel focuses direcrly upon the process of interiority at the centre of his thought. This process captures certain fundamental classical philosophical and religious themes in its gamut: knowledge, love, the Incarnation, and the Trinity. The central anti-reductionistic principle around which my examination of interioriry is developed is Hegel’s contention that the low or imperfect must be seen in the light of the high or perfect. I discriminate between the different ontological forms of this principle in the philosophies of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hegel.

In Hume’s Of Miracles the person movecl by faith is put in a dilemma between faith and reason . Can one resolve this dilemma as a compleat Humean? The answer is yes. Within the Humean context different approaches can be developed ta overcome Hume’s dilemma. One uses Hume’s theory of utility to defend the belief in the afterlife. The other requires Hume to place faith on a par with beauty and therefore among the passions to which reason must be a slave. Historically there was at least one compleat Humean who was also moved by faith --- Johann Georg Hamann [1730- 1788].

Strict constructivist philosophers conclude that no truth claims can be verified on the basis of mystical exploration due to the thoroughly conditioned character of such experiences. In response, Bede Griffiths’s life of dialogue between Christianity and Hinduism suggests that mystical knowing incorporates both conditioned and unconditioned elements. In the cross-culturally identifiable experience of self-transcendence in meditation, the relationship between the conditioned subject and the unconditioned sacred “object” is transformed, resulting in an intuitive knowledge for which different criteria of verifiability are both needed and available. Griffiths’s multireligious experience thus supports the identification of common ground for various religions in mystical knowing.

Theologians differ not merely as to whether, but as to how Christian morality might be distinctive. In this essay, I consider the differing senses of distinctiveness in Christian ethics, i.e., how the predicate “Christian” qualifies the justification of moral judgment; the form, extension, and modal force of moral rules; and the morally relevant description of action in the theological ethics of Karl Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar, and the “autonomy school” of Josef Fuchs and Bruno Schüller. The essay concludes with an assessment of the distinctiveness of Christian ethics in Iight of the foregoing criticism.

Recently some theologians have argued that philosophical debates about the rationality of religious belief, such as the current evidentialism debate, are theologically irrelevant. For those debates assume the integrity of a particular religious tradition and neither provide a way of choosing between conflicting religions nor any way of sorting through conflicts which are internal to the particular religions (that is, they provide no solutions to “the pluralism problem”). In opposition to these claims I argue that the current evidentialism debate can provide resources which, taken together with Kierkegaard’s stress on subjectivity, enable fruitful discussion of the pluralism problem. I focus on the problem of diversity within a religion, but suggest applications to the problem of many religions.

Some philosophers argue that a commitment to religious pluralism precludes the affirmation and encouragement of religious conversions on the grounds that decisions to convert are rationally unwarranted and, thus, their encouragement is ethically suspect. I challenge this view; furthermore, I contend that a proper understanding of religious conversion from a Christian and pluralistic point of view requires instead the identification of pluralism’s multiple meanings, i.e., as a descriptive category, a philosophical position, and an ideological construct.

The sciences and popular views generally consider matter from the bottom up, that is, as the least common denominator underlying all of its various forms and realizations. In Rahner sensibility is matter looked at from the top down, that is, with a view to the highest realization of matter in human beings, and in Christ. In Whitehead creativity is matter, not inert or static but spontaneous and active, and creativity is matter viewed in light of its highest realizations in humans and in God. So, in Rahner and in Whitehead, matter is viewed in much the same way, called sensibility in Rahner, and creativity in Whitehead, and defined in terms of its actualization in human nature.