281.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
郭博文
Po-Wen Kuo
羅益世的絕對觀念論
The Absolute Idealism of Josiah Royce
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This paper attempts to offer a detailed exposition and a critical analysis of Josiah Royce's absolute idealism. Section one explains Royce's basic jdealistic position. Sections two and three deal respectively with Royce's refutation of realism and his treatment of other conceptions of Being. Section four expounds and clarifies the essential content of Royce's absolute idealism. Section five contains some critical remarks.Royce's theory represents an ingenious effort to integrate the insights and contributions of the past major idealistic philosophers into a systematic whole. His criticisms of realism are pointed and convincing. However, Royce's own idealisnl is not free from solipsistic tendency, and his argument for the absolute knower fails to do justice to ideas and judgments about the future.
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282.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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1985 >
Issue: 8
張為良
Jui-Liang Chang
蘊處界三概念之分析研究
An Analytic Study on Three Concepts of “Skandha", “Āyatana" and “ Dhātu"
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In the Philosophy of Buddhism, the three concepts of "Skandha" "Āyatana" and "Dhātu" are the fundamental and important concepts.The contents are:The five skandhas (aggregates) include form (matter), perception, conception (idea), volition (will) and conciousness.The twelve ayatana include six sense organs and six sense objects.The eighteen dhātus include six sense organs, six sense objects and six senses.I explained, discussed and illustrated these concepts.Finally, I attained conclusion, that is to say, "Skandha", "Āyatana" and "Dhātu" are no substance (anātma) , no duration (anityā) and no bliss (duḥkhā) except Nirvāṇa.
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283.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
球文秀
Wen-Shiow Chen
休誤的位格同一論證研討
On Burne's Personal Identity
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The present paper attempts to examine Hume's argument of personal identity. The first section points out that personal identity is a specific case of the general problem of identity, which has been one of the perenial problem in philosophy since the ancient Greeks. The problem of personal identity on the other hand has occuppied an important place in philosophical discussions since Locke.The second and third sections deal with Hume's views concerning identity, including unmerical identity, specific identity, identity and diversity, and the relationship of all those identities with personal identity. The fourth section discusses Hume's theory of the self. It explains how Hume criticizes the traditional philosopher's view of the self as a substance. It also examines Hume's position concerning the mind. The fifth section examines another of Hume's arguments of persmal identity. The sixth section points out the three basic assumptions in Hume's arguments. It also offers some brief criticisms of these assumptions.
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284.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
張永偽
Jun-chun Chang
讀「上蔡語錄」所見
Thoughts from Reading “The Sayings of Shang-tsai (上蔡)"
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Hsieh Shang-tsai (謝上蔡), with Yang Kwei-shan (楊龜山),two of the most distinguished disciples of the Cheng brothers(二程). Hsieh played an important role in the diffusion andtransimission of the ideas of the Cheng brothers. Both HuWu-feng (主胡鑫) and Lu Hsiang-shung (劉鼓山) were deeplyinfluenced by him in their philosophical development. Even ChuHsi in his early years was stimulated and inspired by him. Inthe present paper, I shall, based on my reading of "The sayingsof Shang-tsai", explore the sources, contents, and later expansionsof Hsieh's thought from the standpoint of philosophy andintellectual history. I shall assess his position in the Sung andMing Neoconfucianism, and I shall also discuss Chu Hsi's (朱熹jcriticssin of him.There are five basic points in Hsieh's philosophical thinking:(1) Perception (not sensory perception, but rather moral intuition) is Jen (仁) vitality is Jen.(2) Jen is rooted in human mind. Mind is function (spontaneous manifestation of the heavenly principle). 'True mind' as the true self' is the 'moral self'.(3) The heavenly principle is in my mind. To understand the heavenly principle is to recognize one's own mind. To investigate things and examine principles is to follow always the heavenly principle and discover the authentic mind.(4) The method of cultivating the authentic mind consists of five steps. (a) contemplation, (b) emptying the mind: becoming disinterested and innoceut. (c) sincerity: being constantly altest (常惺惺) and empathitic (spontaneous expression of the authentic mind-free self-awareness of the moral subject), (d) removing arrogance and restraining desires, (e) enjoying righteousness and principles.(5) Discriminatier between Confucianism and Buddhism: the Buddhists do not understand heaven, do not recognize principles, and do not see their own mind.
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285.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
楊志南
Huei-nan Yang
「空」否定了什麼? 一幢以龍樹《姐譯論〉為主的一個研究一一
What Does the 'Emptiness' in Nāgārjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī Negate?
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What does the 電Emptiness' in Nāgārjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī negate? It negates 'svabhāva'-the intrinsic nature of things. This is a widely held view. However, Nāgārjuna himself in Vigrahavyāvartanī claimed, "I do not negate anything, I only 'make known' that the 'svabhāva' of things does not exist."Nāgārjuna's response was aimed at the Nyāya-one of the six schools in Indian philosophy. The Nyāya school said, "what is negated must be real; therefore, it is self-contradictory to say that the 'Emptiness' negates the 'real' thing." In order to counter this attack, Nagarjuna replied that the 'Emptiness' does not negate anything.
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286.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 8
茶信安
Denis Hsin-An Tsai
何必要有道德?
Why Should I Be Moral?
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The paper deals with ethics by analyzing the ethical problems, such as "Why should I be moral?" The problem can be solved by seeing the "knot" of the questioner. When one has a difficulty of knowing why human being has to accept moral value, one might ask the question. Then, this question will become nonsensical.Moreover, the "knot" might be:(i) What is the nature of the highest good as the end of moral action? Or,(ii) Is the moral way the best one for us to procure the highest good? Or,(iii) Can we have a ground of moral faith?The problem can be solved or dismissed when the questioner has his answer to the question/ or questions.The last part of the paper indicates that ethics can be constructed as a ("game-theory" by a hermeneutical methodology.Those ethical rules have to be taken as a grammar of the humanities.
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287.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1985 >
Issue: 8
黃金色梅
Yih-Mei Huang
清代哲學中格物致知理論之探究
On the Theories of Ko-Wu and Chih-Chih in Ch'ing Dynasty
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Under the influence of Koa-Cheng, the Ko-wu and Chih-chih becomes fundamental concepts to moral theories. Philosophy in Ch'ing Dynasty did not have theories of intellectual knowledge. Knowledge is nothing but for the sake of knowledge rather than for morality. This paper indicates this point by a discussion of thoughts of Wang Fu-chih, Huang Tsun-hsi, Ku Yen-wu, Yen Yüan, Li Kung, Tai Chen, and Chiao-Hsün.
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288.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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1985 >
Issue: 8
黃皮明
Ching-Huang
休如論實然與應然
Hume on “Is" and “Ought"
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This paper deals with "is-ought" in order to indicate an ambiguity in Hume's ethical theory. Concerning the notion of "is-ought" there are two inconsistent interpretations of it. The one is provided by the emotivists, such as C. L. Stevenson. They contend that t "is" cannot entail "ought". Our moral judgment is an expression of our moral feeling. It does not report a fact. The other interpretation is provided by naturalists and descriptivists. The concept of "ought" can be derived from that of "is". Our moral judgment is a report or a description of our feeling and a fact.These two interpretations both can have its own evidences from the Hume's writings. The ambiguity cannot be clarified by the Humean ethical theory itself.
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289.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1986 >
Issue: 9
郎昆如
Kun-yu Woo
先蘇格拉底期的『太素』問題探討
The Problems of Rhizomata in the Pre-socratic Period
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Unlike the problems of Arche the Pre-socratic philosophers discussed the elenlents of the material world in the rhizomata questions.This article is divided into three main parts. The first part deals with the historical development of the problems of rhizomata proceeding in the order of pluralism, mechanism and teleology. In the second part we investigate the essential contents of rhizomata operating from Empedocles, Democritus and Anaxagoras. The causal principle took place in the transcendental and immanental sophistication, and at the same time the materialistic and the idealistic Weltanschauung have had their origin and their naive forms. Finally, in the third part, the contemporary significance is discussed in the light of Aristotle's metaphysical point of view. The author tries here to raise some questionsabout the foundations of the oppositional atmosphere of the Materialism and the Idealism today, which seems to have their origin from the Pre-socratic period.
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290.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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1986 >
Issue: 9
郭博文
Po-wen Kuo
桑達雅納的道德哲學
The Moral Philosophy of George Santayana
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This is a study of George Santayana' ethical theory. Santayana never wrote any systematic treatise on moral philosophy, though he claims that it is his chosen subject. In this paper I try to piece together his scattered reflections and remarks on ethical problems, and to present them in a cogent and systemtic form. The paper is divided into four sections. Section one clarifies Santayana's view of the nature and scope of ethics. Section two explains Santayana's ethical naturalism and relativism and recapitulates his arguments against the view that good is absolute and unconditioned. Section three deals with Santayana's theory of reason in morality, of which self-knowledge and harmony are the two essential elements. Section four includes some critical observations. Both Santayana's particular type of ethical relativism and his theory of rational ethics areimportant contributions to the field. 'Yet his moral philosophy contains an equivocation and confusion between 'tis' and ‘ought ', and he fails to provide a satisfactory account of moral obligation.
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291.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1986 >
Issue: 9
張局良
Jui-liang Chang
天台智者大師的如來性惡說之探究
An Inquiry study of Chih-i's Theory of "Tathāgata inherent evil" on the T'ien-t'ai School
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T'ien-- t'ai School was the excellent school in Chinese Buddhism The T'ien-t'ai School was established by Chih-i. (A.D. 538597) He was a great philosopher. He systenlatized the doctrines of this school.The theory of "Tathāgata inherent evil" (evil immanent in Tathāgata nature) was the special creative theory of Chih-i. This theory also manifested the particular feature of T'ien t'ai School.This paper attempts to deep inquiry study this thought's Origin, Method, Content, Principle, Direction and Practice.Finally, I grasped its real meaning, discovered its eternal valuation, and also attained the wisdom of life.
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292.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1986 >
Issue: 9
張永偽
Jun-chun Chang
比論二程子理學思想之分以 一一兼論楊龜山及謝上蔡之思想發展
On the Differences between the Philosophies of Cheng' Brothers and that between Hsieh Shang-tsai and Yang Kwei-shan
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This artical deals vvith the difference between the philosophies of Cheng brothers, Chen-I and Chen Ho. The difference signifies that the Li-ism, and Hsin-ism , i.e. Chen-Chu school and Lu-Wang school, are derived from those two different philosophies. The author indicates the historical development of those philosophies and the characters the of philosophers. He contends that the difference is critical to the development of history of philosophy in China.
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293.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1986 >
Issue: 9
楊J惠南
Huei-nan Yang
論禪宗公集中的矛盾與不可說
The Contradiction and inexpressibility in Ch'an Kung- an (Köan)
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There are three types of Ch'an kung-an that often bewilder Buddhologists; namely, (1) the contradictory, (2) the inexpressible, and (3) mixture of the two. D. T. Suzuki and the scholars influenced by him, for example, E. Fromm, think that these three types of kung-an imply the truth realized by Ch'an masters, the truth which gose beyond daily language and logic. However, as the author points out, there are two traditions in Ch,an School: (1) the "Buddha-nature" tradition based on the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, and (2) the prajna tradition based on the Diamond Sūtra. Suzuki and Fromm's interpretation only emphasizes the first tradition and ignores the second one. According to the secondtradition, the contradition and inexpressibility of kung-an may seem to indicate the truth of non-existence --śūnyatā, not necessarily indicating the truly existing "Buddha-nature".
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294.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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1986 >
Issue: 9
蔡信安
Denis Hsin-an Tsai
論人文文法
On Grammar of Humanity
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Harmony, unity and communication are the basic requirements for the progress of human culture and happiness. A harmony of human relations can be obtained, if "grammar of humanity" is known and be observed. "Grammar of humanity" is used in an analogical sense in this article, since the universe of human beings has been taken as a linguistic system. Human actions is a kind of language which includes all speechs and signs. Language can become a language, and be learned if and only if there is agrammar. The author contends that there is a grammar of humanity.The grammar can be known and observed. The article deals with the grammar of humanity by five sections.i) Indicating the language-learning-process. One learns language as well as the grammar.ii) On the foundations of the grammar of humanity.iii) The characteristics of the grammar and the conditions of formulization of the grammar.iv) The grammar and praxis.v) Meaning and perfection.The approaches are phenomenological and hermeneutical.
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295.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 9
釋恆清
Heng-ching Shih
論佛教的自殺觀
Suicide in Buddhism
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This paper is addressed to the subject of suicide within both Hinayana and Mahayana traditions. The concept, type, and motive of suicide found in the canons of both traditions differ substantially. The relevant Hinayana and Mahayana doctrines are examined to explain their differences.The first section deals with suicide casea in the Agamas and Vinaya and explains why some cases were condoned vvhile others censored. This section also investigates how Abhidharma literature treats the subject of suicide.The second indicates five kinds of motives in Mahayana suicide. Each is justified by its own doctrinal basis. The final section examines the attitude of some Chinese eminent Buddhists toward the controversial problenl of religious suicide.
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296.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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1986 >
Issue: 9
關永中
Wing-chung Kwan
問題的指望與存有的視域葛立夫《形上學》第一意釋義
The Anticipation of the Question and the Horizon of Being ·········A Commentary on Emerich Coreth's Metaphysics, Chapter One
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Emerich Coreth's contribution lies mainly in his employing the act of questioning as the appropriate starting point for metaphysics. To systematically comment on his first chapter of his main work, Metaphysics, this article successively studies the transcendental method he uses, the question as the starting point, and the horizon of Being which the question anticipates. Coreth's transcendental method operates on two movements, namely, transcendental reduction and transcendental deduction. The former means the movement from the 'concent' of the question to its 'act' and then to its tconditions of possibility'. On the other hand, the latter concentrates itself mainly on the movement from the tconditions of possibility' to the essential structure of the 'act' , which is then expressed through certain 'contents'.The question is used as the correct starting point because it is undeniable, most primordial, presupposing nothing, and basing itself on experience without being confined completely on the empirical level.When one pays attention to the act of questioning, one will discover from within the act a dynamic anticipation which surpasses every finite empirical horizon and opens itself to the horizon of Being which transcends everything and encompasses all things.
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297.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1986 >
Issue: 9
陳俊輝
Jiunn-huei Chern
先秦儒家思想的發展
The Development of Confucianism in Pre-Chin's dynasty
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In this paper, I shall attempt to explicate the development of Confucianism in our Pre-Chin's dynasty. In order to make this paper more clear and comprehensible, I divide it into five steps.In the first step of my historical analysis, I trace the Confucious' thought back to two sources; one is from I Ching 〈易經), the other is from Confucious' knowledge of len Te (仁德) of the Chinese ancient sages and rulers. Besides, I also cite the Book of History (書經) as to confirm the Confucian teachings in Analects (論語).In the second stage of this paper, I deem Tseng-tzu (曾子〉 as a follower of Confucious at his old age. Being the filial, Tseng-tzu seems to be the author of The Great Learning (大學〉 and that of Canon of Filial Piety (;孝經). Historically speaking, thoughts of these two books have made a great influences upon the later Confucianists. The former, especially, had shown an adequate way to penetrate into Jen (仁) ; that is, it had established a regular procedure of cultivation to attain the spiritual state of Jen.In the third stage of the paper, I deal with the thought of Tze-sze (子思); he is the Confucious' grandson and seems to be the author of The Golden Mean ( 中庸). Being a morally metap hysical book, the book anticipates the basic moral theories of Mencius while discussing on those themes of Moral Subject and moral conciousness ······etc.In the fourth stage of my analysis, I deal with the systematic moral theories of Mencius, and take them as a great products of thought of Pre-Chin's Confucianism.Finally, in the fifth stage of the paper, I deem Hsün-tzu 〈茍子) as the last Pre-Chin's Confucianist. Though he had established much of marvellous theories after the death ofMenicus, he had almost gone astray from the originally Confucian scheme which had been concerned about the presupposition and generalization of moral self-consciousness.
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298.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2018
廖欽彬
Chin-Ping Liao
務台理作與洪耀勳的思想關連─「辯證法實存」概念的探索
Mutai Risaku and Hung Yao-hsün: A Study of the Concept of “Dialectical Existence”
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務台理作(1890-1974)是京都學派創始人西田幾多郎(1870-1945)的得意門生,於1928 年被任命為台北帝國大學哲學科教授。務台的黑格爾研究為洪耀勳的「辯證法實存」概念帶來了直接的影響。「辯證法實存」雖非洪耀勳以自明的方式提出,卻是他作為自身哲學發展的基礎來加以闡釋與演繹的概念。此概念亦非洪耀勳的獨創,而是成形於吸納黑格爾的精神哲學、海德格的實存哲學以及西田幾多郎、田邊元(1885-1962)、務台理作所接受、消化與轉釋的西洋哲學。雖說如此,「辯證法實存」這個概念在台灣當時的歷史處境(殖民地處境)及洪耀勳哲學的特殊性中,顯然有別於京都學派,具有近現代哲學在台灣異化的歷史性意義。本文首先闡明1930 年代的黑格爾研究狀況以及西田與務台的黑格爾研究之異同,接著探討務台的黑格爾研究及「表現世界的邏輯」如何影響洪耀勳的「辯證法實存」概念,最後思考洪耀勳哲學在東亞的哲學發展脈絡中所處的境遇。
Mutai Risaku (1890-1974) is one of the disciples of Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), and founder of the Kyoto School. Appointed as the professor of philosophy in Taiwan Imperial University in 1928, Mutai’s research of Hegel directly influenced Hung Yao-hsün’s notion of “dialectical existence.” Hong did not develop this notion in a clear way, but it actually served as the foundation of his own philosophy. Moreover, this notion is not Hong’s invention, but it is a concept developed in his dialectical ontology, which is a result of his reading and understanding of the philosophy of spirit by Hegel, the existential philosophy by Heidegger, and the reception and transformation of Western philosophy by Nishida Kitaro, Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) and Mutai Risaku. However, Hong’s concept of “dialectical existence” has a special context, namely the context of Taiwan under the colonization of Japan. Different from the Kyoto School itself, Hong’s philosophy is historically significant as the alienation of Western modern philosophy in Taiwan. In this paper, I shall first describe studies of Hegel in the 1930s, and explain the difference between Nishida’s and Mutai’s reading of Hegel. Then I turn to discuss how Mutai’s study of Hegel and “logic of the expressive world” influenced Hong’s concept of “dialectical existence”. Finally, I shall reflect on Hung’s philosophy in the context of the development of philosophy in East Asia.
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299.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2018
馮鳳儀
Foong-Ee Pong
讀《莊》以自我轉化─以「活動幅度」為根據的「擬道之勢」
Self-Transformation Through Reading the Zhuangzi: A Dao-Embodying Pose Based on the Notion of Amplitude
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本文嘗試建立《莊子》「與世俗處」的理論基礎及實踐策略,俾使讀者能循此脈絡在莊書中發現具有啟發性的線索。本文透過分析莊書中支離疏(理想人物的象徵/體道者)與人臣(非理想人物的象徵/有成心者)的活動特性,一方面突顯「成心」形塑人的內心與身體特性,另一方面彰顯不為成心束縛的內心與身體特性。有成心者受限於世俗規範而以「人亦無疵」為目的,體道者則跳脫成心限制,得以在己身所處的生存脈絡中實現最適合自己的生命型態。體道者的活動幅度大而不具特定模式,體現一種彈性與創造性;有成心者的活動幅度小而依循特定模式,體現一種僵固性與規律性。讀《莊》以自我轉化,關鍵在於不受限於成心、具體展現彈性的處世之道。「擬道之勢」是一個輔助策略:透過模仿體道者大而不具特定模式的活動幅度,修道者得以反省自身為成心所約束的一面,並體現彈性(就與人互動而言)與創造性(就自我實現而言)。
This article shall explicate the theory and praxis of how to live with others under conventional norms in the Zhuangzi. The theoretical aspect is explicated by analyzing the amplitudinal quality of the movements performed by two types of characters─a bodily deformed figure (the ideal person) and a ritually formed figure (his foil). The main difference between the two is the absence of chengxin (成心,the completed heart-mind) in the former and its presence in the latter. A person restricted by chengxin adheres strictly to conventional norms in order to avoid criticism. By contrast, a person not restricted by chengxin deals with these norms in an adaptive and creative manner. Because of this difference, the movements of a person restricted by chengxin have a narrow amplitude, and so they exhibit inflexibility and stubbornness, while the movements of the ideal person have a wide amplitude and therefore manifest flexibility and creativity. The key to self-transformation is, then, to live without the restriction of chengxin, to concretely exhibit such flexibility concerning norms. To approximate such a state, one can adopt the practical strategy of what I call “Dao-embodying posing”. Roughly put, in imitating the wide amplitude manifested in the movements of the ideal person, one gains flexibility in social interaction and creativity in one’s own life.
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2018
蔡龍九
Lung-Chiu Tsai
高攀龍對王學修正之相關探究
Gao Panlong’s Modifications of Wang Yangming’s Philosophy
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本文欲探究高攀龍對王學思想的批判與認同,並釐清他的批判是否恰當。筆者初步發現,他對陽明學本身的批評,相較於王學末流的思維相對和緩,而較著重於「無善無惡」這個內涵上的不接受;然而在工夫方面,曾試圖採取陽明思想上的部分精要。此外,他對陽明思想的「心」及其描述,則採取一種回歸程朱思維的視角來反省。根據此文細部探究,欲清楚說明他對朱熹與陽明學說分別提出甚麼樣的修正,且試圖「兼顧」二學的內涵是否合理。
This paper shall explain and evaluate Gao Panlong’s criticism of Wang Yangming’s philosophy. Compared to his criticism of Wang’s followers, Gao’s criticism of Wang himself is rather mild: much of his objection is to the concept of wushan wu’e. With respect to his own account of gongfu, however, Gao actually incorporates some of Wang’s crucial ideas. Furthermore, he reverts to the Cheng-Zhu position when reflecting on Wang’s understanding of xin. So, through a careful reading of relevant texts, this paper shall specify Gao’s modifications of Zhu’s and Wang’s philosophy respectively and, on that basis, evaluate the coherence of his reconciliation between the two thinkers.
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