21.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1998 >
Issue: 21
Tran Van Doan
陳艾團
Asian Marxism or The Dialectic of Violence
亞洲馬克思主義一一暴力辯證法
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在本篇論文中,我們將論述那些所謂的亞洲馬克思主義者,言之鑿鑿奉行的「主義J '在事實上,只不過是一個口號。這些 亞洲共產主義的領導者並不是真正採取馬克思的觀點,而是向列 寧或史達林那邊靠攏。對他們來說,辯證法不意謂著無產階級的 發展邏輯,而是用來摧毀反對力量(包括保守主義、反對主義、或修正主義等等)的有效工其。因此, 「揚棄」 (Aufhebung) (不論以普遍階級或無產階級作為形式)只存在烏托邦論者的空 想中。這樣的一種「揚棄」是不能被實現的。因為,在亞洲所企 盼的任何實現,不論其外在或內在條件都是不充足和不成熟的。
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22.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1998 >
Issue: 21
Wing-wah Chan
陳榮華
Is the Mind in Mencius' Philosophy Self-sufficient for Moral Cultivation?
孟子哲學的心概念在這德實踐中是否自足?
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本文要指出, <孟子〉在討論道德實踐時,心不是最後的存有 學基礎,它尚需莫基於天,因此本文認為,心在道德實踐時不是 自足的。但是,當代的孟子哲學詮釋者大都認為心是自足的。對 於這種主張,我稱為心靈自足論。本文首先介紹這種理論的源 起,再提出三個論証來指,出它在理論上的困難。跟著,我提出以 天為道德實踐的存有學基礎,並嘗試以這個主張來詮釋孟子的道 德實踐理論。對於這種詮釋,我稱之為「以天為基礎的詮釋」 。 最後,我發現這種詮釋能避免心靈自足論所導致的困難,且又一 致於〈孟子〉的語吉。所以,我認為這種詮釋是更妥當的。
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23.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1998 >
Issue: 21
Tim Lane
藍亭
Quiet Qualia, Unsensed Sensa
無感覺的感知
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In C. I. Lewis's epistemology, qualia are taken to be directly intuited and inherently recognizable. He distinguishes sharply between qualia and that which C. D. Broad and Bertrand Russell refer to as “sensa" or “sense-data." Where Broad and Russell appear to allow for the possibility of unsensed, incompletely sensed, or inaccurately sensed sensa, Lewis regards qualia as given--to be is to be sensed and certain. Lewis finds the Broad-Russell view to be incredible and says of sensa so construed that they are “neither fish, flesh, nor good red herring."I argue that the Broad-Russell view is at least as plausible as Lewis's and, indeed, that to adequately describe and explain mental phenomena, it may be necessary to distinguish the phenomenal aspect of consciousness (sensa or qualia) from the accessing function of consciousness. In arguing the pIausibilityof this distinction, I draw upon work from both cognitive science and phenomenology. I also argue that, in principIe, experimental evidence could be adduced to decide the issue between the Broad-Russell and the Lewis views. In a concluding section I suggest implications of the view developed here for Lewis's epistemology.
在路易斯 (C.I. Lewis) 的知識論中,感知 (qualia) 被視 為直接的直覺及與生俱來的察覺O他非常明確的區分感知及布洛 得 (C.D. Broad) 和羅素 (Bertrand Russell) 所認為的感覺材料 (Sensa-data) 對於布洛得和羅素顯然容許的「未 感覺到」、「未完全感覺到J '或「不正確感覺到」之感覺材料 (Sense-data) 的可能性, 路易斯卻視感知 (qualia) 為必定會被感覺到、且不可能感覺錯的。他認為布洛得一羅素的觀點不可 思議,並說如此解說感覺材料是荒謬的。我論證布洛得一羅素的觀點至少是與路易斯的同樣合理。事 實上,要適切的描繪及解說心理現象,去區分意識的現象層面 (phenomenal aspect of consciousness) 和意識的進入使用功 能 (accessing function of consciousness) 或許是需要的。在論 證此區分的合理性中,我援用了認知科學及現象學的研究。我還 論證原則上,由實驗而得的證據可以決定布洛得一羅素和路易斯 的觀點何者正確。在結論部分,我提出了這一觀點對路易斯的知 識論發展之影響的看法。
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24.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2001 >
Issue: 24
Gerald Cipriani
Reflections on the Nature of the Figural in Art
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In this essay I develop evelop a critique of different modes understanding what is a moment of meaningful form in art (the figural). I attempt to show that approaches which maintain a separation between form and content, or the subjective and the objective cannot truly do justice to the presentational nature of meaning in art. In particular, I refer to Mikel Dufrenne's conception of expression in his Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience as being paradoxically misleading when it comes to understand the figural in its phenomentality. I ultimately argue for the need to bear in mind that the relationship between presentation and representation, or experience and objectivity ought to be approached in terms of complementary difference.
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25.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2002 >
Issue: 25
Jih-Ching Ho
何志青
Inferentialism, Conceptualism, and Social Pragmatism
推演論,概念論,及社會實踐論
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How do our minds grasp the world? The nlajor task in explaining the relation between mind and the world is to indicate how facts, experiences, and judgments stand in justificatory relation. This paper examines three ways of explaining the cognitive relation between mind and world: inferentialism, conceptualism, and social pragmatism. These three theories differ from the traditional foundationalism, coherentism, and reliabilism in that they no longer attempt any analysis of the epistemic notions such as knowledge and evidence abstractly; rather, they explore, in a Wittgensteinean way, these notions in relation to linguistic practices. In this paper, I will first examine the debate between inferentialism and conceptualism, a debate involving Sellars, Davidson, McDowell, and Brandom. I will show that both inferentialism and conceptualism have difficulties in giving a complete account of empirical justification and that their difficulties can be remedied only by resorting to some social pragmatisnl notions such as the social development of conceptual capacities and the social recognition of cognitive performance.
我們的心智如何掌握世界?最近之相關哲學論述的主要關 懷是要指出事實、經驗和判斷之間具有某種證成之關係。本論文 檢視三個經驗證成之理論:推演論、概念論及社會踐行論。此三 理論不同於傳統之基礎論、融貫論及可靠論,在於它們不企圖對 知識論概念(如「知識」和「理據J )提供抽象之分析;這些新 興理論深受維根斯坦之影響,強調知識概念與「語言踐行」之密 切關連。本文首先說明推演論與概念論之間的論爭,釐清其主要 論證和反駁,最後展述社會踐行論,並指出其對推演論與概念論 之修正及補強。
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26.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2002 >
Issue: 25
Francisco Calvo Garzon
The connectionist sceptic versus the “full-blooded" semanticist
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Gareth Evans produced a powerfulline of argument against Quine's well-known Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference. In one part of his attack, Evans argued that, under certain conditions, structural simplicity may become truth-conducive for semantic theories. Being structurally more complex than the standard semantic theory, perverse semantic theories a la Quine are an easy prey for Evans' considerations. The bulk of the paper will be devoted to addressing Evans' criticism. By reviewing the classical/connectionist debate in cognitive science between a hypothetical sympathizer of “cognitive orthodoxy" and the friend ofconnectionism, I shall contend that the Quinean has nothing to fear from a classical reading of Evans' considerations.
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27.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2002 >
Issue: 25
Chung-Chi Yu
游涼祺
Schutz on Pure We-Relationship
舒茲論純粹我們關條
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An inquiry into the “pure we-relationship" in Schutz is attempted. In his early major work The Phenomenology of the Social World Schutz regards the “pure we-relationship" as the ultimate foundation of the social world. Because of the confusion with “concrete we-relationship," its meaning remains misunderstood among many interpreters. While this concept is rooted in “Thou-orientation" and is regarded as formal concept without any content, Schutz is criticized for having taken up an idealistic and egocentric position in his social theory. I find it is deficient to defend Schutz by reference to the lifeworld theory that he develops in late thought. Instead , I suggest that we might save him from such criticism by introducing the “mutual tuning-in relationship."
本文旨在探討舒茲的「純粹我們關係」概念,本文的出發點 在於認識到此概念往往被當作「具體我們關係」而導致其涵義未 能被適切的理解。本文指出,舒茲將「純粹我們關係」奠定在「對 你態度」之上,並視之為「極限概念J '亦即將它當作無任何具 體內容的抽象概念,而且主張它是任何社會關係的最終基礎。此 一論述導致理念化與自我中心化的批評。本文指出,舒茲此一觀 點在晚期的生活世界論述中依然保留,並試著指出此一概念所導 致的批評或許可以藉由「相互準備投入關係」來加以化解。
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28.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2003 >
Issue: 26
Francisco Calvo Garzón
Francisco Calvo Garzón
Is Simplicity Alethic for Semantic Theories?
「簡單性」是否為語義理論所不可忘 者?
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Crispin Wright (1992) has reshaped debates about Realism by offering a new landscape of what's at stake in the discussions between realists and their opponents. Instead of arguing whether a given discourse can be truth apt, discussion should focus, Wright contends, on what kind of truth predicate a discourse can enjoy. Namely, whether truth for a discourse can be 'robust' or merely ‘minimal' Wright's approach has important implications for Quine's well-known Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference. The bulk of this paper will be devoted to showing that an argument involving minimalism about truth which Wright (1997) offersagainst the Inscrutability Thesis fails by reductio. By the end of the paper, we'll see how Wright's proposed frame of' discussion for Realism bears on themetaphysical status of Semantic Theories.
賴特 (Crispin Wright) 於其1992 年之文章中, 為實在論與 反實在論之爭提出了一個新的看法,也因此,吾人實可對實 在論者與其對手間之爭論焦點有一番新的認識。賴特認為: 實在論者與其對手間之爭論,實非針對「語句是否能具真理 傾向(truth apt) J 此一問題而發, 而係針對「語句究竟能有何 種真理述詞」此一問題而發一亦即:吾人可謂實在論者與其 對手之爭,實為對於「語句之真」究竟是「直率 ('robust') 之 真」抑或僅是「最小之真」之爭O對翩因 (Quine) 著名之「指 稱之不可測」 (the Inscrutability of Reference) 主張, 賴特之探 究進路實有重要之哲學理趣。對此,本文擬指出:賴特於其 1997 年之文章中提出「真理之最小論」 (minimalism about truth) 論證' 並藉以反對捌因之「指稱之不可測」主張, 整體 而言並未成功,此為本文之主要重點所在。儘管如此,賴特 之探究進路與「語意理論之形上地位」間究竟有何關係,亦 為一重要問題。此為本文最後所將著墨之重點。
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29.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2003 >
Issue: 26
Szu-Ting Chen (陳思、廷)
The Distinction between Causation and Invariance and Its Implications for the Philosophical Discussion of Economic Theorizing
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Recently, certain philosophers have argued that an explanatory relation is a causal relation that is fundamentally about the invariance of a relation betweenvariables of interest under intervention-i.e., about a manipulable invariant relation. This manipulative theory tends to reduce a causal relation to a manipulable invariant relation. By explicating a case from contemporary econometrics, this paper argues that a manipulable invariant relation can be obtained only when the causal chain or causal structure of the targeted relation is free from disturbing influences. In other words, a manipulable invariant relation can be regarded only as a special kind of causal relation, and so the notion of invariance can never replace the idea of causation. This paper also shows that the distinction between causation and invariance has methodological import concerning the philosophical discussion of economic theorizing and of economic theory development.1. Introduction2. Manipulation, Invariance, Superexogeneity, and Causal Structure2.1 The Manipulability Theory of Causation2.2 The Idea ofWeak Exogeneity2.3 The Idea of Invariance and Its Relation to the Idea of Superexogeneity2.4 Can We Equate a Causal Relation with an Invariant Relation?3. The Methodological Import of the Distinction between Causation and Invariance4. A Causal Structuralist Account of Economic Theorizing and Economic Theory Development5. Conclusion
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30.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2004 >
Issue: 27
Hans Lenk
Hans Lenk
Towards a Technologistic Methodology and Philosophy of Science
邁向技術取向的方法論和科學哲學
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For the past several decades, philosophers of science such as Hacking and Giere, instead of focusing attention on scientific theories and seeing them as just linguistic entities, have been thinking about philosophy of science from the standpoint of experimental manipulation and model-construction. Both Hacking’sexperimentalism and Giere’s modelism have played a great part in giving birth to an action-oriented and technology-shaped philosophy of science. In this paper, it is argued that philosophy of science can benefit from the technological approach and correlatively, the methodology of general technology might profit from taking into consideration the refinements and novel developments of philosophy of science. It is argued, besides, not only that different methodological approaches have to be integrated into a rather general theory of scheme-interpretation, but also that action-“grasping”-knowledge is shaped by interpretations and by perspectives.
過去數十年來,諸如Hacking 和Giere 等哲學家在討論科學 哲學時,已不再專注於科學理論本身,而是從實驗操控和建造模 型等方面來進行論述。就催生實作和技術取向的科學哲學而言,不管是Hacking 的實驗主義或是Giere 的模型論都貢獻良多。本 文要論證的是,科學哲學和工程技術學科的方法論兩者之間其實 可以彼此借鏡而相互受益。此外,不同的方法論進路也有必要整 合成一個更普遍的詮釋架構理論,而實作-理解-認知乃是被詮釋 和觀點所形塑而成的。
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31.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2004 >
Issue: 27
Ruey-Lin Chen
陳瑞 麟
Testing through Realizable Models
透過可落實模型來檢驗科學理論
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How is a scientific theory, especial a classical physical theory, tested? This problem has a long history. In this paper I’ll propose a theory of testing based on but differentiated from Giere’s studies on the structure of scientific theories (Giere 1988, 1994, 1999). I will show, from both theoretical and historical perspectives, that a scientific theory can always be understood as one contains a classified model population, including both higher-level models and realizable models, and that scientists always test a theory through its realizable models. To transmit the consequences of testing realizable models to a higher-level model is a very complicated mechanism. Therefore, it is unlikely that a whole theory could ever be completely confirmed or falsified, even if some of its realizable models havebeen conclusively confirmed or falsified. Finally, I’ll illustrate such a theory of testing can give an adequate account of the testing history of a scientific theory, for example, the Newtonian theory. This theory of testing is a rational reconstruction, in Lakatosian sense, of the process of scientific testing.
像古典力學一類的科學理論如何被檢驗?這個問題有個長 遠的歷史。在本文中,我將提議一個檢驗理論,建基在吉爾關於 科學理論結構的研究上。但我的模型觀點與吉爾有些微不同。我 將從理論性和歷史性兩個不同角度來展示:科學理論總是可以被 理解為擁有一個分類的模型體系的理論,其中包括高層的模型與 可落實模型;而且科學家總是透過可落實模型來檢驗理論。但 是,透過可落實模型把檢驗的結果傳送到高層的模型或原理,乃 是一件非常複雜的機制。因此,就算有一些可落實模型被印證或 否證,整體理論完全被印證或否證實際上不太可能。最後,我將 以說明牛頓理論的檢驗史為例,來佐證本文提議的檢驗理論。以 拉卡托斯的話來說,這個檢驗理論在本質上也是個針對歷史的 「合理重建」。
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32.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1973 >
Issue: 3
Catherine D. Rau
The Artist's Intention and G.E.M. Anscombe's Intention
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33.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1973 >
Issue: 3
Robert L. Martin
Ayer on Sense and Reference
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34.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1973 >
Issue: 3
Martin A. Bertman
Pain
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35.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1973 >
Issue: 3
Chung-ying Cheng
Metaphors: An Annotated Bibliography and History by Warren Shibles
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36.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2005 >
Issue: 30
Francisco Calvo Garzón
Francisco Calvo Garzón
Game-Theoretical Semantics and Referential Inscrutability
賽局理論語意學與指涉之 不可測度說
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This paper consists of two parts. First, (i) I shall consider two defences of Quine´s polemical Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference put forward by Hookway (1988), and Calvo Garzón (2000a; 2000b), respectively. Then, (ii) I shall consider an extension of Quine´s succinct behavioural criteria of Radical Translationsuggested by Hintikka´s Game-Theoretical Semantics (1973; 1976). I shall argue that Hintikka´s semantics suggest behavioural criteria which we can use to constrain perverse semantic theories. In particular, I shall try to show that whilst Hintikka´s behavioural data tells against Hookway´s proposal, it reveals, nonetheless, a reason as to why my proposed perverse semantic theory enjoys the same priviledged status that a standard semantic theory is supposed toenjoy.
此篇論文有兩部分,第一,我將討論分別由Hookway 及Calvo Garzon 所提出對Quine 的指涉之不可測度說的兩個辯護。第二, 我將討論Hintikka 的賽局理論語意學如何延伸Quine 徹底翻譯之 行為判准。我將論證,Hintikka 語意學所提出的行為判准將可限 制不當的語意理論。尤其是,我將說明儘管Hintikka 的行為與料 不符Hookway 的方案,它仍說明了為什麼我所謂的不當語意理 論享有一般語意理論所享有的特權地位。
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37.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2005 >
Issue: 30
Aysel Doğan
Aysel Doğan
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities and Causal Determination
其他可能性原則與因果決定論
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Some compatibilists believe that the principle of alternative possibilities has been shown to be false by Frankfurt-style arguments, and this gives way to the compatibility of causal determination with moral responsibility. Those incompatibilists who defend the principle of alternative possibilities, on the other hand, insist on the truth of the principle and on the incompatibility of causal determination with moral responsibility. In this article, I argue that Frankfurt-stylecounterexamples are unsuccessful in indicating the falsity of the principle of alternative possibilities, and yet this failure is inconclusive to prove the correctness of incompatibilism. In fact, the principle of alternative possibilities is, I show, compatible with causal determination and thus with compatibilism on a specificunderstanding of determinism and compatibilism.
有些相容論者相信其他可能性原則已為Frankfurt 的反例所 駁斥,而這讓支持因果決定與道德責任為相容的相容論者有機可 乘。但捍衛其他可能性原則的不相容論者則堅持此原則,以及因 果決定與道德責任的不相容性。在此篇論文中,我將論證 Frankfurt 的反例無法指出其他可能性的錯誤,但這不會導致不相 容論的成立。事實上,我將證明,在一種對決定論與相容論的理 解下,其他可能性原則與因果決定論及相容論者是相容的。
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38.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2007 >
Issue: 34
Caleb Y. Liang
梁益堉 *
Conceptualism and Phenomenal Character
概念論與現象特性
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Consider two of the central debates in the contemporary philosophy of mind: the debate between representationalism and anti-representationalism about phenomenal character, and the debate between conceptualism and nonconceptualism about the content of experience. The former, the qualia debate, centers on whether the phenomenal character of conscious experience is exhausted by its representational content. The latter is about whether conceptual capacities are constitutive of the representational content of perceptual experience such that the only kind of content that perceptual experience possesses is conceptual content. Most philosophers consider these two debates as unrelated, or at least should be treated separately. In this paper, I argue that there is an obvious and important sense in which the two issues are related. More specifically, if one accepts conceptualism, it would impose a significant constraint on what position one is allowed to take in the qualia debate. First, I suggest that once it is made clear that conceptualism can be considered as a particular version of representationalism, the conceptualist would have to take a certain stance on whether there are nonintentional qualia. The reason why the conceptualist needs to worry about the qualia issue is that if in addition to intentional content perceptual experiences also contain nonintentional qualia as constituents, then perceptual experiences cannot be fully conceptual. Second, I argue that although in McDowellian conceptualism the content of perceptual experience is construed in terms of Fregean sense rather than internal mental representation, it still faces challenges from the Inverted Earth argument against representationalism. My goal is not to show that conceptualism fails, but to show that it is a serious issue that the defenders of conceptualism have to take into consideration.
當代心智哲學有兩個重要爭議:一是關於意識之現象特性 (phenomenal character)的表徵論(representationalism)與反表徵論 ( anti-representationalism) 之爭; 另一是關於經驗內容的概念論 (conceptualism)與非概念論(nonconceptualism)之爭。第一個論爭, 可稱為感質之爭(the qualia debate),討論意識的現象特性是否能完全 被表徵內容所窮盡。第二個論爭的焦點在於,知覺經驗的內容是否由 我們的概念能力(conceptual capacities)所參與構成,以致於完全是概 念性的內容(conceptual content)。大部分哲學家認為這兩個爭論互不 相干,或認為應該分開處理。在本文中,我指出這兩個爭議其實有一 明顯且重要的關連。那就是:在第二個論爭中若採取概念論的立場, 那麼在第一個論爭中就非得採取表徵論不可。更進一步說,本文要論 證兩件事:第一,概念論可以視為是一種特殊版本的表徵論。一旦釐 清這點, 持概念論者就需要提出理由來反對非意向性感質 (nonintentional qualia)的存在。原因是:如果知覺經驗除了意向性內 容之外,還具有非意向性的感質為其成分的話,那麼知覺經驗的內容 就無法完全是概念性的。第二,雖然McDowell 的概念論將知覺經驗 的內容理解為一種Fregean sense,而非理解為某種心理表徵(mental representation),這樣的立場仍然得面對「顛倒地球論證」(the Inverted Earth argument)的攻擊。概念論並不一定因此失敗,但任何為概念論 的辯護都必須設法回應這項攻擊。
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39.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2007 >
Issue: 34
Melissa Zinkin
Melissa Zinkin
Kant’s Concept of Force: Empiricist or Rationalist?
康德之力的概念: 經驗論者或理性論者?
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This paper explores Kant's account of force, a topic that was of central philosophical concern in his day, but which he does not explicitly address in any of his Critiques. Just as with the nature of space and time and the nature of the human will, the nature of force was under dispute by the philosophers and natural scientists to whose legacy Kant was responding. Yet, Kant does not make force an explicit topic of his Critiques, and thus provides no explicit transcendental account of force. Nevertheless, I will argue that one can indeed find in Kant a transcendental account of force, one that is a synthesis of empiricist and rationalist accounts, but in an unexpected place; the third Critique, in the discussion of the principle of purposiveness
本論文探討康德對於力的說明。這個題目在康德所處的時代中,位於哲學關懷的核心地位,但在他的各種《批判》裡,他卻沒有明示 地處理過這個題目。正如同時間與空間的本質以及人類意志的本質, 康德回應有關哲學家與自然科學家爭論力的本質之成果。然而,康德 並沒有在他的《批判》中,將力作為一個明示的主題,因而並沒有針 對力的概念,提供一個明示的先驗說明。不過,我論證,吾人的確可 以在康德哲學中尋獲一個有關力的先驗說明,而且這是一個經驗論與 理性論說明的綜合,只不過在一處意想不到的地方:在《第三批判》中,有關合目的性原則的討論裡。
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40.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2010 >
Issue: 39
Chung-Kee Lee
李仲 驥
From Aquinas’ Analogy to Ian Ramsey’s Models and Disclosures – the Possibility of Religious Language Then and Now
從阿奎那的類比法到藍聖恩的 「模型」與「揭示」 ──宗教語言可能性的古與今
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The search for a proper language for God-talk is a perennial task in theology as well as in philosophy. From times of antiquity, the use of analogy was employed in different realms of knowledge. Yet it was not until the medieval era, primarily through the effort of Thomas Aquinas, that analogy was used extensively in religious discourse. However, Thomistic analogy was not accepted by all. The contention between univocal and analogical use of words was never settled. The contemporary scene adds further fuel to the debate. Logical positivism claims that God-talk is totally meaningless, as truth claims can never be established in such a domain. And some critics say that religion belongs to the world of the ‘un-sayable’ and silence is the only response. The situation demands an urgent response from the side of the religious thinkers, and Ian Ramsey, previous Nolloth professor of Philosopy of Christian Religion at Oxford University, has taken up the task to face this challenge. Ramsey’s job is twofold. First, he is of course concerned with defending religious discourse against such philosophical critiques. At the same time, he is eager to show how theological apologetics could actually benefit from the tenets of Logical Empiricism. His method of ‘models’ and‘disclosures’ is used to demonstrate the empirical relevance of religious language. Such approach also reveals that religious discourses do containsomething more than the narrowness of meaning and truth set down by the logical empiricists. The purpose of this paper is to place Aquinas’ analogyside by side with Ramsey’s models approach and see how they compare and contrast each other. Specifically, we will see how these approaches haveroughly the same dynamics of going from what is seen to what is unseen in talking about God. We will also see how the two projects differ owing to a fundamental difference in their ontology.
尋覓一套適切的語言,以便用於有關上帝的言說(God - talk),歷久以 來都是神學及哲學的一個重要課題。比喻作為一種語言的工具,自古已被應 用到不同的知識範疇,但對宗教論述而言,類比的方法卻是經由中世紀的托 馬斯‧阿奎那推廣後,才開始被廣泛採用。但阿奎那式的類比法也並非普遍 被接納。其中的主要爭論,是在於文字究竟是否只可以作單一意義的闡釋,還是可以像比喻那樣具有多重涵義。當代學術界的研究,對宗教語言的討論 更是火上加油:邏輯實證論者堅持認為有關上帝的言說都是毫無意義的,因 為真理的宣稱永不能在這個範疇得以立定。有些批評者更認為,宗教是屬於 「不能言說」的世界,人們只能以沉默來回應。這些批評驅使宗教思想家們急於作出回應。前牛津大學基督宗教哲學教授藍聖恩(Ian Ramsey)對此挑 戰作出了當面的回應。他的回答可分為兩方面。首先,他固然是要在這些哲 學的批判之前為宗教語言作出辯護。與此同時,他也渴望說明護教學其實能 夠從邏輯經驗主義的理論找到支持。藍氏所建構的「模型」(model)與「揭 示」(disclosure)進路,恰能證明宗教語言在經驗世界的基礎。他的進路也 顯示出,宗教言說所涵概的足以超越經驗主義對真理與意義的狹隘定義。本 文的目的,是將阿奎那的類比法與藍氏的模型理論作一個比較,並特別指出 兩個方法同樣是從可見的到不可見的進路來言說上帝。與此同時,本文也會 指出,兩者因着不同的本體論引申而來的基本區別。
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