Aristotle assigns positive value to artistry and its skills, placing them below science but nearby. Fuller content for this view of art can be garnered from his technical treatises, especially the accounts of rhetoric and dialectic, where the subjectivity imported by the role of audiences is explored with subtlety. These ideas have influence on later philosophy of aesthetics and of technology, and they need to be pondered by those engaged in current debate in these areas.

Ancient Greek culture and its crown jewel philosophy grew out of a distinct realization that life is precarious. In order not to perish, humankind needs art {poiesis). With art human beings can live well and rise above the forces of destruction. Art in all of its forms proceeds by receiving guidance from logos, the principle of metron. Mythos is logos enacted. Through logos as art human beings can create value and be a value unto themselves.

The thesis that I will present in this paper is that tragic and epic poi sis contain a philosophical dimension that provided the poets with principles for exploring the passions and that these, in turn, served as foundations for the philosophical analyses of human praxis. To identify some of these principles I will first turn to Homer, who established this framework, and then turn briefly to Euripides' Medea to show continuity and enrichment, and finally touch upon several elements of Aristotle's psychological theory to show ethical philosophy's debt to poiesis.

In this article I argue that in H 6 Aristotle's main concern is to explain both the unity of form and the unity of composite substance. Commentators have taken H 6 as concerned with either the unity of form or the unity of the composite substance, but not with both. But there is no exclusive "either/or". The correct position is "both/and". I argue that proper identification of the aim of the inquiry of H 6 indicates that Aristotle is concerned with both the unity of form and the unity of composite substance. On my interpretation, Aristotle's intention is to defend the theory of substance-as-cause by dealing with a possible problem. The possible problem arises from a combination of (a) speaking about the parts of form and the parts of composite substances and (b) the principle that parts of a whole need a unifying cause in order to be one and not many. Aristotle has (a') spoken about the parts of form and the parts of composite substance. He has also (b') claimed that the parts of a whole have to have a unifying cause in order to be one and not many. Do form and composite substance, then, have a unifying cause for their unity? Aristotle sees a possible problem arising from thinking that they do. If both form and composite particulars need a unifying cause, form cannot be substance, and composite substances, as composites of form and matter, cannot be unities, but must be mere heaps of matter. The problems of theunity of form and the unity of composite substance are similar, then; and the unity of each must be accounted for. Not surprisingly, the problems being similar, the solutions to those problems, the accounts of the unity of form and composite substance, are similar as well. The two are thus discussed together in H 6. It is there that Aristotle provides such accounts. H 6, then, concerns both the unity of form and the unity of composite substance.

According to Kant, all finite rational beings are unconditionally bound to obey the moral law, expressed in the formula of the categorical imperative. The assent (the taking to be true) to this law is a practical knowledge, since its ground is objectively and subjectively sufficient. However, the immortality of the soul and the existence of God are not objects of practical knowledge but just objects of practical faith, of moral faith more precisely, for the assent to them has a barely subjectively sufficient ground and is not a necessary consequence of this knowledge of the moral law. According to our interpretation of the Kantian philosophy, the ground of moral faith in God's existence and in the immortality of the soul will be found only in the finite rational being with a disposition (Gesinnung) for the actual fulfilment of the moral law. We will defend this interpretation and maintain that the radical evil of human nature, diagnosed by Kant, prevents all men from having a moral faith, which does not mean that this obstacle is unsurmountable, since the conversion of men into Good is possible. In our view, what makes this conversion feasible is the possibility (implicit in Kant's thought) of an irregular act of the free-will, that of adopting a good fundamental maxim.

Plato put housing second only to a secure food supply in the order of business of an emerging polis [Republic 2.369d); we argue, without quibbling over rank, that adequate housing ought to have fundamental priority, with health and education, in civil societies' planning, budgets, and legislative agendas. Somethingmade explicit in the Platonic Laws, and often reiterated by today's poor — but as often forgotten by bureaucrats— is that human wellbeing, eudaimonia, is impossible for the homeless. That is, adequate housing is valuable to human societies independently of its instrumental role in supporting the safety, health, and education of the populace. Currently, governments all too frequently end up undermining their own health and education programs as a direct result of neglecting the housing needs of the poor. Finally, we argue that governments ought now to be using the low-cost ways that already exist to provide, or to promote the provision of, better housing for their increasingly urbanized populations; further, even in those circumstances where it is necessary to subsidize housing, governments' most important role is to develop just regulatory and enforcement systems within which public- and private-sector investment can operate.

The paper considers the multiplication of speech organs in Diderot's first novel Les Bijoux indiscrets. The main plot device of the novel—the talking "jewels" or female sex organs— enables Diderot to confront two different conceptions of the soul, the spiritual and material, in one and the same body. The voice coming from the head, traditionally held to be the seat of the soul, is contradicted by a voice that comes from that part of the body which is traditionally considered as to be the least submissive to the head or mind. When the body rebels against the women who believe themselves to be spiritual substances in command of the body to which they are united, it is in fact the soul which is identical with the body or with its organization that really rebels against them, and objects to the false portrayal of its seat—and function— in the body. Strictly speaking, by unmasking the testimony of the women as a lie, the jewels expose the very spiritualist position itself as a lie. The paper then argues that, unlike the spiritualism propounded by the head, the spontaneous philosophy of the "indiscreet jewels" is one of forthright materialism.

The paper focuses on the trajectory of involvement of the ancient Greek philosophers, up to Callisthenes and Clearchus, in the competition of the two greatest oracles, the Delphic and the Didymian (Branchidae), on the one hand, and in the ideology of colonization of the East, on the other. While the pre-Socratic Milesian philosophers were close to the Branchidae, Plato and Aristotle supported Delphi and the Delphic Apollo-Dionysian syncretism. I examine how theoriginal interpretation of the famous Delphic maxim 'Know Yourself related to political issues, e.g. implementation of the Platonic and Aristotelian political Utopias, and how after Alexander this interpretation lost its value. I conclude that from the very dawn, philosophy has been neither the first nor the last comer to the stage of world affairs, but already is inside them, acting as a creative intermediary within such problem-producing domains as politics and religion.

The objective of this paper is to analyze the appeal to the notion of the light of the soul as a commonplace in theories of knowledge from the Renaissance to early 18th century philosophy, showing that language will only become a central subject for philosophy with the progressive criticism of the powers of the intellect, especially intuitive thought.

Plato wrote dialogues, and he praised dialectic, or conversation, as a suitable style for fruitful philosophical investigation. His works are great literature; and nodoubt this quality derives much from their form as dialogues. They also have definite philosophical content; and an important part of this content is their dialecticalepistemology. Dialectic is part of the content of Plato's philosophy. Can we reconcile this content with his literary style? I shall examine and sharpen the sense of this problem by referring to four passages from different works of Plato: Parmenides 132b-c, Protagoras 351-2, Sophist 248-9, Republic 592. In these passages we can distinguish a main position, which represents what it is natural to label Platonism, from a line of thought which diverges from that position and yet also seems authentically Platonic. I argue that the solution to this tension lies in the notion of dialectic as a tentative and exploratory method of philosophy. This view of dialectic is in some conflict with Plato's official account of the method as guaranteed to deliver fundamental truth; but that conflict presents one more version of the phenomenon which I am exploring. The theory of dialectic provides philosophical support for the method of dialogue. That is how philosophy and literature are linked in Plato's pursuit of truth.

The architectonic principle, as stated in Aristotle's Politics, is related to the arrangement of the arts, the technai, whereby it is argued that the leading art is the politike techne. Plato, in the Gorgias, has argued for an architectonic of crafts. Four technai provide the best, aei pros to beltiston therapeuousai, and they differ from the pseudo-crafts that offer pleasure while indifferent to the beltiston. The principle for arranging the architectonic is the pursuit of the best, whereby each practitioner of a craft is expected to give logos concerning the "how" as well as the end of the craft. Extending the Platonic principle, Aristotle brings together under a unified theory the intelligibility of nature and human nature in line with the ends of episteme and techne, especially the politike techne.

In this paper, I shall discuss the relation between practical reason and emotions in Kant. First, I begin by explaining why knowledge of emotions is important for the transcendental project in the moral domain, understood as the claim that reason can determine our actions, in spite of our inclinations. Second, I explain the definition of affects and passions in Kant's philosophy and relate the two to feelings and the faculty of desire. I then question the possibility of controlling emotions, showing that it is, if not an altogether impossible task, at least a difficult one. I show that while affects present a momentary loss of control, they can still coexist with practical reason. Passions, however, may ground principles for actions, and represent a serious danger for rational mastery over inclinations.

Kant's account of subjectivity is ambiguous: there is an implicit critique of Descartes in Kaaat, but this is in conflict with more Cartesian aspects of his approach to subjectivity. Fichte develops the critical elements of Kant and turns them against Kant's residual Cartesianism. Fichte, in the various versions of the Wissenschaftslehre, is the first to be aware of the limitations of the reflective model of consciousness. In those texts he presents his alternative model for subjectivity by trying to conceive of selfconsciousness such that the self-relation makes no separation between thinker and thought. While Fichte's insight into the limitations of the reflective model of consciousness is generally accepted, his own account of the character of the immediate self-relation, which he presents as the alternative to the reflective model, was never satisfactorily resolved. The exposition of Fichte will examine his theory of subjectivity in relation to the central notion of striving; it will be argued that the notion of a striving subject tries to reconcile the dichotomy of idealism and realism.

This paper argues that an important feature of Locke's doctrine concerning primary and secondary qualities is also central to Hume's thinking. Section one considers Locke's distinction, presenting it in terms of an "error theory." Locke argues that we attribute secondary qualities to objects and that in so doing give those qualities an ontological status they do not otherwise possess. Locke completes his theory by drawing on the concept of "resemblance" to explain why such mistakes occur in the first place. Section two turns to Hume's philosophy, arguing that, despite his ambiguous comments on Locke and "the modern philosophy," he employs an error theory of the sort developed by Locke. This contention is supported by way of Hume's treatment of beauty as a secondary quality or sentiment which arises in an individual who judges an object beautiful. The paper concludes by emphasizing that, for Hume, this philosophical explanation of beauty stands in contrast to the error committed in common life where, as in Locke's account, people make the mistake of taking beauty to be in the object itself.

Emerson's Representative Men reveals his awareness of the dangers of the tyranny of the majority and his admiration for figures of great genius. These trends of thought, which led Emerson's contemporaries Carlyle and Nietzsche to reject democracy, are combined in Emerson with support for democracy. To understand and justify Emerson's combination of fear of the tyranny of the majority, admiration for genius, and support for democracy, it is helpful to examine his portrait of Socrates in Representative Men. Emerson's Socrates is a figure of genius who, by his ironic profession of ignorance and demonstration of moral truths, is capable of freeing the citizen of a democracy from the tyranny of the majority.

Taking off from the observation that scholars have for too long maintained that late ancient philosophy has no ethical theory, the purpose of this paper is toshow that there is. indeed an ethics in late antiquity, and even that it is rich and consistent. I make a distinction between an ethical theory (about e.g. happiness and virtue) and its practical foundation in the philosophical curriculum of Neoplatonic schools. I focus on the curriculum, showing that the pedagogical focus of late ancient ethics is twofold: it aims to make people turn away from worldly ties, but nevertheless always retains social concern as a main preoccupation. To this end two different kinds of ethical tasks can be distinguished: (a) the purification of the soul who is starting her philosophical journey and (b) the generous testimony of the soul who has already experienced purification. The Platonic call for divinization of the soul [Theaetetus 176b) turns out to bear interesting parallels with late ancient ethics and, what is more, to provide its general framework.

In the modern Continental tradition the word "subjectivity" is used to denote all that refers to a subject, its psychological-physical integrity represented by its mind, all that determines the unique mentality, mental state, and reactions of this subject. Subjectivity in this perspective has become on the Continent the central principle of philosophy.Modern Continental philosophy not only maintains the value of the subject and awakens an interest in genuine subjectivity. It evolves from the subject and subjective self-consciousness as Jundamento inconcusso. Thus modern Continental philosophy should be understood and discussed as a philosophy of subjectivity. This paper deals, on the one hand, with the philosophical-historical reconstruction of modern philosophy of subjectivity from Descartes to Hegel, and, on the other hand, with an analysis and evaluation of Hegel's systematic approach to subjectivity in terms of philosophical tradition, especially from the viewpoint of the realization of the idealistic program of selfconsciousness represented by German idealists.Focusing on the major lines of development of the theory of subjectivity in Continental philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, 1(1) discuss the quandaries of early modern philosophers concerning subject and subjectivity and their attempts to resolve these quandaries by developing the fundamentally new (in contrast to previous tradition) understanding of subjectivity; (2) show that the issue of subjectivity was the basic topic of transcendental idealism; and (3) introduce Hegel's approach to subjectivity and briefly define its novel character.

Aristotle is right to argue that the best life is a life of unimpeded activity, but I believe he went wrong in thinking that ordinary human life is, or must be, far removed from the best life. To establish this claim, I offer a historical explanation of what unimpeded activity involves. I use the class of art patrons in Renaissance Florence to show how mathematical skills acquired in everyday life can be applied to widely differing tasks. As patrons extend their mathematical skills, their activities become more self-realizing and hence more continuous in Aristotle's sense. I argue that the activities of the Florentine patron class, to be sustained over time, require many of Aristotle's virtues. Examples like this show, I argue, that reasonably unimpeded activity is an important human good and that it is genuinely desirable to, and within the grasp of, ordinary people, even those who initially claim no interest in virtue.

In the sixth century BCE Ionian philosophers explained the sun as a mass of fire, sometimes as floating like a leaf or a cloud above the earth. It was thought to be fueled by moist vapors from the earth. In the f i f t h century philosophers typically envisaged the sun as a red-hot stone or a molten mass carried around by the force of a cosmic vortex. The decisive shift in explanations seems to result from the cosmology of Parmenides, who recognized that the moon received its light from the sun, and hence inferred that the heavenly bodies were spherical solid bodies. The new theory required a new account of how the sun came to be hot. The sun was said to be heated either by being in a fiery region or by friction. The discovery of a large meteorite seemed to confirm the fifth-century theory.

This paper draws upon my research into the posthumously published fragmentary remains of Hölderlin and Novalis's philosophical reflections to describe how their explanations of the possibility of self-consciousness are far more convincing than those provided by their philosophical contemporaries, and still have much to contribute to contemporary debates concerning the nature of 'consciousness' and 'selfhood.' The paper begins by sketching the background to their accounts of self-consciousness, that is, Fichte's critique of Kant's 'reflection model' of self-consciousness and the subsequent critique of Fichte's 'solution' to this problem by more orthodox Kantians (such as F. I . Niethammer). I shall then present an account of how Hölderlin and Novalis may be said to enact a 'synthesis' of the opposed Kantian and Fichtean positions, to formulate an account of self-consciousness that on one hand acknowledges the power of—in Henrich's words—Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht into the inadequacy of the Kantian 'reflection model,' whilst, on the other hand, re-appropriating such a 'reflection model.' They thus argue that I am only aware of myself as T by means of a reflective act (in which I in some sense become my own intentional object), whilst at the same time arguing that such awareness nevertheless involves a non-reflective 'dimension.' For Hölderlin and Novalis, therefore, consciousness is always intentionally directed, and yet in being intentionally directed, it is also non-reflectively related to itself or "self-luminous" sea conception of consciousness which has similarities with Sartre's conception of the 'pre-reflective cogito.'