Being experienced (Erfahrung) means living. Around these two concepts: experience and living, I created this paper, as an approach to a pretty sensitive field of study, the religious one.The place of truth here can be read between the lines, but this issue stays open and needs more profound study. There is still a question: what is thepriority in studying religious experience: living as an inner and outer manifestation of a person, the analysis of a psychological report between the human being and the divine, the sacred, a research of a belief's truth or all these taken together.It is obvious that Truth stays in itself and its basis is in itself, and the report with the human is found through the act of living.

A socioanthropological debate in the 17th Century. The Myth of the Good Savage. The myth of the Good Savage was born and developed especially in the17th century, but it already had its ethnological bases in the geographical discoveries of the 15th century and in the colonial conquests. The French Enlightenment questions about the Occidental civilization and the moral principles that were the bases of the colonial expansions of the European powers. The cultural debate, extended by the anthropological science, was directed to the attempt to knowledge the submissive populations who became the colonial populations. Any kind of reduction of the social debate to the superiority of the Occidental human being is progressively surpassed by the comparison of two worlds, initially opposed and than more and more close to one another: the civilization world and the primitive one. In Voltaire’s stories the moment of the overtaking of the natural state, specific to the savage, is more important, through one necessary acculturation, while in the autobiographic and traveling stories, under the impulse of the ethnical similarities reminded by Rousseau and by the anthropological philosophers, is asserted the equality of people’s rights. In this way the natural condition is „sweetened” by the knowledge of the nature and of its laws, which is inspired from the recognition of the equality between social condition and birth. To fallow the laws of nature means to surpass the social conventions and to give back to the civilized man the naturalness of his own feelings, the innocence and the purity of his customs. In the rational way, to fallow the laws of the nature means the reconciliation between Rousseau’s principles and Voltaire’s ones. In this way the paradoxes of the civilized world and the ones of the primitive world are eliminated through the integration of the two in one united concept.

Merleau-Ponty. Une conception de l’empathie non centrée sur le sujet?Cet article étudie l’émergence du terme « empathie » dans les textes de Merleau-Ponty. Il souligne que le concept n’est pas avant tout présenté comme une catégorie épistémologique, remettant en question si et comment nous pouvons éventuellement connaître les autres. Au contraire, il est conçu comme une catégorie ontologique, pour dire notre appartenance à une nature commune. De ce point de vue, il propose une façon sensible pour comprendre les autres, basée sur une proximité et un partage physiques.Mais, avec des références à l’actuel débat, le texte suggère que, dans les réflexions du phénoménologue français, il est possible de trouver un paradigme qui n’est pas centré sur une conception subjective de l’empathie – c’est a dire qu’il s’agit d’un paradigme qui ne suppose pas toujours une projection subjective de ma sensibilité sur celle des autres. Plutôt, il peut à la fois consister en un sentiment commun, prépersonnel, qui constitue l’arrière-plan de nos sensibilités conscientes, et aussi proceder de l’autre être humain à moi, alors que souvent je sens et comprendre moi-même par differentiation des autres personnes, qui s’imposent sur mes sentiments et sur mes mots.Merleau-Ponty. A Conception of Empathy not centered on the Subject?This paper investigates the emergence of the term “empathy” in Merleau-Ponty’s texts. It points out that the concept is not primarly introduced as an epistemological category, questioning if and how eventually we can know the others. On the contrary it is meant as an ontological category, in order to say our belonging to a common nature. From this point of view he proposes a sensible way to understanding the others, based on a bodily closeness and sharing.But, with references to the current debate, the text suggests that in the reflections of the French phenomenologist it is possible to find a not subjectively centered paradigm for understandig empathy – that is a paradigm which does not always presuppose a subjective projection of my sensibility on that of the other ones. It can rather both consist in a common, prepersonal feeling, costituting the background of our conscious sensitivities, and proceed from the other human being to me, so that I often feel and understand myself by differing from the other individuals, who impose themselves on my senses and on my words.