In this paper, a pluralistic explanation of the sources of evil according to Plato is offered, which takes into account not only ethics, but also cosmology. In Plato, one must distinguish between negative evils, which result from the inherent distortion of images, that is, of bodies, as compared to their model, that is, of intelligible reality; and positive evils, whose ultimate cause is the soul. In the case of the soul of the world, one must speak of relative positive evils that are the consequence of its degraded power, and in the case of man, of absolute positive evils, which are the consequence of error.

Alexander’s Treatises on Fate (in Greek) and on Providence (conserved in Arabic) have many features in common, so that Jaap Mansfeld referred to them as «twins treatises». One reason of this kinship is the method used by Alexander, who takes the doxographical presentation as a skeptical dissensus in order to establish the superiority of Aristotelian thesis. But another reason, perhaps more important, is their conceptual closeness : the peripatetic definitions of providence and fate, in these two treatises, are very similar and obviously seek to address similar concerns. This proximity is so high that one could ask in which way the two concepts differ one from another. In this paper I will offer an overview of common features between the two treatises, especially Alexander’s attempts to find some textual grounds in Aristotle’s treatises for building a peripatetic theory of fate and providence consistent and strong enough to be held against the thesis developed on these topics since the Hellenistic period. Then I will propose a hypothesis on the relation between these two treatises and consequently between these two concepts.

In this paper, we argue that Plotinus denies deliberative forethought about the physical cosmos to the demiurge (or to any other divine principle) on the basis of certain basic and widely shared Platonic and Aristotelian assumptions about the character of divine thought. We then discuss how Plotinus can nonetheless maintain (as he does) that the cosmos is «providentially» ordered.

Studies the doctrine of providence of the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry of Tyre (c. 234‑c‑304 AD). Following a survey of Hellenistic theories of fate and providence, the doctrine of destiny ex hupotheseos, developed on the basis of Plato’s dialogues, is examined : according to it, our acts are free, but their consequences are necessary. As an integral part of Middle Platonic philosophy, this theory was probably transmitted to Late Antiquity by Porphyry. We then move on to examine Porphyry’s treatise On what depends on us, which contains an interpretation of Plato’s Myth of Er, and develops the doctrine of the twofold choice of lives. Nemesius and Proclus react, each in his own way, against the individualism of Porphyry’s approach. In conclusion, the theory of fate and providence in Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy is briefly examined.

The article is dedicated to the study of the origins of Christian cosmogony. Christian authors of the 2nd century are known for their enigmatic or ambiguous positions on the issue. The problem concerns mainly the apologists, but it first appears in Ignatius of Antioch (†180) and continues in Bardesanes (†222). Although they all confess God as the Creator, their ways of presenting the act of creation are strongly marked by philosophical doctrines, primarily by Platonism, or by Stoicism in the case of Bardesanes. The Christian Creator receives the characteristics of a demiurge and an artisan. This approach has implications for the notions of universe and matter. But first and foremost, the idea of God as a demiurge and an artisan determines the role assigned to the Logos in the act of creation. Those concepts are later abandoned in favour of a doctrine based more on the Bible, but they give us a better understanding of the relationship between young Christianity and Platonism.

La discussione sull’idea del buono (to agathon) occupa uno spazio marginale nel libro VI della Repubblica, ma comporta un eccezionale impegno teorico : di qui la vastita della letteratura esegetica che contrasta con la brevita del testo platonico. Il problema cruciale e questo : in Repubblica VI 504a‑509c to agathon non e piu solo un principio di valorizzazione e un criterio di valutazione di cose e condotte – com’e consueto in Platone – ma assume il ruolo di principio ontologico ed epistemologico. Questa posizione ha spesso suggerito interpretazioni di tipo “teologico” dell’idea del buono (identificata a volte con l’Uno neoplatonico, altre con il Demiurgo del Timeo). Quello che si puo affermare sulla base del testo, e che Platone ha conferito in queste pagine della Repubblica un primato al vertice etico del triangolo i cui altri vertici sono quello ontologico e quello epistemologico ; l’intento e quello di offrire una fondazione etica assoluta (antiprotagorea), mediante la connessione della sfera del valore con quelle dell’essere e della verita (quindi anche in ambito politico una giustificazione ultimativa al diritto dei filosofi a governare).L’unificazione delle dimensioni etica, ontologica ed epistemologica sarebbe parsa teoricamente insostenibile ad Aristotele, cui si deve una critica devastante alla teoria platonica del buono.

The article again treats the question of whether ≪the Idea of the Good is a Reality in the Universe, or beyond it. Is it immanent or transcendent ?≫ (Rufus Jones, 1863‑1948). Plato scholars such as Matthias Baltes (1940‑2003) and Luc Brisson have defended the thesis that Plato’s Idea of the Good is, on the one hand, beyond being (epekeina tes ousias) in dignity and power, but, on the other, is nevertheless not transcendent over being. The article delivers first (I) the most important arguments for the thesis of Baltes and Brisson. Then (II), it gives two counterarguments against the thesis. Third (III), it concludes with some general questions concerning the deflationist interpretation of Plato’s Republic 509b9‑10, and defends again the transcendence of the Idea of the Good.

Self‑sufficiency of the Good and dependency of Being ? From Republic to Sophist. Even thought Parmenides doesn’t use αὐτάρκης and any noun derived from this root, the Being is conceived by him as self‑sufficient (v. 8,33). Plato, for its part, never uses this term concerning the intelligible reality ; however, in the Sophist, he allusively challenges Parmenides self‑sufficiency of Being and outlines an ontology that is conflicting with it. On the other hand self‑sufficiency is explicitly ascribed by Plato to the human good (Philebus, 20d, 67a), to the divine world (Timaeus, 33d), and also to the virtuous man (Republic, 387d). This paper aims to demonstrate that these facets (theological or anthropological) of self‑sufficiency are consistent with the supremacy of the idea of the Good in the Republic, which can be understood as a structural kind of self‑sufficiency.

Among Plato’s dialogues, the Timaeus was the most authoritative for Middle Platonists. But alone it does not suffice to explain some of the most important tenets defended by these philosophers. A remarkable example is the doctrine of the three Principles (God, Ideas, matter), which characterizes imperial Platonism, and which cannot be stated on the basis of the Timaeus alone. In my paper I show that Numenius was influenced by the Republic as well : in the metaphor of the Sun he found the Good as first principle and an indication of a second principle which is further subdivided into an Intellect thinking the Ideas and a Demiurge ordering the universe. This interpretation provides him with some interesting solutions. But such an influence also raises difficulties insofar as the causal role of the first principle is concerned.

Why does the Stoic demiurge cause the conflagration ? In this paper, I revisit some issues addressed in Salles 2005 and argue that the conflagration is the result of an incapacity in the demiurge for creating an everlasting and uninterrupted cosmic order. Also, I bring out in more detail (a) the parallel between the Stoics and Plato at Tim. 75a‑c (section 1), (b) why cosmic order is the ultimate end pursued by the demiurge (section 2), (c) what is the physical mechanism that leads up to the conflagration (section 3), and (d) why the conflagration is contrary to the cosmic order (sections 1 and 4).