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Ken Cussen
Aesthetics and Environmental Argument
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The human-centred notion of the “instrumental value of nature” and the eco-centred notion of the “intrinsic value of nature” both fail to provide satisfactory grounds for the preservation of wild nature. This paper seeks to identify some reasons for that failure and to suggest that the structure - though not the content - of the “aesthetic value” approach is the most promising alternative, though the notion of “the aesthetic value of nature”, as usually employed, also fails to capture the real motivation for such preservation. I argue that these problems arise because humans are, for good reasons, deeply ambivalent about their relation to nature. This ambivalence is explained in a Nietzschean context and I argue that an understanding of this ambivalence can be used to develop and illustrate a fuller and richer understanding of what we mean by “the value of nature” which does provide grounds for the preservation of wild nature.
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42.
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Thomas Heyd
Nature Restoration Without Dissimulation:
Learning from Japanese Gardens and Earthworks
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43.
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Emily Brady
Interpreting Environments
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44.
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William O. Stephens
If Friendship Hurts, an Epicurean Deserts: A Reply to Andrew Mitchell
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Andrew Mitchell
A Response to the Reply of William O. Stephens to “Friendship Amongst the Self-Sufficient: Epicurus”
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46.
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David Boersema
Introduction: Pragmatism and Neopragmatism
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47.
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Heidi Salaverria
Who is Exaggerating? The Mystery of Common Sense
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48.
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Hendrik R. Pieterse
Neopragmatism and the Christian Desire for a Transcendent God:
Is a Meaningful Dialogue Possible?
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Charbel Niño El-Hani, Sami Pihlström
Emergence Theories and Pragmatic Realism
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The tradition of pragmatism has, especially since Dewey, been characterized by a commitment to nonreductive naturalism. The notion of emergence, popular in the early decades of the twentieth century and currently re-emerging as a central concept in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, may be useful in explicating that commitment. The present paper discusses the issue of the reality of emergent properties, drawing particular attention to a pragmatic way of approaching this issue. The reality of emergents can be defended as a pragmatically-useful ontological commitment; hence, pragmatism can be employed as a tool in the debate over the structure and reality of emergence. This strategy of justifying ontological commitments is examined through historical and systematic discussions of the pragmatist tradition. It turns out, among other things, that while classical pragmatists did not specify any technical notion of emergence in the contemporary sense, their non-reductively naturalist views are relevant to the more recent emergence discussions -- especially because they rejected the metaphysical realism typical of today’s ontologically-oriented emergence theories.
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Gregory M. Fahey
The Idea of the Good in John Dewey and Aristotle
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Kevin Decker
Habermas on Human Rights and Cloning:
A Pragmatist Response
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52.
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Mark McEvoy
Naturalized Epistemology, Normativity and the Argument Against the A Priori
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53.
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Brian E. Butler
Legal Pragmatism:
Banal or Beneficial as a Jurisprudential Position?
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D. S. Clark
Pragmatism’s Instrumental View of Moral Reasoning
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55.
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Dennis R. Cooley
Medical Research Ethics: Introduction
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56.
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David Rudge
Do Unknown Risks Preclude Informed Consent?
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Allen Buchanan and Daniel Brock, in a widely influential account, Deciding for Others (1990), advocate a sliding scale approach to the determination of whether a patient is competent to make a decision regarding his/her health care. An analysis of two critiques of their position (Beauchamp and Childress (1994), Wicclair (1991 a,b)) reveals a tacit presumption by all of these authors that the greater cognitive challenge often posed by high risk therapies constitutes grounds for an elevated standard of competence. This presumption cannot be consistently maintained in cases where the patient's decision involves experimental therapies. It implies either that informed consent can never take place in such situations, or, perhaps even more counter-intuitively, that a lower standard of competency should be used than when the patient is asked to choose only among standard therapies.
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Richard B. Miller
How the Belmont Report Fails
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58.
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William Fish
The Direct/Indirect Distinction in Contemporary Philosophy of Perception
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59.
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Paul Coates
Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness and Theories of Attention
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The problem of the richness of visual experience is that of finding principled grounds for claims about how much of the world a person actually sees at any given moment. It is argued that there are suggestive parallels between the two-component analysis of experience defended by Wilfrid Sellars, and certain recently advanced information processing accounts of visual perception. Sellars' later account of experience is examined in detail, and it is argued that there are good reasons in support of the claim that the sensory nonconceptual content of experience can vary independently of conceptual awareness. It is argued that the Sellarsian analysis is not undermined by recent work on change blindness and related phenomena; a model of visual experience developed by Ronald Rensink is shown to be in essential harmony with the framework provided by Sellars, and provides a satisfactory answer to the problem of the richness of visual experience.
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David DeMoss
Hunting Fat Gnu:
How to Identify a Proxytype
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