41.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2004 >
Issue: 27
Ruey-Lin Chen
陳瑞 麟
Testing through Realizable Models
透過可落實模型來檢驗科學理論
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How is a scientific theory, especial a classical physical theory, tested? This problem has a long history. In this paper I’ll propose a theory of testing based on but differentiated from Giere’s studies on the structure of scientific theories (Giere 1988, 1994, 1999). I will show, from both theoretical and historical perspectives, that a scientific theory can always be understood as one contains a classified model population, including both higher-level models and realizable models, and that scientists always test a theory through its realizable models. To transmit the consequences of testing realizable models to a higher-level model is a very complicated mechanism. Therefore, it is unlikely that a whole theory could ever be completely confirmed or falsified, even if some of its realizable models havebeen conclusively confirmed or falsified. Finally, I’ll illustrate such a theory of testing can give an adequate account of the testing history of a scientific theory, for example, the Newtonian theory. This theory of testing is a rational reconstruction, in Lakatosian sense, of the process of scientific testing.
像古典力學一類的科學理論如何被檢驗?這個問題有個長 遠的歷史。在本文中,我將提議一個檢驗理論,建基在吉爾關於 科學理論結構的研究上。但我的模型觀點與吉爾有些微不同。我 將從理論性和歷史性兩個不同角度來展示:科學理論總是可以被 理解為擁有一個分類的模型體系的理論,其中包括高層的模型與 可落實模型;而且科學家總是透過可落實模型來檢驗理論。但 是,透過可落實模型把檢驗的結果傳送到高層的模型或原理,乃 是一件非常複雜的機制。因此,就算有一些可落實模型被印證或 否證,整體理論完全被印證或否證實際上不太可能。最後,我將 以說明牛頓理論的檢驗史為例,來佐證本文提議的檢驗理論。以 拉卡托斯的話來說,這個檢驗理論在本質上也是個針對歷史的 「合理重建」。
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42.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1973 >
Issue: 3
Catherine D. Rau
The Artist's Intention and G.E.M. Anscombe's Intention
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43.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1973 >
Issue: 3
Robert L. Martin
Ayer on Sense and Reference
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44.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1973 >
Issue: 3
Martin A. Bertman
Pain
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45.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1973 >
Issue: 3
Chung-ying Cheng
Metaphors: An Annotated Bibliography and History by Warren Shibles
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46.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2005 >
Issue: 30
Francisco Calvo Garzón
Francisco Calvo Garzón
Game-Theoretical Semantics and Referential Inscrutability
賽局理論語意學與指涉之 不可測度說
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This paper consists of two parts. First, (i) I shall consider two defences of Quine´s polemical Thesis of the Inscrutability of Reference put forward by Hookway (1988), and Calvo Garzón (2000a; 2000b), respectively. Then, (ii) I shall consider an extension of Quine´s succinct behavioural criteria of Radical Translationsuggested by Hintikka´s Game-Theoretical Semantics (1973; 1976). I shall argue that Hintikka´s semantics suggest behavioural criteria which we can use to constrain perverse semantic theories. In particular, I shall try to show that whilst Hintikka´s behavioural data tells against Hookway´s proposal, it reveals, nonetheless, a reason as to why my proposed perverse semantic theory enjoys the same priviledged status that a standard semantic theory is supposed toenjoy.
此篇論文有兩部分,第一,我將討論分別由Hookway 及Calvo Garzon 所提出對Quine 的指涉之不可測度說的兩個辯護。第二, 我將討論Hintikka 的賽局理論語意學如何延伸Quine 徹底翻譯之 行為判准。我將論證,Hintikka 語意學所提出的行為判准將可限 制不當的語意理論。尤其是,我將說明儘管Hintikka 的行為與料 不符Hookway 的方案,它仍說明了為什麼我所謂的不當語意理 論享有一般語意理論所享有的特權地位。
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47.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2005 >
Issue: 30
Aysel Doğan
Aysel Doğan
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities and Causal Determination
其他可能性原則與因果決定論
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Some compatibilists believe that the principle of alternative possibilities has been shown to be false by Frankfurt-style arguments, and this gives way to the compatibility of causal determination with moral responsibility. Those incompatibilists who defend the principle of alternative possibilities, on the other hand, insist on the truth of the principle and on the incompatibility of causal determination with moral responsibility. In this article, I argue that Frankfurt-stylecounterexamples are unsuccessful in indicating the falsity of the principle of alternative possibilities, and yet this failure is inconclusive to prove the correctness of incompatibilism. In fact, the principle of alternative possibilities is, I show, compatible with causal determination and thus with compatibilism on a specificunderstanding of determinism and compatibilism.
有些相容論者相信其他可能性原則已為Frankfurt 的反例所 駁斥,而這讓支持因果決定與道德責任為相容的相容論者有機可 乘。但捍衛其他可能性原則的不相容論者則堅持此原則,以及因 果決定與道德責任的不相容性。在此篇論文中,我將論證 Frankfurt 的反例無法指出其他可能性的錯誤,但這不會導致不相 容論的成立。事實上,我將證明,在一種對決定論與相容論的理 解下,其他可能性原則與因果決定論及相容論者是相容的。
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48.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2007 >
Issue: 34
Caleb Y. Liang
梁益堉 *
Conceptualism and Phenomenal Character
概念論與現象特性
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Consider two of the central debates in the contemporary philosophy of mind: the debate between representationalism and anti-representationalism about phenomenal character, and the debate between conceptualism and nonconceptualism about the content of experience. The former, the qualia debate, centers on whether the phenomenal character of conscious experience is exhausted by its representational content. The latter is about whether conceptual capacities are constitutive of the representational content of perceptual experience such that the only kind of content that perceptual experience possesses is conceptual content. Most philosophers consider these two debates as unrelated, or at least should be treated separately. In this paper, I argue that there is an obvious and important sense in which the two issues are related. More specifically, if one accepts conceptualism, it would impose a significant constraint on what position one is allowed to take in the qualia debate. First, I suggest that once it is made clear that conceptualism can be considered as a particular version of representationalism, the conceptualist would have to take a certain stance on whether there are nonintentional qualia. The reason why the conceptualist needs to worry about the qualia issue is that if in addition to intentional content perceptual experiences also contain nonintentional qualia as constituents, then perceptual experiences cannot be fully conceptual. Second, I argue that although in McDowellian conceptualism the content of perceptual experience is construed in terms of Fregean sense rather than internal mental representation, it still faces challenges from the Inverted Earth argument against representationalism. My goal is not to show that conceptualism fails, but to show that it is a serious issue that the defenders of conceptualism have to take into consideration.
當代心智哲學有兩個重要爭議:一是關於意識之現象特性 (phenomenal character)的表徵論(representationalism)與反表徵論 ( anti-representationalism) 之爭; 另一是關於經驗內容的概念論 (conceptualism)與非概念論(nonconceptualism)之爭。第一個論爭, 可稱為感質之爭(the qualia debate),討論意識的現象特性是否能完全 被表徵內容所窮盡。第二個論爭的焦點在於,知覺經驗的內容是否由 我們的概念能力(conceptual capacities)所參與構成,以致於完全是概 念性的內容(conceptual content)。大部分哲學家認為這兩個爭論互不 相干,或認為應該分開處理。在本文中,我指出這兩個爭議其實有一 明顯且重要的關連。那就是:在第二個論爭中若採取概念論的立場, 那麼在第一個論爭中就非得採取表徵論不可。更進一步說,本文要論 證兩件事:第一,概念論可以視為是一種特殊版本的表徵論。一旦釐 清這點, 持概念論者就需要提出理由來反對非意向性感質 (nonintentional qualia)的存在。原因是:如果知覺經驗除了意向性內 容之外,還具有非意向性的感質為其成分的話,那麼知覺經驗的內容 就無法完全是概念性的。第二,雖然McDowell 的概念論將知覺經驗 的內容理解為一種Fregean sense,而非理解為某種心理表徵(mental representation),這樣的立場仍然得面對「顛倒地球論證」(the Inverted Earth argument)的攻擊。概念論並不一定因此失敗,但任何為概念論 的辯護都必須設法回應這項攻擊。
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49.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2007 >
Issue: 34
Melissa Zinkin
Melissa Zinkin
Kant’s Concept of Force: Empiricist or Rationalist?
康德之力的概念: 經驗論者或理性論者?
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This paper explores Kant's account of force, a topic that was of central philosophical concern in his day, but which he does not explicitly address in any of his Critiques. Just as with the nature of space and time and the nature of the human will, the nature of force was under dispute by the philosophers and natural scientists to whose legacy Kant was responding. Yet, Kant does not make force an explicit topic of his Critiques, and thus provides no explicit transcendental account of force. Nevertheless, I will argue that one can indeed find in Kant a transcendental account of force, one that is a synthesis of empiricist and rationalist accounts, but in an unexpected place; the third Critique, in the discussion of the principle of purposiveness
本論文探討康德對於力的說明。這個題目在康德所處的時代中,位於哲學關懷的核心地位,但在他的各種《批判》裡,他卻沒有明示 地處理過這個題目。正如同時間與空間的本質以及人類意志的本質, 康德回應有關哲學家與自然科學家爭論力的本質之成果。然而,康德 並沒有在他的《批判》中,將力作為一個明示的主題,因而並沒有針 對力的概念,提供一個明示的先驗說明。不過,我論證,吾人的確可 以在康德哲學中尋獲一個有關力的先驗說明,而且這是一個經驗論與 理性論說明的綜合,只不過在一處意想不到的地方:在《第三批判》中,有關合目的性原則的討論裡。
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50.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2010 >
Issue: 39
Chung-Kee Lee
李仲 驥
From Aquinas’ Analogy to Ian Ramsey’s Models and Disclosures – the Possibility of Religious Language Then and Now
從阿奎那的類比法到藍聖恩的 「模型」與「揭示」 ──宗教語言可能性的古與今
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The search for a proper language for God-talk is a perennial task in theology as well as in philosophy. From times of antiquity, the use of analogy was employed in different realms of knowledge. Yet it was not until the medieval era, primarily through the effort of Thomas Aquinas, that analogy was used extensively in religious discourse. However, Thomistic analogy was not accepted by all. The contention between univocal and analogical use of words was never settled. The contemporary scene adds further fuel to the debate. Logical positivism claims that God-talk is totally meaningless, as truth claims can never be established in such a domain. And some critics say that religion belongs to the world of the ‘un-sayable’ and silence is the only response. The situation demands an urgent response from the side of the religious thinkers, and Ian Ramsey, previous Nolloth professor of Philosopy of Christian Religion at Oxford University, has taken up the task to face this challenge. Ramsey’s job is twofold. First, he is of course concerned with defending religious discourse against such philosophical critiques. At the same time, he is eager to show how theological apologetics could actually benefit from the tenets of Logical Empiricism. His method of ‘models’ and‘disclosures’ is used to demonstrate the empirical relevance of religious language. Such approach also reveals that religious discourses do containsomething more than the narrowness of meaning and truth set down by the logical empiricists. The purpose of this paper is to place Aquinas’ analogyside by side with Ramsey’s models approach and see how they compare and contrast each other. Specifically, we will see how these approaches haveroughly the same dynamics of going from what is seen to what is unseen in talking about God. We will also see how the two projects differ owing to a fundamental difference in their ontology.
尋覓一套適切的語言,以便用於有關上帝的言說(God - talk),歷久以 來都是神學及哲學的一個重要課題。比喻作為一種語言的工具,自古已被應 用到不同的知識範疇,但對宗教論述而言,類比的方法卻是經由中世紀的托 馬斯‧阿奎那推廣後,才開始被廣泛採用。但阿奎那式的類比法也並非普遍 被接納。其中的主要爭論,是在於文字究竟是否只可以作單一意義的闡釋,還是可以像比喻那樣具有多重涵義。當代學術界的研究,對宗教語言的討論 更是火上加油:邏輯實證論者堅持認為有關上帝的言說都是毫無意義的,因 為真理的宣稱永不能在這個範疇得以立定。有些批評者更認為,宗教是屬於 「不能言說」的世界,人們只能以沉默來回應。這些批評驅使宗教思想家們急於作出回應。前牛津大學基督宗教哲學教授藍聖恩(Ian Ramsey)對此挑 戰作出了當面的回應。他的回答可分為兩方面。首先,他固然是要在這些哲 學的批判之前為宗教語言作出辯護。與此同時,他也渴望說明護教學其實能 夠從邏輯經驗主義的理論找到支持。藍氏所建構的「模型」(model)與「揭 示」(disclosure)進路,恰能證明宗教語言在經驗世界的基礎。他的進路也 顯示出,宗教言說所涵概的足以超越經驗主義對真理與意義的狹隘定義。本 文的目的,是將阿奎那的類比法與藍氏的模型理論作一個比較,並特別指出 兩個方法同樣是從可見的到不可見的進路來言說上帝。與此同時,本文也會 指出,兩者因着不同的本體論引申而來的基本區別。
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51.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1981 >
Issue: 4
Paui Yu
On Theories of Reference
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52.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1981 >
Issue: 4
Po-wen Kuo
On Arthur Danto's Criticism of the Speculative Philosophy of History
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53.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2012 >
Issue: 44
Jih-Ching Ho
何志 青
The Motivational Structure in Practical Reason
實踐理由之動機結構
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A central issue in the contemporary philosophy of action focuses on the relation between reason and motivation: Internalism holds, while Externalism denies, that there is a necessary connection between reasons for action and motivational states. In 1980, Bernard Williams launched a powerful argument against Externalism in his article, “Internal and External Reasons,” which triggered influential debates in ethics, action theory, and theory of reason. Twenty years later Williams published “Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons” (2001), in which he refined his Humean theory so as to accommodate the many criticisms he had so far received. More importantly, he classified his major critics, in the past two decades, mainly into two groups, “the Kantian” and “the Aristotelian,” and raised objections to both. This paper explores the later development of the Kantian and the Aristotelian approaches, primarily in terms of the recent works of Christine Korsgaard and John McDowell, and argues to the effect that Williams’ objections are insufficient to refute the two approaches.
有關行動理由的哲學爭辯常聚焦於理由與動機之關連,內在論主張行動 理由與動機事實有必要之聯結,外在論則否認。1980 年,威廉斯發表論文 “Internal and External Reasons”,提出反對外在論的強力論證,引發了倫理 學、行動理論以及理由理論一連串深具影響力的辯論。二十年後,他發表 “Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons”(2001),精進他的休謨 理論以回應這些年來其他學者所提出的質詢;更重要的是,他將過去二十多 年來的主要批評歸類為兩種進路:「康德進路」以及「亞理斯多德進路」,並 且對二者提出強烈反對。本文檢視康德進路及亞理斯多德進路近來的可能發 展,其中包括柯思嘉和麥克道爾的哲學論述,以解釋並論證為何威廉斯的最 新論點不足以反駁此二進路。
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54.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2012 >
Issue: 44
Eric M. Peng
彭孟 堯
Why Resemblance is Not a Relation? -Trope Ontology in a Conceptualist Guise
為什麼相似性不是一個關係 ─從概念論看殊性存有論
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It is argued that Trope Particularism need not take trope-level resemblance to be an ontological primitive. The main idea is the appeal to the Arity Principle suggested by Butchvarov. But, this does not mean that “resemblance” is unintelligible. I propose that “resemblance” can be metaphysically reduced to a second order internal relation over two first order internal relations such as “greater than” and “heavier than,” and that the phenomena of similarity should call solely for an epistemological or psychological explanation.
本論文試圖論證:殊性存有論並不需要將殊性之間的相似關係作為其存 有論的原初設定。論證主要依據所謂的「位元原則」。但這不表示「相似」 是一個沒有意義的概念。本論文建議,在形上學裡,「相似」可以化約到介 於兩個一階內存關係之間的二階內存關係,例如「大於」、「重於」;本論文 並且倡議相似現象應該訴求知識論或心理學的解釋。
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55.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2014 >
Issue: 47
Cheng-Hung Tsai
蔡政 宏
Technê and Understanding
技藝與理解
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How can we acquire understanding? Linda Zagzebski has long claimed that understanding is acquired through, or arises from, mastering a particular practicaltechnê. In this paper, I explicate Zagzebski’s claim and argue that the claim is problematic. Based on a critical examination of Zagzebski’s claim, I propose, inconclusion and in brief, a new claim regarding the acquisition of understanding.
人是如何獲得「理解」?德性知識論的代表人物Linda Zagzebski 長久 來宣稱「理解的獲得來自於對技藝的掌握」。在本文中,作者闡釋Zagzebski 的宣稱,並指出這宣稱的問題。透過對Zagzebski 之宣稱的批判性檢視,作 者在文後提供另一修改自Zagzebski 的理解獲得觀點。
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56.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2014 >
Issue: 47
Caleb Liang
梁益 堉
Perceptual Anti-Individualism and Vision Science
知覺的反個體主義與視覺科學
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I discuss the nature of visual perception from an interdisciplinary perspective. The target of investigation is Tyler Burge’s theory of perceptual anti-individualism, according to which perceptual states constitutively depend on relations between perceivers and the external world. Burge argues that this theory is presupposed by vision science. My goal is to argue that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only theoretical choice. First, I consider the notion of homeostasis and suggest how it may cast doubt on the perceptual norms in Burge’s theory. Second, I argue that many phenomena studied by vision science can be explained without positing Burge’s notions of veridicality and singular representation. Third, I consider some empirical theories and argue that vision science does not uniquely favor Burge’s theory. I conclude that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only framework for understanding visual perception.
本文從跨領域的角度探討視覺的根本性質,並以Tyler Burge 的「知覺 的反個體主義」(perceptual anti-individualism)為研究對象。根據這一理論,知覺狀態的本質乃是由知覺者與外在環境的互動關係而定。Burge 提出論證 主張:視覺科學(vision science)預設了這個理論。本文反對這個觀點,並 企圖從三方面來論證:「知覺的反個體主義」不是我們理解視覺的唯一理論 選項。首先,我討論「體內恆定」(homeostasis)的概念,並指出這概念會 使我們對Burge 理論中的「知覺規範」(perceptual norms)產生質疑。第二,我以論證指出:許多視覺科學所研究的現象,可以不必預設Burge 理論中的 「正確性」(veridicality)和「單一表徵」(singular representation)也能得到解釋。第三,我討論一些有關視覺的科學理論並論證:許多視覺科學領域中 的看法其實不支持Burge 的理論。本文的結論是:「知覺的反個體主義」並 不是瞭解視覺本質唯一可選的理論架構。
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57.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2014 >
Issue: 48
Hsiu-Lin Ku
古秀 鈴
The Semantic Theory and the Availability Principle
語意理論與可及原則
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This paper aims to defend François Recanati’s Availability Principle approach to semantics by illuminating and responding to two major challenges from minimalists, in particular from Emma Borg: the first concerns the notion of intuitive content and “awareness-of” presupposed in the Availability Principle, and the second concerns whether the principle makes a semantic theory unfit with normativity and compositionality. I lead the discussion toward the kernel question--the bearer of the semantic content--and show that the Availability Principle is appropriate if we respect the empirical basis of meaning.
本文試圖替François Recanati 回應以Emma Borg 為主的兩面向批評,而 得以闡明並辯護其所主張的可及原則:其一面向是關於可及原則所預設的 「直覺內容」與「意識到」兩概念,其二面向是關於是否滿足可及原則會使 的語意理論無法滿足語言的規範性與組構性。我將引導此爭論至問題核心 ─即語意內容的承載者─重新審視何以一般咸認為語句本身有其客觀、不受脈絡影響而改變的語意內容,並論證若我們顧及意義的經驗基礎,則可及原則是恰當的。
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58.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2014 >
Issue: 48
Tzu-Wei Hung
洪子 偉
Why the Enzyme Model of Modularity Fails to Explain Higher Cognitive Processes
心智模組的酵素模型及其困難
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The enzyme model (EM), inspired by biological enzyme catalysis, is a computational-functional description of information processing and distribution in modular cognitive systems. It has been argued that EM offers advantages in solving both the allocation problem and global computation and thus may play a role in upholding the massive modularity hypothesis (MMH). This paper, however, argues that EM solutions are untenable, as EM avoids the infinite regress of allocation problem only at a high cost and with several critical drawbacks. Moreover, to clarify global processes, EM needs to satisfy two necessary conditions: first to demonstrate that the EM allows cross module communication, and second to be sensitive to not only the syntax but also the semantics of representations. I argue that EM only satisfies the first condition and thus fails to hold.
「酵素模型」指的是借用生物學中酵素催化機制的概念,來說明認知科 學中「大量模組假說」在計算與功能層次上有關資訊處理與分配之模型。酵 素模型的最大優點在於回應了「訊號配置」與「整體計算」兩難題,從而替 大量模組假說提供有利的辯護基礎。但本文之目的,在論證酵素模型的這兩 個回應並不成立。一方面,酵素模型在避免訊號配置的無限後退時會產生新 的困難。另一方面,要說明整體計算至少得滿足兩個必要條件:一是跨模組 的訊號交換是可能的、二在於模組能夠不只是針對輸入訊號的語法結構來處 理訊號。本文將論證酵素模型頂多說明如何滿足第一個必要條件,而沒有釐 清第二個必要條件如何在該模型中實現。換言之,酵素模型對兩難題的回應 不成立。因此,酵素模型無法用以支持大量模組假說。
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59.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2015 >
Issue: 49
Hua-kuei Ho
何畫瑰
Plato’s Treatment of Desire and Eryximachus’ Medicine in the Symposium
理性的慾望:柏拉圖對慾望的看法 與《饗宴》裡厄律克希馬可斯「愛的醫療」
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Confronted with the stereotype of a rationalistic Plato, the paper argues for the value of desire at its own right in Plato. To explore the relation between desire and rationality in Plato, I choose Eryximachus’ medicine in the Symposium as an object of comparison. Eryximachus’ τέχνη, representing the Hippocratic medical knowledge, is in conformity with Plato’s earlier requirement of knowledge, that is, giving a rational account. The medicine achieves the harmony by balancing the good and bad desires. Plato’s philosophy, however, goes beyond the epistemic model of rational science or τέχνη. On the treatment of desire, he does not follow the discrimination of good and bad desires in medicine, nor does he even out the different desire, because as the doctor. Plato’s philosophy needs the strength of desire, because—though desire sometimes becomes irrational—it is the vital strength of the soul to pursue philosophy.
面對一般對柏拉圖「理性主義」的刻板印象,這篇論文試圖論述:對柏 拉圖而言,「慾望」本身具有價值。為進一步探討柏拉圖哲學中慾望和理性 的關係,文中將以《饗宴》裡厄律克希馬可斯的醫學談話,作為比較的對象。 厄律克希馬可斯的「技藝」(τέχνη),即,希波克拉底派的醫學,符合柏拉 圖早期對知識的要求,也就是:知識必須要能提出合理的說明;此外,當時 的醫學是在藉由好慾望與壞慾望之間的平衡,而使人內在各成分達致健康與 和諧。然而,這裡提出的解釋是:柏拉圖的哲學超出了理性科學或技藝的知 識範本;在對慾望的處理上,他不依循醫學對慾望好壞的區分,他的和諧概 念也保留了理性與非理性慾望並存的差異。柏拉圖哲學需要慾望的力量,慾望雖然可能變成非理性,卻也是靈魂追求哲學不可缺少的力量。
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60.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1982 >
Issue: 5
Hsueh-Li Cheng
Mādhyamika, Kant and Wittgenstein
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