I re-question the Enlightenment by bringing together Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Peter Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason. The year 2021 celebrates the 240th and 40th anniversary of the respective Critiques, and it is opportune to read the common thread that binds them—the Enlightenment. This essay has three parts: I first read the Critique of Pure Reason in light of Kant’s Enlightenment essay to underscore reason’s ill-fate as found in the public sphere; I then introduce Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason along with his general philosophy, highlighting the cynical state he characterizes reason’s public presence with. In the conclusion, I draw affinities between the two Critiques to form a certain dialogue in the presentation of both philosophers to understand the concept on stage: the Enlightenment.

Critical Social Theory's search for a normative ground of its engagement in the critique of contemporary societies is essentially founded on a reflexive way of thinking. Arguably, this can be traced back from modernity - specifically to Kant, Hegel, and Marx. This paper will demonstrate how the Kantian, Hegelian, and Marxian practices of self-reflection inform the concept of social critique. By an adequate understanding of self-reflection, we secure the methodological foundation of critical social theory.

Embedded in the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi is a unique concept that lends itself to the formulation of a distinct system of ethics. The distinctiveness that wu-wei infuses into the realm of ethics resides in its principal constituent, spontaneity. Implicit in wu-wei is spontaneity and its dialectical opposite, the nonspontaneous elements that are essential to the integrity of any system of ethics. This paper attempts to bring to the fore this implicit dialectic of spontaneity and non spontaneity through wu-wei's relation to the Dao as harmony of opposites, its imperative of enlightened response, and its congeniality to the case for libertarianism.

This paper seeks to develop a Wittgensteinian response to the Scope Problem, which ensnares a theory of truth considered as inflationary. The scope problem challenges any inflationary truth theory to provide a single explanation which can account for the concept of truth given the diversity of statements that most of us are willing to accept as true. In line with Wittgenstein's later-views on language and philosophy and their corresponding functions, this paper provides a general diagnosis of the problem: similarities in syntax do not entail similarities in meaning. By employing Wittgenstein's metaphors (i.e., "handles" and "tools") and an analysis via concrete cases and analogies, this paper responds to the challenge presented by the Scope Problem, not by providing a satisfactory definition of truth but rather by providing its "dissolution" á la Wittgenstein.

The integrative approach to punishment appears more adequate than the utilitarian and retributive theories. It does not only engender restitution, retribution, and deterrence but it also reconciles the physical and nonphysical realms of existence. The goal of punishment is to maintain social balance or order. Content analysis is employed. The integrative notion of punishment is associated with the principle of proportionality within a vigorous collective conscience. This paper seeks to contribute to the criminal justice system by going beyond the discussion of the utilitarian- retributive punishment framework.

The contemporary meaning of the concept φιλοσοφία is not quite clear especially because of the vagueness of the meaning of the ancient Greek word σοφία. Departing from the etymological research of Vladimir N. Toporov, we stress the synonymy of the words σοφία (wisdom) and τέχνη (art) in some contexts. These words act as synonyms in the mythological conception of the cosmos. According to this conception, both σοφία and τέχνη mean wisdom as a characteristic of the mind in relation to the origin of the cosmos. The word σοφία is related to cosmic self- generation while the word τέχνη, to cosmic creation. Our research shows that the meaning of " sophia-wisdom" either includes or is included in the meaning of "techne-art." we come to the conclusion that the word φιλοσοφία reveals the problematical character of wisdom, which is cognitive in principle. Does σοφία depend τέχνη, or vice-versa? And does the cosmos originate from self-generation or from creation? These questions are a preview of what later became an issue in philosophy.

The author interprets Lopez's work as a case of mythologizing a historical figure for the Filipino masses. It is therefore a proletarian myth in contrast to bourgeois myths which Roland Barthes talks about. Myth indeed is a language - a metalanguage - and Lopez made use of it to express the theme of emulation and the responsibility of the proletarian man through traits that endure in the Filipino psyche: his loob (inner self), budhi (conscience), hiya (shame), and sense of responsibility. The author agrees with Barthes that history and myth do not mix. Where a piece of work does not portray historical facts faithfully it should not be taken as a historical document but - in the context of Lopez's awit - as a piece of literary work that must be enjoyed.

Is contemporary media society still interested in truth? This paper will try to unravel the vaguely suspicious epistemic relationship between information marketers and information consumers in today's society. There seems to have been forged a feeling of quasi-omniscience within the private and public spheres wherein people, due to the sheer volume of inforntation readily accessible for viewing at any time, become predisposed to exhibit an intriguingly relaxed relationship with knowledge. If the current systems of information seem to trivialize the question of truth or falsehood, and since the public is apparently just interested in spectacles, then how must we view epistemologically the status of contemporary media discourse? Does it still reveal truth or is it simply empry talk? To address this question, the paper explores a possible parallelism between Plato's critique of rhetoric in his dialogue, Gorgias, and Jean Baudrillard's critique of contemporary media society.

Against the pervading opinion, the author takes the positive side of the question "Does logic rest on a metaphysical foundation?" Logic is generally understood as a science that investigates ways of distinguishing good from bad arguments. This conception leads many to think that logic does not rest on any metaphysical foundation - that it is not an ontologically-committing enterprise. To claim that "'Someone is male' logically follows from 'Joey is male"' does not commit one to the existence of maleness or the existence of Joey, even if it is logically true that if Joey is male, then someone is male. This paper, however argues for the contrary thesis. In one possible rendering of what logic means and in one possible understanding of what it is for someone to be ontologically committed to something else, it can be shown that logic is an ontologically-committing activity. From this it is argued that logic has a metaphysical foundation.