The present paper is a contribution to the history of logic and its philosophy toward the mid-20th century. It examines the interplay between logic, type theory and set theory during the 1930s and 40s, before the reign of first-order logic, and the closely connected issue of the fate of logicism. After a brief presentation of the emergence of logicism, set theory, and type theory (with particular attention to Carnap and Tarski), Quine’s work is our central concern, since he was seemingly the most outstanding logicist around 1940, though he would shortly abandon that viewpoint and promote first-order logic as all of logic. Quine’s class-theoretic systems NF and ML, and his farewell to logicism, are examined. The last section attempts to summarize the motives why set theory was preferred to other systems, and first orderlogic won its position as the paradigm logic system after the great War.

Using a contextual method the specific development of logic between c. 1830 and 1930 is explained. A characteristic mark of this period is the decomposition of the complex traditional philosophical omnibus discipline logic into new philosophical subdisciplines and separate disciplines such as psychology, epistemology, philosophy of science, and formal (symbolic, mathematical) logic. In the 19th century a growing foundational need in mathematics provoked the emergence of a structural view on mathematics and the reformulation of logic for mathematical means. As a result formallogic was taken over by mathematics in the beginning of the 20th century as is shown by sketching the German example.

In this paper, Tarskis notion of Logical Consequence is viewed as a special case of the more general notion of being a theorem of an axiomatic theory. As was recognized by Tarski, the material adequacy of his definition depends on having the distinction between logical and non logical constants right, but we find Tarskis analysis persuasive even if we dont agree on what constants are logical. This accords with the view put forward in this paper that Tarski indeed captures the more inclusive notion of theoremhood in an axiomatic theory. The approach to logical consequence via axiomatic theories leads us to grant centrality to inference schemas rather than to full-fledged arguments and to view the logically valid schemas as a subclass of generally valid schemas.

Nonreductive naturalism holds that we can preserve the (scientifically valued) metaphysical truth of physicalism while averting the methodological mistakes of reductionism. Acceptable scientificexplanation need not (in some cases cannot and in many cases, should not) be formulated in the language of physical science. Persuasive arguments about the properties of phenomenal consciousnesspurport to show that physicalism is false, namely that phenomenal experience is a nonphysical fact. I examine two recent, comprehensive efforts to naturalize phenomenal consciousness and argue thatnonreductive naturalism yields a dilemma of reductionism or panpsychism.

This paper points out several difficulties to understand Putnam’s views in his recent “Dewey Lectures”, which involve a certain move away from his “internal realism”. The main goal is to set into relief tensions in Putnam’s thinking probably provoked by his philosophical development. Two such tensions are touched upon. In the first place, Putnam wants to reject an account of phenomenal consciousness (sensory experience in particular) he had subscribed to during his realist times, which he calls “Cartesianism cum Materialism”, CM. He puts forward what he takes to be an alternative, apparently based on the traditional Chisholmian “Theory of Appearing”. The paper suggest firstly that, in view of the facts to be accounted for, a theory along those lines cannot count as a real alternative to CM. In the second part, the paper develops an analogous tension between the views on truth Putnam seems to be willing to defend in the Dewey Lectures, and previous criticisms of the semantic conception of truth by hirn that heclaims still to be willing to subscribe.

Armstrong (1983) poses two requirements that law-statements must satisfy in order to support the corresponding counterfactuals. He also argues that law-statements can not satisfy one of these requirements if they merely express regularities, although both requirements are satisfied if law-statements are interpreted as expressing relations between universals. I try to show that Armstrong’s argument can be raised against Armstrong’s own solution by adding three premisses to it: the inference thesis, the contingency thesis and a principle whose rationality I also argue for. Finally, I offer a more reasonable alternative condition for nomic counterfactual supporting which is satisfied by law-statements if they are interpreted as expressing relations between universals, but not so if we interpret them as mere regularities.

En este trabajo se define formamente el concepto de representacion en química utilizando homomorfismos desde estructuras algebraicas, que llamamos sistemas de tipo C, en otras estructuras especiales de símbolos muy relacionados con los que son habituales en la qímica experimental. Para la definicion de los sistemas de tipo C se ha seleccionado un conjunto minimo de relaciones y funciones, que son necesarias para expresar proposiciones significativas en química. Tambien se define un lenguaje formal de primer orden adecuado a los sistemas de tipo C, que llamamos L(C). EI resultado principal que se demuestra es que toda representación que verifica las mismas sentencias de L(C) que un sistema de tipo C, es necesariamente isomorfo a él. Se concluye por lo tanto que puede existir un problema linguístico subyacente en la aplicacion que de la mecaníca cuántica se hace en la química teórica.The concept of representation in chemistry bas been formallv defined by means of homomorphisms from algebraical structures, which we call type-C systems, to some special sets of symbols which can be related to the symbols ordinarily used in experimental chemistry. A minimum number of relations and functions, which would suffice to express significant propositions in chemistry, have been chosen to define type-C systems. A first order formal language L(C) adequate to type-C systems has been defined. It has been shown that each representation that verifies the same sentences of L(C) as a type-C system is necessarily isomorphic to it. It is concluded that a systematic study of the representation problem in chemistry is in order because a deep language problem underlies the application of quantum mechanies to chemical problems.

The essay begins with a detailed consideration of the introduction of incommensurability by Feyerabend in 1962 which exposes several historically inaccurate claims about incommensurability. Section 2 is a coneise argument against causal theories of reference as used as arguments against incommensurability. We object to this strategy because it begs the question by presupposing realism. Section 3 introduces and discusses a hypothesis that w'e call meta-incommensurability which provides the reason for the wide-spread accusation of question-begging and use of circular argumentation among the proponents of both realist and non-realist interpretations of science.

Does incommensurability threaten the realist’s claim that physical magnitudes express properties of natural kinds? Some clarification comes from measurement theory and scientific practice. The standard (empiricist) theory of measurement is metaphysically neutral. But its representational operational and axiomatic aspects give rise to several kinds of a one-sided metaphysics. In scientific practice. the scales of physical quantities (e.g. the mass or length scale) are indeed constructed from measuring methods which have incompatible axiomatic foundations. They cover concepts which belong to incomensurable theories. I argue, however, that the construction of such scales conmmits us to a modest version of scientific realism.

The incommensurability thesis is the thesis that the content of some alternative scientific theories is incomparable due to translation failure between the vocabulary the theories employ. This paper presents an overview of the main issues which have arisen in the debate about incommensurability. It also briefly outlines a response to the thesis based on a modified causal theory of reference which allows change of reference subsequent to initial baptism, as well as a role to description in the determination of reference. On such a view. the content of theories may be compared on the basis of shared reference, despite failure of translation. Two recent developments involving the incomnensurability thesis are also examined: (i) the taxonomic version of the incomensurability thesis found in Kuhn’s later writings. (ii) Hoyningen-Huenc’s neo-Kantian interpretation of Kuhn’s metaphysics.

“Prediction” and “prescription” are crucial notions for economics. This paper offers a philosophical and methodological approach and takes into account the connection with the problem of science and values. To do this, two steps are followed: firstly, prediction in economics -its characteristics and limits- will be examined and, secondly, the role of prescription in economics (and its relations with internal and external values) will be studied. Thus; the underlying aims of this paper are to make explicit the characters of economic prediction, to show its nexus with the economic prescription and to point out the links of both -especially, the latter- with the specific values of “economic activity” and the values of “economics as activity” (i. e., values of economic undertaking as an activity interconnected with others in the social context).

This essay is concerned with the special difficulties that arise in testing and appraising mainstream economic theory. I argue that, like other theories designed to apply to complex open systems, it is very hard to confirm mainsteam economics. Parts can be tested and appraised, but the theory is only very weakly supported by evidence.