This survey aims to show that reason cannot be understood solely in terms of natural science. It must be understood in a much wider context of our lifeworld. In order to prove our thesis, we try first to unmask the dangerous strategy of methodologists who claim the unique role of method based on scientific rationality. The domination of method and hence the self-promotion of methodology to the rang of universal epistemology gives birth to rationalism and methodological determinism. Such a narrow understanding of reason comes from an insufficient or incomplete survey of the genetical process of reason and method. Our survey is conducted from following aspects:1) An analysis of the so-called crisis of methodology and reason, best seen in the works of Husserl (The Crisis of European Science) Feyerabend (Against Method), and Gadamer (Truth and Method).2) A historical survey of the genetical process of reason and method and3) A reflection on the internal relationship of reason and method \vhich was first defended by the late Wittgenstein.

Gilbert Harman firmly believes that his moral theory, first published in his paper "Moral Relativism Defended" has succeeded in defending moral Relativism which has been previously attacked as being inconsistnet. Harman claims that his version of rnoral relativism is a thesis concerning the logical form of a certain kind of moral judgments, i. e., inner judgments. Although Harman's moral relativism avoids the charge of inconsistency, it is not free from serious defects. In this article, I embark on evaluating sonle crucial points which underlie Harman's theory.

Theory can be divided into 'that which is to be managed' and 'that which manages'. The former is a first-order theory and the latter is second-order theory. The so-called insufficiency of theory refers to second-order theory. This paper uses the Hsun-tzu as an example of the insuffciency of theory in Chinese thought and its consequences.1. The insuffciency of theory in Chinese thought is possibly universal. The style of Chinese philosophical work manifests this point. They are mostly literary texts, and not written in an academic style. The key concepts are seldom expressed in any theoretical framework, e. g. the concepts of tao, jen , hsin, hsing, Ii, ch'i, etc.2.1 The first direct consequence of the insufficiency of theory are laxity, crudeness of thought and chaos, the inability to enter a fine and complete realm.2. 2 The second direct consequence is the inability of the author to understand himself, and also, the inability of the reader to understand him.2.3 Thirdly, the misunderstanding of the reader.3.1 The first indirect consequence is an unhealthy academic research model.3.2 The second indirect consequence is the difficulty of manifesting an academic standard. I think that the work of second-order theory will become the work of Chinese academic philosophical thought from now on. This is a natural situation, because in anything, there is a progression from crudity toward refinement. No doubt this is difficult and even painful. Moreover, I think, when this work has reached a certain level of accomplishment, we will all crossover the ancestral product and make progress. Thisis because in the midst of chaos, man has no way forward. At that time, it is possible that we shall have new thinkers.

The form of Confucius' thinking is such that it integrates the positive values of two opposing poles onto a higher level of harmonious value. In practice, he advocates the orderly and gradual process of maintaining the mean, after considering both sides of the matter. Based on moral consciousness, it is the middle way 'which begins witIl the small to the large, positively encompassing in order to achieve the highest goal. Lao-tzu's method is to emulate the way of heaven and furthermore, to return to the root of nature-Tao, expressed in paradoxes of affirming the negative to reveal the positive. It emphasizes the 'how' of 'not-doing-nothing', namely, achieving profound virtue by being(non-virtuous', achieving great benevolence by being 'non-benevolent', achieving great righteousness by (forsaking righteousness', achieving great propriety by (despisingpropriety', and achieving great wisdom by 'forsaking wisdom'. In this regard, Lao-tzu's teaching can be utilized to remove the defects of the fossilized Chou cultllre. It can also be said to have facilitated the Confucianists' effort to realize their absolute values. 'The outline of this paper is as follows:1. PREFACE2. THE PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD OF CONFUCIUS (1) Value Distinctions and Integration (2) The Goal and Process of Moral Practice (3) The Principles and Steps of Political Government (4) The Fundamental Form of Thinking3. THE PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD OF LAO-TZU (1) Value Distinctions: Classes and Relations (2) Tao as Metaphysics (3) Tao as Practicality (4) Paradoxical Forms of Expression4. REFLECTIONS ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL METHODS OF PRE-CH'IN CONFUCIANISM AND TAOISM

Chih-i is the founder of the T'ien-t'ai school. His philosophical method is "Harmonious dialectic" which can illuminate the Reality (shih-hsiang， 實相). This paper attempts to analysis the central concepts of "Harmonious dialectic". These central concepts may be discussed as follows:1. Mutual contrary identity (敵對相師)2. Negation (Chê， 遮)3. Affirmation (Chao， 照)4. Two-fold negation (Shuang Chê， 雙遮) and twofolda 伍rmation (Shuang Chao， 雙照)5. Kle'sa is identical with Bodhi (fan-nao chi p'ut'i，煩惱師菩提)Finally, we attained conclusion, that is to say, through the "Harmonious dialectic", we hold the Key of Chih-i's philosophy.

T'his article deals with modern ethical values. The author tries to use the phenomenological method to analyse the differences and the possible coincidence between normative ethics and meta-ethics.The normative ethics which concentrates its heavy point in the practical part of philosophy, and the meta-ethics, which maintains the cognitive function would be more fundamental in moral philosophy, inspires the same moral subject, namely the human being, according to the descriptive phenomenologicol point of vievv.In the transcendental phenomenology this moral subject practises its cognition, volition and all other inner activities as a pure subject in its transcendental milieu.The volition as one of the human inner activities brings not only the intentional act, creates also all bonum sibi and consequently any bonum alteri. Bonum sibi and bonum alteri constructe the perfect goal of moral philosophy.Thus in the constititive phenomenology the moral subject contents all the subjective intention and volition, and at the same time all the objective goods both for himself and for others.The moral subject, the ethical person, stands in the middle point of the ethical values. It would be the possible coincidence and conformity between normative ethis and meta-ethics.

I explore the concepts of existence and substance in the present paper. "To be" is the pivotal concept of ontology. Aristotle says that "there is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes whic belong to this in virtue of its own nature." Descartes treats being as a perfection, but Kant clams that "to be" is not a real predicate. In the practice of modern logic "to be" is distinguished between the following three senses: identity, predication, and existence.In the second section, I discuss the various senses of Aristotle's uses of "things are said to be". All of these uses can be presented in the formula of quantificational logic. In the remaining part, I discuss Ariatotle's conceptof substance. In particular, the distinction between species, genus, and accidental properties are clarified, the general structural features of substance are explicated.

John Rawls argues, in his renowned book A Theory of Justice, that the concept of right is prior to the concept of the good. It seems the underlying idea is that he takes the diversity of comprehensive philosophical or moral doctrines as an enduring fact of the public culture of the contemporary constitutional democracy. Therefore, he attempts to construct his conception of justice without presupposing any particular comprehensive ideal of the good. This article tries to show that Rawls does assume a controversial conception of the good, namely, the individualistic ideal of the person, as one of premises in developping his theory of justice. In other words, Rawls cannot consistentlyholds the priority of right over the good.

To have "faith" in a person is to say to him, "You will never betray me!" To be "faithful" to a person is to say to him, "I will never betray you!" Faith and fidelity which seem to be two separate iterns, are nevertheless sprung from the same loy lng-presence of an "I-Thou Relationship". They simply are two different foci of the same mutual call and response. In addition to the horizontal-human dimension of faith and fidelity between two human persons, we also have the vertical-transcendent dimension of faith and fidelity between man and God. The one cannot be separated from the other any more than love of neighbour can be separated from love of God. Those unbelievers who live in fidelity create a climate in which belief in God can grow just as small trees create a climate in which a forest of large trees can grow.The article is divided into three main parts:Part I meditates on Marcel's analysis of the meaning of Faith.Part II discusses about Marcel's description on the meaning of Fidelity.Part III is a synthetic explanation of the combined meaning of Faith and Fidelity together. An emphasis is placed on the connection between the horizontal aspect and the vertical aspect of the two notions.

One basic problem of epistemic justification is the regress problem. The externalist attempts to solve the regress problem by claiming that the acceptance of beliefs satifying the externalist conditions is epistemically justified. They claim that the person for whom the belief is justified need not himself has any cognitive grasp at all of the reasons. This paper introduces D. M. Armstrong's and A. Goldman's theories and analyses the arguments in favor of or against the theories. I argue that externalsim is not sufficient forepistemic justification.