41.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Daniel Heider
Zpráva o filosoficko-teologické sekci konference Jezuité v českých zemích Bohemia Jesuitica 1556–2006:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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42.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Petr Dvořák
Zpráva z konference o analogii ve filosofii a teologii:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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43.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Kamila Pacovská
Kritika metaetiky v díle P. Footové a dalších „deskriptivistů“:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article aims to present one of the most decisive criticisms of metaethics which resulted in the restoration of substantive ethics in Great Britain in the late fifties. Philippa Foot attacks the basic metaethical presupposition that evaluative meaning is logically independent of descriptive meaning. She concentrates on the semantics of the word “good”. The second, most extensive part of my article summarizes her argumentation for the thesis that evaluative meaning of the latter word can imply some description of the object evaluated. This result can be linked with the rejection of formalistic methods in ethics.
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44.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Petr Dvořák
Univerzální preskriptivismus R. M. Hara:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The article is a critical systematic presentation of R. M. Hare's ethical concepts and doctrine as outlined in his books The Language of Morals (1952) and Freedom and Reason (1963). The theory merits attention for many reasons, yet it appears to suffer from some weaknesses; the chief among them being the lack of explanation for the source of binding force of moral principles.
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45.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Paul E. Oppenheimer, Edward N. Zalta
O logice ontologického důkazu:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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In this paper, the authors show that there is a reading of St. Anselm’s ontological argument in Proslogium II that is logically valid (the premises entail the conclusion). This reading takes Anselm’s use of the definite description “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” seriously. Consider a first-order language and logic in which definite descriptions are genuine terms, and in which the quantified sentence “there is an x such that…” does not imply “x exists”. Then, using an ordinary logic of descriptions and a connected greater-than relation, God’s existence logically follows from the claims: (a) there is a conceivable thing than which nothing greater is conceivable, and (b) if x does not exist, something greater than x can be conceived. To deny the conclusion, one must deny one of the premises. However, the argument involves no modal inferences and, interestingly, Descartes’ ontological argument can be derived from it.
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46.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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David Peroutka OCD
Suárezova nauka o receptivních potencích a její ohlas u R. Arriagy:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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Receptive potencies are the essence in relation to the act of being (esse) and the matter in relation to the form. Suárez identifies the essence with the existence. A potential essence, according to Suarez, is nothing; therefore it cannot be receptive potency for being (esse). The actuality of an actual essence is its being (esse). Hence, the actual essence does not need to receive any further being distinct from it. Essence does not differ really from being (esse); nevertheless, we can conceive it without being. Essence as “whatness”, quiddity, is closely connected with concept and definition. In this regard we may make some critical remarks on Suarez’s doctrine: If the “whatness” is identical to the being (esse), this fact has to be reflected in the adequate notion of the “whatness”. If it is so, it seems that the essence conceived without being (esse) is not the same essence any more. Furthermore: If essence and existence are identified, what is it to which existence can be non-trivially ascribed? What is the receptive potency for being (esse)? Arriaga follows Suárez in the doctrine of essence and being, in his teaching on the prime matter however he goes even further. Whereas Suárez ascribes to the prime matter its own actuality, Arriaga assigns to it some attributes of substance. In contradistinction to the Suarezian conception of receptive potencies, the Thomistic doctrine of the relation of participation between potency and act permits metaphysics to withstand the threats of mechanicism and the post-fregean trivialization of the notion of being (esse).
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47.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Lukáš Novák
Anselmův ontologický důkaz očima teorie abstraktních objektů:
Úvodní poznámka
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48.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Tomáš Machula
Les quatre causes de l’être selon la philosophie premiére d’Aristote:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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49.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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David Peroutka OCD
K Novákově odpovědi:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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50.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Stanislav Sousedík
Základní fenomény lidského bytí očima filosofie. Témata týkající se života každého člověka.:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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51.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Lukáš Novák
Problém abstraktních pojmů:
Odpověď Davidu Peroutkovi
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52.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Stanislav Sousedík
Dilinganae Disputationes. Der Lehrinhalt der gedruckten Disputationen an der philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Dillingen.:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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53.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Peter Hoenen SJ
Descartův Mechanicismus:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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54.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Rastislav Nemec
The Eternity of God. Comparative Study of Bernard Lonergan SJ and Richard Swinburne.:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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55.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Stanislav Sousedík
Člověk a stát:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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56.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Lukáš Novák
Metafyzika jako věda. Ibn Síná a Ibn Rušd ve scholastické diskusi.:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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57.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Michal Chabada
700-lecie śmierci bł. Jana Dunsa Szkota. Międzynarodowe sympozjum jubileuszowe:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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58.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Lukáš Novák
Ján Duns Scotus. Vybrané kapitoly z jeho epistemológie a metafyziky.:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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59.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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Stanislav Sousedík, Karel Šprunk
G. Frege:
Dialog s Pünjerem Český překlad s kritickým výkladem
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60.
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Studia Neoaristotelica:
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7 >
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Jan Palkoska
Descartova ontologie mentální reprezentace a otázka Suárezova vlivu:
A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The aim of the article is to critically assess the widespread surmise according to which Descartes was in certain important aspects of his thought infl uenced by Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations. In the article this question is addressed with regard to the problem of the ontological background of the representational acts of a finite mind. Descartes’ position is reconstructed on the basis of an analysis of Meditation III and consequently of Descartes’ polemic with Johan de Kater in the First Objections and Replies; the reconstruction is accomplished by means of terms and concepts commonly used in the late scholastic thought of the end of the 16th century. An analysis of the key passage of Section 2 of Disputation 54 of the Metaphysical Disputations of Suárez (concerned with the distinction between extrinsic denominations and beings of reason) then shows, first, that Suárez’s position concerning the ontology of mental representation does indeed agree with that of Descartes, not Kater; second, that the implications of Suárez’s critique of certain theses concerning the identity of extrinsic denominations and beings of reason probably form an important part of the conceptual framework presupposed in the polemic between Decartes and Kater.
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