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61. Schutzian Research: Volume > 11
Carlos Belvedere, Alexis Gros The Phenomenology of Social Institutions in the Schutzian Tradition
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There is a broad consensus that the study of social institutions is one of the fundamental concerns of the social sciences. The idea that phenomenology has ignored this topic is also widely accepted. As against this view, the present paper aims at demonstrating that especially Schutzian phenomenology—that is, the social-phenomenological tradition started by Alfred Schutz and continued by Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger, among others—provides rich insights on the nature and workings of social institutions that could contribute to enriching the current social-scientific debate on the issue. In order to show this, the authors attempt to unearth and systematically reconstruct Schutz’s and Berger and Luckmann’s insights on social institutions and to confront them with current approaches.
62. Schutzian Research: Volume > 11
Marek Chojnacki Phantasying, How to Get Out of Oneself and Yet to Remain Within: Alfred Schutz’s Interpretation of Husserl’s Phenomenological Reduction
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Assuming the importance of Alfred Schutz’s “protosociology” in social theory as a given, the paper tries to explore its philosophical core, treating Schutz’s sociophenomenology as an answer to the most fundamental questions of phenomenology, such as evidence and phenomenological reduction. It analyses Schutz’s point of departure – the problematization of Max Weber’s concept of the meaning of social action and its deepening by means of Henri Bergson’s and Edmund Husserl’s notion of time – and tries to unravel the double structure of consciousness (first in Brentano and Husserl, then in Schutz), revealing increasingly its complex temporal character. Brentano’s and Husserl’s double intentionality, seeming to offer a kind of “decent realism” in modern philosophical context, in Schutz turns out to be marked by the profound pastness of reflexive consciousness, reaching the primary stream experience only by means of primary and secondary acts of remembrance, re-effectuated intersubjectively in acts of phantasying about future (modo futuri exacti), thus constituting the very core of meaning, with its reference to external objects. It appears that only analysing this mode of phantasying in reference to its motives that we can solve the conundrum of realism in its modern shape.
63. Schutzian Research: Volume > 4
Ken’ichi Kawano Reformulation of “How Is Society Possible?”
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“How is society possible?” posed by Georg Simmel has been one of the fundamental problems in sociology. Although various attempts have been madeto solve it, I conceive that “society” in the problem remains to be articulated. Simmel provides us with two concepts of society—“society as interaction” and “societyas unity”—to be distinguished. Some research traditions in sociology have been concerned with the former, others have dealt with the latter. On the other hand, Simmel maintains continuity between them. In this sense, his concept of “society” has “ambiguous” characteristics. It seems to me that in the ambiguous style Simmel had intended to reveal the secret of “society,” but in the end could not have got to it. In my opinion, in order to unveil the secret, it is required that, drawing on Schutzian phenomenologically oriented sociology, sociologists or social scientists make a differentiation between the society which is realized or brought about by partners with no need of an observer, “the social,” and the society which an observer recognizes by use of the concept. In this article, from a Schutzianpoint of view, I wish to articulate “society” and to indicate four phases of “society.” These investigations lead to a reformulation of the problem of “how is societypossible?” and sociology (or the social sciences) which makes possible the deeper understanding of society.
64. Schutzian Research: Volume > 4
Hermílio Santos Action and Relevance: Making Sense of Subjective Interpretations in Biographical Narratives
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This paper analyses biographical narratives as a possibility of getting access on how individuals interpret their life-world, that is, the subjective interpretationin biographies of actors on their social context. Here biography is understood as the description made by the individual himself. It is of processes and experiencesthat extended through the course of life, that is, written or oral presentation of the history of life. In this sense, biographies and biographical trajectories are notpurely individual phenomena, but social ones. The biographical narrative offers important elements for the analysis not only on the narrator´s life, but especially on the connections between the individual and his group or community, considering however that any narrative is an interpretation based on a specific biographical situation. In this sense, the access to the experiences accumulated and consolidated in their biographies permits the analysis of the subjective interpretation of the actors.
65. Schutzian Research: Volume > 4
Tetsuya Sakakibara Phenomenological Research of Nursing and Its Method
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The aim of this paper is to clarify what “phenomenological” means in the phenomenological researches of nursing and what “method” is or should beadopted in phenomenological researches of nursing. The essay first defines a traditional classification of the phenomenological researches of nursing by Cohen and Omery, and then gives a new attempt to classify the phenomenological approaches in the theories of nursing. On this basis, the essay reviews some representative “phenomenological” researches of nursing today and addresses critical comments to them. Finally, the essay will make clear what “phenomenological” should mean in the phenomenological research of nursing and what kind of “method” should be adopted in those researches.
66. Schutzian Research: Volume > 4
George Psathas On Garfinkel and Schutz: Contacts and Infl uence
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Th is paper considers the relation between Harold Garfinkel and Alfred Schutz. Reference will be made to their correspondence as well as to some of Garfinkel’s writing. Garfinkel, who was a graduate student at Harvard at the time, first met Schutz at the recommendation of Aron Gurwitsch. Their meeting led tofurther exchanges including papers that Garfinkel sent to Schutz. When his book, titled Studies in Ethnomethodology, appeared in 1967 he specifically cited Schutz as one to whom he was “heavily … indebted” in his work. In later writings he no longer made such citations and moved away from his earlier position.
67. Schutzian Research: Volume > 4
Denisa Butnaru Crossing Cultures of Knowledge: Alfred Schütz’s Heritage and the Contemporary Social Science of the Individual in France
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The aim of the present article is to draw attention on a historical development in the French sociological tradition. Being a heritage of the Germanintellectual context, the tradition of the comprehensive sociology was not among the main trends in France. Furthermore, the phenomenological orientationin social theory mostly associated with the work of Alfred Schütz was also a side interest until the 1980s. From this decade on, a new paradigm becomesgradually institutionalized, a paradigm which gathers different intellectual and theoretical positions and which partly rehabilitates the comprehensive and thephenomenological heritage. My intention is to analyze how this new orientation in the French social science used the comprehensive legacy in order to proposea new culture of knowledge.
68. Schutzian Research: Volume > 4
Lester Embree Two Concepts of Type in the Work of Alfred Schutz
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Schutz not only adapted Max Weber’s “ideal types” but also Edmund Husserl’s prepredicative “types,” which must have been “empirical types,” in hiswork. With care, these terms can be kept distinct. The former term refers to concepts used in common-sense thinking as well as cultural science, while the latterrefers to vague material universals or eidē. This essay studies how “type” is used in these two different ways by Schutz after he had read Husserl’s Erfahrung undUrteil by 1940.
69. Schutzian Research: Volume > 4
Andreas Göttlich Imposed Relevance: On the Sociological Use of a Phenomenological Concept
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The present paper discusses the concept of imposed relevance as developed by Alfred Schutz. Th e discussion acts on the assumption that within his writingsthere are two different usages of the concept: a phenomenological one and a sociological one. The argument states that both usages may not be confused—afailure which might be induced by the fact that Schutz himself never dwelled on their correlation. This being said, this paper presents some basic considerationswhich try to utilize phenomenological reflections for sociological analyses, keeping in mind that the difference between them may not be blurred.
70. Schutzian Research: Volume > 4
Daniela Griselda López The Oblivion of the Life-World The Correspondence of Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons
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At the beginning of the 1940s in the United States, an exchange of correspondence took place between two of the great thinkers in Sociology, Alfred Schutz and Talcott Parsons. This correspondence dealt with matters which many deemed to be “the greatest central problems in the social sciences.” The reading of these letters leads one to assume that the focus of both authors was on answering how sociology could be appropriately based on the revision of Max Weber’s classicalcontribution. However, this interpretation has served as the basis to affirm that Schutz and Parsons revisited Weber’s project from opposing sides by detaching theelements from its main corpus. This leads to not only opposite but antithetical points of view. From this perspective, Schutz is labeled as a subjectivist whereas Parsons is labeled as an objectivist. Strikingly, even Schutz himself dismisses the idea of presenting both authors as antagonists. What’s more, he underlines his purpose as that of complementarity. Here arises an obvious question. If Schutz from the very beginning underlined the idea of complementarity, why then does contemporary sociological theory present Schutz and Parsons’ contributions as antithetical? Taking this question as the starting point, our enquiry allows us to expose the existence of an interpretive scheme in Sociological Th eory that introduces the dualistic dilemma in the analysis of Schutz and Parsons’ epistolary exchange. We will analyze this interpretive scheme’s main features by using the hermeneutical analysis. Then, in order to critically revisit the debate, our research unveils the prejudices involved in this interpretive tradition, highlighting the misunderstandings regarding the dualistic interpretation of Schutz’s work and his links with Parsons. By doing this it makes clear the way in which these interpretations have veiled the original sense of Schutz’s epistolary exchange with Parsons. Thus our paper, being directly opposed to the dominant reading, aims to propose that the debate shouldn’t be seen as a confrontation between subjectivism and objectivism, but as part of Schutz’s project to go beyond the dualism, starting with a phenomenological approach that recovers the life-world as the forgotten foundation of the social sciences.
71. Schutzian Research: Volume > 4
Lester Embree It’s about Time! A Sometimes Personal Narrative of Schutz Scholarship
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With some remarks on what I have personally contributed, this essay sketches the origins of the posthumous eff ort by which Schutz’s thought, which could have been forgotten, has become well-known internationally through the dedicated work in the United States, Germany, and Japan of a modest number of named students and followers in successive generations as well as his widow Ilse ans daughter Evelyn. How his thought connects with phenomenology, sociology, social psychology, and the theory of the cultural sciences is touched on. Besides references to the two biographies and the annual, Schutzian Research, counts of editions of translations into a dozen languages and then lists of the Schutz Memorial Lectures, the archives in Germany, Japan, and the United States, the Werkausgabe, and the many conferences focused on Schutz are off ered. This is to make the case that the International Alfred Schutz Circle for Phenomenology and Interpretive Social Science is long overdue.
72. Schutzian Research: Volume > 4
Michael D. Barber The Cartesian Residue in Intersubjectivity and Child Development
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This paper argues that Husserl’s account of adult recognition of another allows for immediate, noninferential, analogical access to the other, though onedoes not experience the other’s experience as s/he does. The passive-associative processes at work in adult recognition of another make possible infant syncretic sociability and play a role in constituting the infant’s self prior to reflection. The reflective perspective of the psychologist and philosopher discovers that such infant experiences, though at first seeming indistinguishable from their parents’ experience, belong to their own stream of consciousness and constitute a non-eliminable Cartesian residue and an inescapable solitude of identity. Finally new research in joint attention reveals that the infant self is constituted not only by passive experience but also by active movements evident in the infant’s attempt to shape the direction of adults in joint attention, however this may fall short of high-level reflection.
73. Schutzian Research: Volume > 5
Douglas Macbeth Ethnomethodological Explorations
74. Schutzian Research: Volume > 5
Jochen Dreher Reflections on a Phenomenology of Power
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A frequent accusation directed at phenomenology and phenomenologically oriented sociology is that of power oblivion. Edmund Husserl’s phenomenologyis accused of not considering the social conditions of the possibility of the doxic experience of the world, and Alfred Schutz’s social phenomenology is blamed for neglecting the social structural preconditions of the experience of everyday reality. Based on this criticism, it is argued that the objectively given power structures, which influence the subjective experience, are not considered in Schutz’s social phenomenological reflections. Bourdieu proclaims that the experience of the social world as being self-evident, as “taken for granted” in Schutz’s words, is taken into consideration without a reference to social conditions such as hierarchies of power. I will reject this reproach by demonstrating the specific potential of Schutz’s theory of the life-world and especially his theory of relevance to conceptualize the phenomenon of power with reference to the subjectivity of the individual actor. The theory of life-world offers a conceptual scheme with a specific capacity to capture theoretically the interrelation of subjective constitution and objective construction of power.
75. Schutzian Research: Volume > 5
Kseniya Dmytrenko Nachfolge der transzendentalen und mundanen Phänomenologie als Voraussetzung empirisch phänomenologischer Forschung
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In the background of accelerated interdisciplinary development of phenomenology, there appears more clearly a deficiency of the epistemological groundingand methodological explanation of present research. This is particularly evident in the field of social phenomenology, in which the research positions extend fromthat of the “orthodox” transcendental phenomenologists to an endless search for a new foundation for pragmatic social phenomenology in philosophical anthropology, to a vague thesis about “fruitful discussion” between E. Husserl and A. Schutz. The main task of this article consists in the establishment of the fundamental significance of the epistemological succession between Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Schutz’s natural phenomenology. This confirms itself through the analysis of such concepts as sense and constitution, which play the prominent methodological role in the main works – Ideas-I and correspondingly The Phenomenology of the Social World. Such comparative analysis allows not only to highlight the most important similarities in the projects of both thinkers such as a “sense-giving function” of consciousness, but also to distinguish small deviations of the mundane phenomenology from the transcendental project, i.e., the rejection of transcendental reductions and the “pragmatic conditioning” of the subjective action’s sense through now- and so-states of the ego. It is proposed to interpret the famous Schutzian “turning away from Husserl” first of all as a skeptical turn; however, that does not mean that the essential transcendental prerequisites such as a correlation of “attitude – experience – world” should be abandoned. In the end, it is demonstrated that the main metaphysical statements of Husserl can still retain their value within the framework of the contemporary conventional research models such as the “scientific research program” by I. Lakatos, whereas further theoretical statements, i.e., of social phenomenology, can be bound with this “hard core” as “auxiliary hypotheses” in cooperation with empirical sciences.
76. Schutzian Research: Volume > 5
Carlos Belvedere On George Psathas and Phenomenological Sociology
77. Schutzian Research: Volume > 5
Carlos Belvedere What is Schutzian Phenomenology?
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My aim is to depict Schutzian phenomenology as a whole. In order to do so, I will start by presenting Schutz’s ideas on the phenomenological, egological,and eidetic reductions as mere technical devices. Then I will show how they are interconnected with phenomenological psychology. After that, I will argue thatphenomenological psychology leads to worldly phenomenology and I will explore its consequences for transcendental philosophy and the empirical sciences. I will conclude with some reflections on naturalized phenomenology and how it finds absolute certainty in the life-world, not in the transcendental realm.
78. Schutzian Research: Volume > 5
Joachim Renn, Linda Nell Acts & Events: Alfred Schutz and the Phenomenological Contribution to the Theory of Interaction
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The following article deals with Alfred Schutz’s contribution to the theory of action and interaction by pointing out the possibly most compelling phenomenological starting position, i.e, the decomposition of the unity of an action. The article stresses that Schutz’s methodical interpretive sociology in thissense has always refused the assimilation of action-events to material occurrences. In contrast to empiricist theories of action which wrongly substantialize actionevents by treating them as material events, the phenomenological account gives reason to the assumption that there must be a systematic gap between at least two subjective estimations of the meaning of action. In other words, the introspective analysis of the subjective constitution of meaning means to take the problem of double contingency seriously. Phenomenology, for its temporal and conceptual resolution, seems much more appropriate to reconstruct the complex structures of “presence,” “identity,” and “intersubjectivity” than empiricist accounts. The article proposes in the end the need for an alternative concept of presence:Instead of confusing levels of cooperation with allegedly “objective” synchronicity, phenomenology reminds us to elaborate an alternative concept of simultaneity, i.e, a simultaneity on the level of performativity and tacit knowledge. The latter could be the warrantor for co-reference.
79. Schutzian Research: Volume > 5
Jonathan M. Wender Phenomenological Sociology as an Intellectual Movement
80. Schutzian Research: Volume > 5
Alfred Schutz, Jasmin Schreyer Fragment of a Phenomenology of Rhythm
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The present paper gives an introduction to Schutz’s hereafter first published [“Fragment on the Phenomenology of Rhythm”]. After the editorial remarks the connections to the first part (first published in 1976) are developed along the lines of a nonconceptual substructure of meaning, the problem of passive synthesis,the phenomenological concept of the ideal object, the problem of the unit, and finally the connection of body, mind, and space. The paper closes with a commented summarization of Schutz’s fragment.