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61. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Matjaž Ezgeta From the Streets to the White House: The Influence of Social Factors on Interspeaker Variation in African-American Vernacular English
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Most linguists have defined African-American Vernacular English (AAVE) as a regular and systematic form of vernacular language which contains distinctive grammatical and phonological features. AAVE is considered a social dialect or a non-standard variety of American English, which is spoken by the majority of African Americans. This article explores variability of the selected AAVE features in the interviews with ten African-American public figures, ranging from Hip Hop artists and blues musicians (Redman, Chuck D, Prodigy, MC Lyte, B.B. King) to talk show hosts (Oprah Winfrey), from Hollywood actresses (Queen Latifah,Whoopi Goldberg) to former government officials (Colin Powell) and residents of the White House (Michelle Obama). The selected features of AAVE treated in this study include the absence of copula, the third person singular –s absence, the possessive –s absence, the plural –s absence, and the generalization of is and was to plural and second person pronouns.We consider the influence of social parameters (i.e., gender, age, social status, ethnicity, and affiliation with Hip Hop culture) on the degree of speech formality within a frame of interspeaker variation by examining the correlation between the frequencies of AAVE features and social factors of individual interviewees. The frequencies of individual AAVE variants are calculated into percentages which represent the levels of vernacular usage of each interviewee. Our results are then compared with the outcomes of previous sociolinguistic findings on external factors that have been reported to affect the degree of linguistic formality in a spoken discourse.
62. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Justin Marquis Contra Leiter’s Anti-Skeptical Interpretation of Nietzsche’s Perspectivism
63. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Søren Flinch Midtgaard On the Scope of Justice: In Defence of the Political Conception
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The paper defends the so-called political conception of the scope of justice proposed by Thomas Nagel. The argument has three stages: (a) I argue that A. J. Julius’ influential criticism of the political conception can be answered. Pace Julius, actual and (relevant) hypothetical cases of state coercion do in fact involve a claim to the effect that people have a duty to obey, so the problem of justice does arise, according to Nagel’s criterion, in the critical cases scrutinised by Julius. Hence the ‘perverseness’ objection lapses. (b) I argue, against other critics of Nagel’s view, that in central instances of international coercion such as immigration control people are not asked to accept the ongoing coercion. Consequently, the problem of justice does not, on Thomas Nagel’s view, arise internationally. Furthermore, to the extent that political authority is exercised internationally, it does not give rise to justificatory burdens involving principles of distributive justice.(c) I relate the notion of authority to other aspects of the political conception, including responsibility, and argue that together they constitute an attractive alternative to an influential allocative conception of justice.
64. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Glen Hoffmann Infallible A Priori Self-Justifying Propositions
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On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justifi ed, i.e., justified in a way that is truth-entailing. In this paper, I examine the second thesis of rationalist infallibilism, what might be called ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. Exploring the seemingly only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I reject the infallible justification of so-called self-justifying propositions.
65. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
J. Jocelyn Trueblood Moral “Ought”-Judgments and “Morally Ought”-Judgments
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In this paper I distinguish moral “ought”-judgments, meaning “ought”- judgments that qualify as moral judgments, from “morally ought”-judgments, meaning “ought”-judgments whose “ought” is either prefaced (or followed) by the word “morally” or construable as so prefaced. Specifically, I argue that the former class of judgments is wider than the second. (As I show in section 3, this is not to argue for the already familiar distinction, or putative distinction, between a broad and a narrow sense of “moral.”) I also speculate as to why the distinction exists, and, more important, show that it has important consequences. For instance, it undermines a tempting argument for moral subjectivism.
66. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 1
Fritz J. McDonald Why Language Exists: Stating the Obvious
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There are words. There are sentences. There are languages. Commonsense linguistic realism is the conjunction of the three preceding claims. Linguists and philosophers including Noam Chomsky (1986, 2000), Georges Rey (2006, 2008), and Barry C. Smith (2006) have presented skeptical doubts regarding the existence of linguistic entities. These doubts provide no good reason to deny commonsense linguistic realism. Some skeptical doubts are in fact not directed at the metaphysical thesis of commonsense linguistic realism but rather only at non-metaphysical methodological concerns. In some instances, linguistic antirealists make their case by foisting upon the realist assumptions that she need not hold regarding the nature of linguistic entities. Furthermore, those who have denied the existence of linguistic entities have not themselves presented an alternative account of words, sentences, or languages that is coherentor defensible. I present an elaboration and defense of commonsense linguistic realism as a metaphysical thesis, with the aim of deflating concerns that have arisen about the existence of language.
67. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Jakub Jirsa Sophists, Names and Democracy
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The article argues that the Euthydemus shows the essential connection between sophistry, right usage of language, and politics. It shows how the sophistic use of language correlates with the manners of politics which Plato associates with the sophists. First, it proceeds by showing the explicit criticism of both brothers, for they seem unable to fulfill the task given to them. Second, several times in the dialogue Socrates criticizes the sophists’ use of language, since it is totally inappropriate to fulfill the above-mentioned pedagogical task. I will show that this critique mirrors a deeper conflict between two different conceptions of language. Finally, the article suggests that the sophistic erroneous use of language has direct implications on their political theory, which Plato criticizes inthe Euthydemus as well as in the Republic.
68. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Karel Thein A Much Disputed “Whole” at Phaedrus 270
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The article discusses several possible interpretations of Socrates’ suggestion that we cannot “understand the nature of soul satisfactorily without understanding the nature of the whole” (Phaedrus 270c1–2). Against those who take the “whole” implied here for the cosmic whole, it argues that nothing in the Phaedrus justifies this interpretation. In the light of both Socrates’ conception of rhetoric in this dialogue and his image of the tripartite soul in the palinode, the “whole” whose knowledge is prerequisite to knowing the soul’s nature is better understood as either the whole of the composed soul or the whole soul-body compound. The real problem of the passage, the article concludes, is that we lack any clear criteria that would enable us to decide between these two readings. At the same time, the dramatic progress of the dialogue makes it possible to argue that Phaedrus briefly misunderstands Socrates’ meaning by reading in it some cosmological connotations. This possibility notwithstanding, it is more likely that, from the perspective of the tripartite soul and its actions and passions, “the whole soul-body compound” and “the whole soul” are two equally defensible solutions to the puzzle.
69. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Pavel Gregorić The First Humans in Plato’s Timaeus
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Plato’s Timaeus gives an account of the creation of the world and of human race. The text suggests that there was a first generation of human beings, and that they were all men. The paper raises difficulties for this traditional view, and considers an alternative, suggested in more recent literature, according to which humans of the first generation were sexually undifferentiated. The paper raises difficulties for the alternative view as well, and examines the third possibility, advocated by some ancient as well as modern interpreters, according to which there were no first humans, strictly speaking. Although the latter view avoids the pitfalls of the former two views, it crucially rests on a metaphorical reading of the creation story in the Timaeus.
70. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Pavel Gregorić In Memory of Maja Hudoletnjak Grgić (1964–2010)
71. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
ISTVÁN M. BODNÁR Sôzein ta phainomena: Some Semantic Considerations
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Saving the appearances (sôzein ta phainomena) often features as a programmatic description of the aim and objective of ancient astronomical theory. The paper, after an expository section, discusses some earlier proposals for what such a programme presupposes. After this, through a survey of the usage in Plato and Aristotle of some key terms—among them the verb sôzein—describing the relationship of an account to what it is an account of, submits that the phrase in this semantic framework could express the crucial property of an account that it is faithful to the phenomena, and it does not overrule or discard them.
72. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Josip Talanga Doubt and Dogmatism in Cicero
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In his numerous philosophical writings Cicero mostly adapted contemporary Greek sources, but occasionally he took up certain positions of his own. His propensity to scepticism in epistemology and dogmatism in ethics and political philosophy appears to be a further development of the model set forth by Carneades. Though Cicero was influenced by both Antiochus of Ascalon and Philo of Larissa—both of them claimed the heritage of the Platonic Academy—he owed a life-long allegiance to the Academic tradition of Carneades. Very often we are faced with a poor state of his own argument. But it seems to me very likely that in main questions his position was consistent throughout his life, and I consider his own philosophy as the beginning of the rising Middle Platonism.
73. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Filip Karfík The Constitution of the Human Body in Plato’s Timaeus
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The author emphasizes the fact that the largest part of Plato’s Timaeus deals with human nature and offers a detailed account of the constitution of the human body. He then lists the parallels and the differences between the constitution of the world body and the human body. The central part of the paper deals with Plato’s explanation of the persistence of the human body within a bodily environment which causes its dissolution. The author pays a special attention to Plato’s theory of the apparatus which keeps running the processes of respiration, digestion and blood circulation. In the concluding section, the author raises thequestion of the relationship between human body and human soul. He shows that, in Plato’s Timaeus, the human body functions to a large extent independently from human soul. One possible reason for this theory is Plato’s conception of the immortal soul. While the human body exists in order to harbour the immortal soul, the latter does not produce and preserve it nor does it cause its dissolution. It only exercises cognitive and ruling functions in it as long as the body is able to hold together and to detain the soul.
74. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Ana Gavran Miloš Epicurus on the Origin and Formation of Preconceptions
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The paper deals with one of the key notions in Epicurean epistemology, preconception. Together with perceptions, preconceptions are the second criterion of truth. The aim of the paper is to explore their epistemological status on the basis of their origin and formation. I argue that the process of formation of preconception is purely empirical, since they are produced through repeated perceptions of individual instances of a particular type of thing. Given the way they are formed, I claim that preconceptions are the means by which we recognize types of object and as such are fundamental to Epicurus’ account of how we gain knowledge of things. Exactly this gives them a distinctive criterial role, since preconceptions––unlike perceptions––enable us to engage in the process of interpretation of perceptual content.
75. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Nenad Miščević Plato’s Republic as a Political Thought Experiment
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Plato’s Republic is a political thought experiment, claims the present paper. Thought-experimenting is announced in the story of the Ring of Gyges, and done in a thorough and systematic way through a series of political scenarios: community of goods, of women and children, educational system and the philosopher rule? The paper considers the longstanding issue of plausibility, putting it in the context of current debates about thought-experiments, and the issue of replaceability: can a given political thought experiment be replaced by an argument which features only norms and empirical information? The paper also puts the Republic thought experiment into a broad historical context, presenting it as the point of origin of utopian literature on the one hand, and the thought-experimental tradition in political philosophy on the other hand, contrasting it with the social-contract thought-experiment, also adumbrated in the Republic but fully developed in modern thought.
76. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Hynek Bartoš Aristotle on Methodological Approaches to the Study of the Human Soul
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This paper focuses on Aristotle’s methodology of science and its application to the study of the human soul. My aim is to contrast two significantly different methodological approaches and to formulate two pairs of premises that Aristotle employs in two clearly differentiated and independent fields of study, namely in his zoological works and in the works of practical philosophy. Acknowledging these principles, as I suggest, may shed a new light on the methodological difficulties that Aristotle indicates in the introductory chapters of his De anima.
77. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 2
Péter Lautner Aristotle on the Intentional Nature of Emotions
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Emotions are characteristic activities/states in hylemorphic structure of the Aristotelian soul. Emotional activities/states are physiological processes/states as well, as it is particularly clear in anger. It raises the question about the origin of their intentionality. Sometimes sheer bodily processes can lead to emotions, which implies that intentionality in emotions might also originate in bodily processes. But Aristotle does not generalize this point in saying that all emotions are due to bodily processes. Moreover, since they are complex phenomena, involving opinion, representation, desire, pleasure and pain, their intentional nature must also be a certain amalgamate of the intentionality of the ingredients. It involves that the relevant kinds of pleasure and pain are also intentional states. On the other hand, besides establishing certain general similarities Aristotle does not seem to have worked out a unifi ed theory of emotions. To mention but one well-known example, most of the emotions he discusses in detail are based on representation, whereas hatred is supported by a general statement.
78. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Joshua Gert Crazy Relations
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In The Red and the Real, Jonathan Cohen defends a relationalist view of color: the view that colors are constituted by relations between objects, perceivers, and circumstances. Cohen’s defense of relationalism is often ingenious, but it also commits him to some extremely counterintuitive—one might say “crazy”—claims. The present paper argues that the phenomena that are captured by Cohen’s ingenious defense of his interesting view can be captured equally well by a more “boring” view. Such a view distinguishes between colors and the ways that those colors appear to various viewers, takes colors to be relatively vague, and claims that other species with color vision simply see other colors. Since the boring view stays closer to common sense on many points, it is to be preferred.
79. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
Kathrin Glüer Colors and the Content of Color Experience
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In previous work, I have defended a non-standard version of intentionalism about perceptual experience. According to the doxastic account, visual experience is a peculiar kind of belief: belief with “phenomenal” or looks-content. In this paper, I investigate what happens if this account of experience is combined with another idea I find very plausible: That the colors are to be understood in terms of color experience. I argue that the resulting phenomenal account of color experience captures everything essential to what has been called the “natural concept of color”. And I show that circularity worries are not aggravated by adopting this account instead of more standard forms of intentionalism—rather, they can be dispelled along the same lines.
80. Croatian Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 12 > Issue: 3
(John) Barry Maund Colour Relationalism and Colour Irrealism/Eliminativism/Fictionalism
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Jonathan Cohen has produced a powerful argument for Colour Relationalism: the metaphysical thesis that colours are relational properties of a certain sort—relational with respect to perceivers and circumstances. Cohen makes two important assumptions: one is that Colour Relationalism and Colour Irrealism (which include Colour Eliminativism, Fictionalism and other “error theories”) are rivals; the second is that “error theories” are theories of last resort. In this paper, I challenge both assumptions. In particular, I argue that there is good reason to think that Colour Relationalism needs to be supplemented by some version ofan Error theory. In so doing, I examine, in detail, the issues raised in a paper by Janet Levin in which she engages in an instructive debate with Colin McGinn. Levin’s paper is important since Cohen places heavy reliance on her arguments, both in defending his relationalist theory against crucial objections, and in his dismissal of error theories.