The repetition of life is being examined on the basis of Henry’s analysis of life as a performance beyond habitualization as sedimentation in Husserl’s approach, as well as a difference in immanent conceptualization on the premise of the coveting organless body according to Deleuze. In contrast to this “nomadic thinking,” which always remains non-subjective, the emphasis in the original reciprocity of life and body is put on the basic transcendentality of the effective repetition of life in the bodily memorial of the radical phenomenological habitualization.

The paper attempts to elucidate and evaluate Oskar Becker’s search for a complementarity between the paradigm of constitutional analysis put forward by Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology and constructivism as a meta-mathematical position suggesting criteria for existence of the mathematical objects. At stake is the issue of the possibility of an existential analytic of “the mathematical”. In this regard, a special attention is paid to the temporality of “mathematical existence”. Th e paper invites new forms of a dialogue between phenomenology and philosophy of mathematics.

This essay tries to show how Michel Henry’s Phenomenology of Life can be understood as a valuable criticism of hermeneutical philosophy and especially of hermeneutical phenomenology in the manner Martin Heidegger and Paul Ricoeur had conceptualized it. Using Michel Henry’s concept of phenomenological distance, it will be shown here that on the basis of every hermeneutics there lies the classical topos of the auctorial intention that was once gained by the interpretation of texts and is simply ontologized by hermeneutical philosophers. What follows from such a perspective is that human life seems to be ontologically separated form itself, against which Michel Henry tries to show that each life can only be humane, both in relation to itself as well as to others, if it affects itself without any distance.

In this article I discuss Michel Henry’s concept of the political. I firstly show how it is derived within his radical phenomenology, secondly give an outline of his respective critique of totalitarianism, and finally question whether his approach is appropriate for adequately thinking the relationship between the social body and its symbolization, which is of paramount importance for any theoretical consideration of the political.