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61. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Çetin Balanuye Agonistik Demokrasideki Kayıp Kavram: Bir ‘Modus’ Olarak Egemen
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Çatışmacı demokrasi kuramıyla Ernesto Laclau ile birlikte yarım asırdır siyaset felsefesi yazınına katkıda bulunan Chantal Mouffe yakınlarda kuramın aldığı son şekli, önceki çalışmaları da özetleyecek bir biçimde bir makalede ele aldı. Bu çalışma, anılan makalede geliştirilmiş izleğe bağlı kalarak şu üç görüşü temellendirmek amacındadır: 1) Mouffe'un, mevcut liberal demokratik siyaset pratiklerinin dayandığı ontolojik kabullerin "çatışma" nosyonunu kavrayamamak nedeniyle siyasetin güncel krizlerine yanıt veremeyeceğine ilişkin saptamaları doğrudur. 2) Buna karşın, liberal demokrasilerin güncel açmazıyla başa çıkabilmek üzere Mouffe'un önerdiği "agonistik çare" ontolojik bir yaptırım kuramına dayanmayı başaramadığı için zorunlu olarak "etik tavsiye" düzeyinden öteye gidememektedir. 3) Mouffe'un önerdiği çarenin ifade olanağı bulacağı bir kuram için Spinozacı bir "güç ontolojisi" ve aynı çerçevede bir 'modus' olarak "egemen" kavrayışının geliştirilmesi zorunludur.Chantal Mouffe, who has been contributing to the trajectory of political philosophy for almost fifty years mostly in collaboration with Ernesto Laclau, recently published an article to signal what her political theory finally looks like based on her previous research presented rather in a nutshell fashion. This paper aims at developing an argument for the justification of three remarks based on the program developed in Mouffe's aforementioned latest work: 1) Mouffe is right in her claim that the existing liberal democratic practices of politics are far from responding to current crisis of politics, as they fail to develop relevant ontological convictions to understand the very notion of 'conflict'. 2) Nevertheless, the agonistic relief suggested by Mouffe herself to tackle with the contemporary challenges, which cannot be taken by liberal democracies as such, also falls short and cannot go beyond making moral recommendations for it also lacks an underlying ontological force. 3) Development of a Spinozistic power ontology -together with the conception of 'the ruler' as a 'modus'- is a necessary condition if we are to benefit from Mouffe's agonistic relief.
62. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Barış Mutlu Alasdair MacIntyre’ın Çağdaş Sorunlar Karşısında Yeni Aristotelesçiliği
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Alasdair MacIntyre, Erdem Peşinde: Ahlak Teorisi Üzerine Bir Çalışma ile Aristotelesçi ahlak anlayışından nasıl uzaklaştığımızı ve bu uzaklaşma sonucunda modern kültürün ahlaki ve politik yaşam üzerindeki yansımalarını ve sorunlarını göstermeye çalışır. Erdem Peşinde’deki etkileyici tarihsel okumasını, Thomasçı yönü daha belirginleşecek bir şekilde diğer eserlerinde de sürdürür. MacIntyre eserleri boyunca, birbirlerine rakip farklı etik yaklaşımlar içerisinde Aristotelesçi etiğin güçlü yönlerine dikkat çeker ve bizi bu rakip yaklaşımlar konusunda ikna etmeye çalışır. Son eseri Modernitenin Çatışmaları İçerisinde Etik: İstek, Pratik Akıl Yürütme ve Anlatısal/Öyküsel’de amacı; Aristotelesçi terimlere bağlı olarak yaşamımızı ele alabileceğimizi göstermektir. Tüm gayreti Aristotelesçiliği yeniden canlandırmaktır. Çünkü, haklı olarak belirttiği gibi, Aristotelesçi felsefenin tarih sahnesinden bir dönem kaybolmasının nedeni, Aristotelesçi terimlerin rakipleri karşısında bir kenara çekilmesi, sıradan insanların gündelik yaşamlarına rehberlik edememesi olmuştur. MacIntyre, özellikle Marx’ın kapitalizm eleştirilerine de dikkat ile Aristotelesçiliğe bir dönüş çağrısında bulunur. Aristotelesçi terimlerle kuracağımız toplumsal pratiklerin, ileri modernite içerisinde önemli direnme alanları açacağını düşünür. Üzerinde durduğu Aristotelesçi toplumsal pratiklerde temel olan ise “ortak iyi”dir. Failler (agents) kendi potansiyellerini, doğalarını bu ortak iyi ile gerçekleştirirler; faillerin iyi bir yaşam sürmeleri ortak iyiyi bir kenara atmayan pratiklerle mümkündür. Bu pratikler faillerin isteklerini belli iyiler, belli erdemler yönünde disipline edecek, iyi yaşam yolunda daha güvenli yol almalarını sağlayacaktır. Özellikle isteklerimizin disiplini sonucunda yaptığımız ve karar verdiğimiz şeyleri gerekçelendirecek nedenleri öğrenir ve böylece kendi yaptıklarımızı diğer toplumun üyeleri için bilinebilir kılarız. Eylemlerimizi, kararlarımızı gerekçelendirmek toplumsal ve rasyonel bir hayvan olmamızın kaçınılmaz bir parçasıdır. Bizlerin kınanması ya da övülmesi “gerekçeler”le mümkün olacaktır ve gerekçeler de isteklerimizi yönlendirdiğimiz iyilere bağlı verilebilir. İşte MacIntyre Aristotelesçi bir şema ile pratik-istek-iyi ilişkisini tartışır. En son eseri Modernitenin Çatışmaları İçerisinde Etik’te bu tartışmasını, günümüzün en önemli ahlak filozoflarından biri olan Bernard Williams’a dikkatle yürütür, onunla hesaplaşarak ilerler. Bu çalışmamızda, MacIntyre’ın en son eserine dikkat ile, Yeni-Aristotelesçi okumasını göreceğiz.Alasdair MacIntyre, with his book After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory tries to show how we move away from Aristotelianism, and the problems of the moral and political life of modern cultures as a result of this departure. His impressive historical reading in After Virtue continues in his other works with making his Thomistic direction clear. Through his work, he draws attention to the strengths of Aristotelian ethics within rivaling different ethical approaches. His aim in his recent work, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning, and Narrative is to show that we can handle our life even today by depending on the Aristotelian terms. In this way, he tries to revive Aristotle. For, as he rightly pointed out, the reason of the disappearance of the Aristotelian philosophy from the stage of history is the fact that Aristotelian terms were not able to guide everyday lives of ordinary people. MacIntyre, with paying attention to Marx’s critics of capitalism, wants to revive Aristotelianism. He thinks that the social practices we build with Aristotelian terms will open areas of resistance that do not conform values of advanced modernity, within this modernity. What is important in these practices is “common good”. The agents carry out their potentials, their natures with this common good. What needs to be done is to discipline the wishes, in this good way of life according to goods, that is, to virtues. As the result of this discipline, we learn the reasons to justify what we have decided, what we have done, so that we can make our own doings intelligible for the other members of the community. MacIntyre thinks that we can implement this Aristotelian outline to our lives and gives some important answers to Bernard Williams’s critique of Aristotle, who is one of the most important moral philosophers of this age. In this work, we will consider the reading of MacIntyre’s Neo-Aristotelian reading by paying attention to his latest work.
63. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Necdet Yildiz Nietzsche’de Arı Öznenin Eleştirisi
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Öz: Kant, “arı usun1 eleştirisi” ile metafiziğe 1) meşru iddialarını teslim etmeyi ve 2) yetkisiz olduğu yerleri göstererek arı usun kullanımındaki gerekli sınırları belirlemeyi amaçlamıştır. Ahlak felsefesinde ise Kant, ahlaki a priori bilgilerin —imkân koşulu olarak da olsa— bulunması gerektiğini öne sürmüştür. Nietzsche ise, farklı bir eleştirel felsefe ortaya koyarak, 1) öznenin ve usunun tamamen ampirik bir zeminde kurulduğunu göstermek suretiyle Kant’ın evrenselleştirdiği formel alt yapıyı olumsallaştırmış ve 2) bir canlı olan öznenin, insan türüne faydalı olabilme potansiyeli bulunan bir bilme yetisinin bulunduğunu öne sürmüştür. Bu makale, Nietzsche’nin Kant’ın eleştirisini perspektivist bir süreç episteme-ontolojisi ve soykütüksel2 yöntemle nasıl ileri götürüp arı öznenin eleştirisi haline getirdiğini göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır.Kant, with his project of “the critique of pure reason,” aimed at 1) deciding where metaphysics has legitimate claims, and 2) showing where metaphysics has groundless pretensions and setting necessary limits to pure reason thereupon. In his moral philosophy, Kant claimed that —albeit as a condition of possibility— there must be moral a priori knowledge in our reason. On the other hand, Nietzsche, performing a different critical philosophy, 1) made contingent the formal structure which Kant had universalized by showing that subject —and its reason— is constructed on an empirical ground, and 2) claimed that, subject, who is a living being, has an intellect which is capable of producing knowledge potentially beneficial for itself or the human species. This article aims to show how Nietzsche took Kant’s critique a step forward via his perspectivist process episteme-ontology and his genealogical method; and how he transformed the critique into “the critique of pure subject.”
64. Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Sezen Bektaş Bilgiyi Nasıl Temsil Edebiliriz?: Bir Örnek Olarak Sorular ve Sorgulayıcı Mantık
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Bu yazı en genel haliyle keşfetme süreci içerisinde gerçekleştirilen sorgulamaların mantığını aramaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, yeni bir bilgi edinimiyle sonlanan sorgulama süreçlerinin nasıl işlediğine basit ve genelleştirilebilir bir açıklama getirmektir. Bu sebeple yalnızca bilimsel keşiflere özgü değil, daha geniş bir açıdan “yaratıcılık” olarak adlandırılabilecek tüm durumlara dair giriş niteliğinde bir mantık örneklemeye çalışacağım. Yalnızca tarihsel olarak yepyeni bir olgu ya da olayın keşfini değil aynı zamanda tek bir kişi özelinde olsa dahi daha önce bilinmeyen bir şeyin idrak edilişi kadar yaygın bir fenomenin de nasıl gerçekleştiğini inceleyeceğim. Bunun için başvuracağım temel kaynaklar J. Hintikka’nın enformasyon edinimi sırasında işletilen sorgulayıcı mantık temelinde sunduğu epistemoloji ve M. Koralus ve S. Mascarenhas’ın düşünme ediminin psikolojisini açıklamak için yararlandığı erotetik mantık olacak. İlk kaynağa, bilginin temsili konusuna felsefi bir bakış açısı sunmak ve sorgulama pratiğinin kendisini bir temsil biçimi olarak tanıtmak için yer vereceğim. İkincisine başvurma nedenim ise başarılı sorgulama süreçleri kadar başarısız olduklarımızdan da belli bir rasyonalite çıkarabildiğimizi göstermek ve insan beyninin nasıl işlediği sorusuna soru yanıtlamadaki becerimizden hareketle bir cevap geliştirmek olacak. Son olarak ise tüm bu teorilerin sunduğu zeminde bilgiyi sınıflandırmak için kullanabileceğimiz bir soru ontolojisi önereceğim. Temelde sorulabilecek tüm soruları şekil ve içeriklerine dair kimi başlıklar altında gruplamaya yarayan bir sistemin sağlayacağı faydalara değineceğim.This article, in its most general form, seeks to determine the rationale of the inquiries carried out within the discovery process. In other words, this article is to provide a simple and generalized explanation of how the inquiries that end with the acquisition of new pieces of knowledge proceed. For this reason, I will try to exemplify the logic of any act that can be called "creativity" rather than just the discoveries in the history of science. I will examine not only the discovery of a historically new phenomenon, but also how a phenomenon as widespread as the perception of something previously unknown will occur in personal history is going to be examined. The main sources for this will be the epistemology on which J. Hintikka is based on the interrogative logic operated during the acquisition of information and the erotic logic that M. Koralus and S. Mascarenhas use to explain the psychology of the act of thinking. I will refer to the first source with the aim of developing a philosophical perspective on representing knowledge and introducing the practice of inquiry as a form of representation. The second source will be referred to show that we are able to rationalize the experiences of failures as well as successful interrogation processes, and to develop a response to the question of how human brain works, from our ability to answer the questions in general. Finally, I would like to propose a question ontology that we can use to classify information in the basis of all these theories. I will briefly mention about the benefits of a system that will group all the questions that can be basically asked under certain headings and tags about their forms and contents.
65. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Jacek Wojtysiak On the Principle of Sufficient Reason
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The aim of this paper is to defend the ontological Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR-O). I analyse various versions of this principle and various ways of justifying it. Then I attempt to challenge some counterexamples allegedly refuting a universal application of the PSR-O. There are standard and non-standard versions of the PSR-O. The PSR-Ostand can only be valid if there are no chains of contingent reasons and outcomes with first modules, i.e. all chains are actually infinite. However, there are serious arguments against this possibility. The necessary condition of the PSR-Onon-stand is the existence of a necessary substance: that substance would be a direct reason of certain contingent states of affairs obtaining in its domain, and those states of affairs would then be indirect reasons for all other contingent states of affairs and things. There are two advantages of the PSR-Onon-stand: a nomological unity of the world and explanatory simplicity.
66. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Sebastian Tomasz Kołodziejczyk, Jan Woleński Editorial
67. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Peter Simons Abstraction, Structure, and Substitution: Lambda and its Philosophical Significance
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λ-calculi are of interest to logicians and computer scientists but have largely escaped philosophical commentary, perhaps because they appear narrowly technical or uncontroversial or both. I argue that even within logic λ-expressions need to be understood correctly, as functors signifying functions in intension within a categorical or typed language. λ-expressions are not names but pure viable binders generating functors, and as such they are of use in giving explicit definitions. But λ is applicable outside logic and computer science, anywhere where the notions of complex whole, substitution, abstraction and structure make sense. To illustrate this, two domains are considered. One is somewhat frivolous: the study of flags; the other is very serious: manufacturing engineering. In each case we can employ λ-abstraction to describe substitutions within a structure, and in the latter case there is even a practical need for such a notation.
68. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Bartosz Gostkowski Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again
69. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Jan Woleński Two Critical Contributions to the Problem of Truth and Meaning
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This paper critically discusses two points concerning some recent views about the concept of truth. Firstly, contrary to Davidson, it shows that meaning of sentences cannot be explicated by T-equivalences. In particular, “is true” is an extensional predicate, but “means that” an intensional one. Secondly, the minimalist account of truth does not provide a satisfactory analysis of the concept of falsity. In this respect, minimalism does not satisfy Russell’s claim that any adequate truth-theory must be a theory of falsity as well.
70. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Susan Haack The Legitimacy of Metaphysics: Kant’s Legacy to Peirce, and Peirce’s to Philosophy Today
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Part of Kant’s legacy to Peirce was a lasting conviction that metaphysics is not irredeemable, but can and should be set “on the secure path of a science”. However, Peirce’s “scientific metaphysics”, unlike Kant’s, uses the method of science, i.e., of experience and reasoning; but requires close attention to experience of the most familiar kind rather than the recherché experience needed by the special sciences. This distinctively plausible reconception of what a genuinely scientific metaphysics would be is part of Peirce’s legacy to philosophy today, enabling us to steer clear of both apriorism and of scientism - the Scylla and Charybdis of recent metaphysics.
71. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Paweł Rojek If Tropes
72. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Janusz Salamon Faith and Philosophical Analysis: The Impact of Analytical Philosophy on the Philosophy of Religion
73. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Jan Hauska Dispositions and Meinongian Objects
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Questions concerning casual involvement of empirican properties have recently given rise to a lively philosophical controversy known as the debate about dispositions. I begin with a description of the focal points of the debate: the issue of the viability of the conditional analysis of dispostions, the question of whether or not they ultimately constitute a distinct kind of properties, the conundrum concerning their causal efficacy, and finally the bold suggestion that all properties are dispositional. Along the way I sketch current theories of the anture of dispositions. Then I draw a fuller picture of dispositionalism, i.e. of the family of positions united by embracing the ontological distinctness of dispositions and their causal efficacy. I conclude by defending dispositionalism against the objection, raised by David Armstrong, that it is committed to the existence of Meinongian objects.
74. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Paweł Łuków What is the Problem of Freedom of the Will?
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I argue in the paper that the problem of freedom has been misconstrued. There is no one problem of freedom but many problems concerning individual agents’ responsiveness to principles and reasons. The problem of free will results from attempts to incorporate the notion of freedom, which belongs to the order of guiding action, into a determinist framework of explanation. My view could be seen as compatibilist because it denies the existence of a fundamental conflict between freedom and determinism. However, since libertarian accounts of local indeterminism are pointless on my view, it cannot be easily place with the compatibilism/libertarianism distinction. Instead of entering the hopelessly unproductive metaphysical debates about freedom and determinism, I propose to turn attention to the domain of ethics. Problems of freedom are questions about the deliberative processes that terminate in action and about reasons and principles on which they are based. To say that an action is free is not to claim that it is independent from causal determination; rather, it is to say that it has been decided upon.
75. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 1
Francesco Coniglione The Place of Polish Scientific Philosophy in the European Context
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Scientific philosophy is a sui generis project and it is not possible to assimilate it into analytic philosophy tout court, nor, a fortiori, into the philosophy of science. Scientific philosophy was practised during the early stage of the Vienna Circle before the influence of Wittgenstein’s thought became decisive. Afterwards, there was a quick transition to philosophy intended as subsidary to science, as a mere classification of meaning, coming, in the end, to its liquidation with Carnap’s logical syntax. Different was the path of the Lvov-Warsaw School, which remained committed to Brentano’s original programme and never abandoned the idea of the possibility of scientific philosophy. Decisive, here, was the absence of Wittgenstein’s influence and the utter irrelevance of that of Mach. It is in Poland that at the present days it has its strongest roots and there we find considerable trends of thought inspired by it.
76. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Piotr K. Szałek Mind and World: with a New Introduction by the Author
77. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Jan Woleński Notes on Books
78. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Dale Jacquette Denying The Liar
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The liar paradox is standardly supposed to arise from three conditions: classical bivalent truth value semantics, the Tarskian truth schema, and the formal constructability of a sentence that says of itself that it is not true. Standard solutions to the paradox, beginning most notably with Tarski, try to forestall the paradox by rejecting or weakening one or more of these three conditions. It is argued that all efforts to avoid the liar paradox by watering down any of the three assumptions suffers serious disadvantages that are at least as undesirable as the liar paradox itself. Instead, a new solution is proposed that admits that if the liar sentence is true then it is false, in the first paradox dilemma horn, but denies that the liar sentence is true, but asserting instead that it is false, and refuting the second paradox dilemma horn according to which it is supposed to follow that if the liar sentence is false then it is true. The reasoning for the second paradox dilemma horn is flawed, in that is not only not supported by but actually contradicted by the Tarskian truth schema. We could only infer the second dilemma horn if it were to clasically follow from the assumption that the liar sentence is false, and from the three liar paradox conditions, that therefore it is false that the liar sentence is false. This entire sentence can be shown to be false on the basis of the standard truth schema, thus blocking the paradox. Alternative formulations of the liar sentence are discussed, and the formal proofs and counterproofs for the two paradox dilemma horns, are considered along with the further philosophical implications of maintaining a resolute stance that the liar sentence is simply false.
79. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Gerald Harrison Libertarian Free Will and the Erosion Argument
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Libertarians make indeterminism a requirement of free will. But many argue that indeterminism is destructive of free will because it reduces an agent’s control. This paper argues that such concerns are misguided. Indeterminism, at least as it is located by plausible Libertarian views, poses no threat to an agent’s control, nor does it pose any other kind of threat.
80. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 1 > Issue: 2
Robert Poczobut Filozofia Umysłu. Dyskusja z naturalistycznymi teoriami umysłu: (Philosophy of Mind. The Debate with the Naturalistic Conceptions of Mind)