La déconstruction des représentations modernes se réclame aujourd’hui de plus en plus de la suspension des critères du jugement non pas à l’instar des règles de la morale chrétienne (“qui es-tu pour juger?”), mais plutôt par une destitution des finalités de tout arrière-monde. Dans cette optique de reconfiguration des catégories, parler du préjugé revient, d’entrée de jeu, à s’exposer dans le cadre d’une métaphysique de la modernité et à évoquer un report possible à l’objectivité. Or, les basculements contemporains dans l’ère du soupçon appellent malgré tout une interrogation: Où est donc passé le préjugé? De quelle histoire restet-il la trace? Cet exposé montre que, loin d’être nié ou confiné à un champ de représentations archaïques, il est plutôt en voie d’être réhabilité, pourvu d’une nouvelle dignité sans le nom, d’ailleurs péjoratif, voire transformé en catégorie épistémique au nom du relativisme et de l’incommensurabilité des univers de sens. Il semble passer de nos jours par un accueil acritique de la contingence ou par l’abandon à une compréhension préréflexive du monde comme possibilité maximale de toute entreprise cognitive. Le propos tente de dégager les difficultés théoriques que pose le projet de la suspension du jugement dans l’épistémologie poststructuraliste.

I submit what, I believe, is a fairly new definition of the nation, one which I call the sociopolitical conception. I try to avoid as much as possible the traditional dichotomy between the exclusively civic and ethnic accounts, and try to explain my reasons for doing so. I also adopt as a general framework a certain conceptual pluralism which allows me to use many different concepts of the nation. After that, I proceed by formulating some constraints on any acceptable new definition. My own sociopolitical conception is then finally introduced. The sociopolitical nation is a political community, most often composed, sociologically, of a national majority, national minorities, and individuals with other national origins. The concept of national majority is crucial for the account and refers to the largest sample in the world of a given population sharing a common language, history, and culture. National minorities are defined as extensions of neighbouring nations, while individuals of other national origins are those members of ethnic minorities that have come from immigration. There would be no sociopolitical nation if there were no national majority, but this is compatible with a pluricultural and multi-ethnic view of the nation, since the political community may also include national minorities and individuals with a different origin. lend the article by showing that this definition meets the constraints that were initially introduced.

Though Habermas explicitly rejected psychoanalysis as a model for a critical theory of society, it seems to have continued to shape his thought beyond the publication of Knowledge and Human Interests. The conceptual framework underlying his more recent social theory (Theory of Communicative Action,) would also be indebted to the psychoanalytical paradigm. This thesis is developed through the idea of the pathology of society, which represents the cornerstone of a specifically critical theory of society. In his demonstration, the author establishes a structural relationship between psychical and social organization, and between individual pathology and the diagnostic of modern societies.

The non-existence of fictional entities does not seem incompatible with their possible existence. The aim of this paper is to give an accornt of the intuitive truth of statements of possible existence involving fictional proper names in an actualist framework. After having made clear the opposition between a possibilist and an actualist approach of possible worlds, I distinguish between fictional individuals and fictional characters and between the fictional use offictional proper names and their metafictional use. On that basis, statements of possible existence involving fictional proper names appear to say of fictional characters conceived as abstact objects that they might have been exemplified.

We believe that, granting radical holism, a homophonie (or disquotational) definition of truth for a language achieves no progress towards guaranteeing the material equivalence of the left- and right-hand-side sentences for T-sentences. In order to avoid paradoxes such as the antinomy of the liar, Tarski requires that the metalanguage be semantically richer than the object language. For a radical holist, the difference in semantic powers of the meta- and object languages means that homophony is no guarantee of synonymy; therefore, worries about the indeterminacy of translation still apply.

This paper focuses on Heideggers 1937 lecture course on the Nietzschean doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. Heidegger interprets the motive of recurrence in Nietzsche as the Moment (Augenblick) of the Eternal Recurrence. Through this key motive of the moment, we try then to examine the double function of the doctrine which, on the one hand, refers us back to some essential themes of the existential analytics, whereas, on the other hand, it paves the way for the new confrontation with metaphysics in the Beitrâge zur Philosophie. We hold that the turning away from the existential conception of the moment toward its “aletheiological” understanding in terms of a “site of the Moment” (die Augenblicksstàtte) takes place in the context of this very lecture course. This transition is even more critical as it constitutes the very heart of Heidegger s critique of subjectivity in the new perspective opened by the history of Being: Nietzsche's doctrine of time provides the basis for this questioning.

The term “Renaissance” usually applies to a period in European history during which the Greco-Latin culture was rediscovered and modern science started. We show that “the Idea of Renaissance” indicates a universal process: a community (a nation, for example), identifying needs that it does not know how to satisfy by itself, and recognising that another community already satisfies them, tries first to acclimate the external process, and then becomes a creative entity. Several interpretations of this process have already been given: we study three of them: the law of the three states by Auguste Comte, the notion of “a single revolution” in Kant’s Critic of Pure Reason and Critic of Judgement, and the notion of “scientific revolution” by A. A. Cournot. Thus conceived, Renaissance means a challenge in which all cultures are equally involved: discovering, even elsewhere, the means of satisfy needs which are related to scientific knowledge and know-how; trying to assimilate them; and making them productive and indigenous by becoming creative.

Si «penser» est d’abord un acte, «repenser» l’est aussi. On ne peut «repenser» que ce qui fut déjà pensé une fois. Ce que «repenser» veut dire, nous ne le comprenons que si nous nous demandons au préalable ce que «penser» veut dire. Pour Heidegger, cela revient à se demander ce qui nous appelle à penser, pour Kant, c’est se demander comment on peut s’orienter dans la pensée, pour Nietzsche, ce qui nous pousse à penser, à quoi j’ajouterai la question, moins connue et plus déconcertante, d’Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy dans son essai sur la «pensée dative»: «Cui cogitatur?», «À qui nos pensées sont-elles destinées?»À quoi nos pensées sont-elles dédiées?, à qui sont-elles destinées?: c’est la tension féconde entre ces deux questions qui nous met sur la voie d’une réflexion sur le sens que le verbe «repenser» peut revêtir dans la bouche d’un philosophe. À la différence de ceux qui s’imaginent que «repenser» veut dire simplement distribuer un peu différemment les cartes du savoir, les vrais «repenseurs» ne cessent de se demander à quel jeu ils jouent quand il s’efforcent de penser philosophiquement et ils cherchent à avoir une conscience plus nette des enjeux de ces jeux de la pensée.