The advances that have been made in the area of genetic technology over the past several years have caused a reflection into the grounds for emerging policy decisions that have emerged as a result of these stunning scientific breakthroughs. Inevitably, controversies have emerged as a result of these rapidly developing genetic discoveries. Recent British judicial decisions in this area have appeared to avoid directly dealing with the accompanying ethical issues. Instead they have appeared to take an ad hoc approach, by looking to statutory authority in aid of the outcome perceived as being the most favorable. This paper tries to outline the problems associated with this and argues instead, on behalf of what has been termed as Dworkinian principalism.

The propriety of expert ethics testimony in the courtroom is as contentious in academic scholarship as any typical ethical debate could be. Some of the main objections to expert ethics testimony stem partly from fears that it could unduly influence judicial thinking or judgments, or foist prejudicial or idiosyncratic moral views or opinions on judicial decisions. This prospect is perceived as contrary to the tenets of a liberal, pluralistic democratic society, where moral and ethical values should ideally be shared and not dictated. Another crucial argument against expert ethics testimony is the ethicists’ propensity to assume the stance of ‘moral advocates’ bent on pitching clients’ agenda, without regards to any merits in the opponents’ moral judgments. Yet another anti-expert ethics testimony posits that reliance on it will foster moral laziness. This paper joins the debate by critically analyzing the arguments for and against expert ethics testimony in the context of relevant literature and standard evidentiary rules governing judicial evaluation and admissibility of expert ethics evidence. With a discourse on the nature of moral expertise and the dynamics of expert ethics testimony as a backgrounder, the paper evaluates the validity of the hypothesis that expert ethics testimony could encourage moral tardiness, unduly influence judicial proceedings or imprint narrow, elitist, or prejudicial moral viewpoints on judicial reasoning and judgments.

This article examines conflicts of interest in the context of scientific research related to regulation or litigation. The article defines conflicts of interest, considers how conflicts of interest can impact research, and discusses different strategies for dealing with conflicts of interest. While it is not realistic to expect that scientific research related to regulation or litigation will ever be free from conflicts of interest, society should consider taking some practical steps to minimize the impact of these conflicts, such as requiring full disclosure of information required for independent evaluation of research, prohibiting financial relationships between regulatory agencies and the companies they regulate, and banning payments to expert witnesses for specific research results, testimony or legal outcomes.

The paper notes that whereas the issue of capital punishment is very old and not alien to any human society, and whereas there is an abundance of literature on Western philosophy of punishment, very little philosophical work on punishment from the African perspective can be cited. By way of filling a part of the lacuna in the literature, the paper examines the Yorùbá culture for its perspectives on the death penalty.The paper finds in the Ifá Literary Corpus, though implicit, a strong philosophical argument against capital punishment. The argument, explicated and analyzed, turns out to be an introduction of a skeptical epistemological consideration into the debate over capital punishment in a unique way that raises some other jurisprudential issues relating to judicial administration.The paper concludes that although there may, as would be expected, be other positions on the issue of death penalty in Yorùbá culture, the particular argument examined validly makes its point for the abolition of capital punishment, especially when situated in the context of Yorùbá social ethic, which is essentially communal and humanistic. The enabling cultural context of the Ifá argument against capital punishment was extended beyond its immediate Yorùbá sociocultural context to the pan-African humanistic social ethic conceptualized in Bantu languages of Southern Africa as ‘Ubuntu’, thereby giving the argument a contemporary universal relevance and applicability.

Sustainable management of dwindling resources is perhaps the biggest challenge facing the human species. Successfully addressing this challenge requires holistic perspective: a nebulous connection across disparate realms of science, economics and sociopolitics. Here, I examine some important historical philosophical ideas in our understanding of science. I relate these ideas to how science is generally perceived today. And I question how our view of science is applied through modern policy incorporating a variant of the ‘precautionary principle’, a notion that essentially attempts to articulate a cautious approach to management in our rapidly changing world. I conclude that deeper, philosophical thought would be much welcome: both for clearer purpose within science itself and in order to move forward more strategically in applied areas, such as sustainable management of our planet.

The starting point for this paper is the question that forms its title. Why is it that management seems to have no history? In making this bold claim I am not of course suggesting that historians have not written about management, as of course they have. The question I am posing is rather one about the practice ofmanagement, its received status as an amalgam of technical insights and administrative expertise perceived to stand objectively, and necessarily so, a corpus of skills analogous to those an engineer or a chemist might have: management as a transferable technology unclouded by competing values. Nor am I suggesting that the practice of management has been perceived as unproblematic. Rather, I aim to probe the degree to which its nature as an objective 'know-how' renders it as in some way anterior to ethics. It is that proposition that I am attempting to investigate here, indirectly as it were, by posing this question - a question initially about history. This question it seems to me is underlined by the assumption that the history of management is necessarily circumscribed in a way that, say, political history or the history of religion is not. Is it the story of how this expertise was acquired, the intellectual equivalent of a Brunel or a Napier, building bridges or constructing log tables? Or is it something more? Religion and politics clearly have a more problematic history than this, while management appears not to do so; and it is that question I propose to probe in this essay.