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Displaying: 81-100 of 370 documents

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81. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Dennis R. Cooley Review of What We Owe To Each Other, by T.M. Scanlon
82. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
David Boersema Review of Reconsidering Logical Positivism, by Michael Friedman
83. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
David Boersema Introduction: Pragmatism and Neopragmatism
84. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Heidi Salaverria Who is Exaggerating? The Mystery of Common Sense
85. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Hendrik R. Pieterse Neopragmatism and the Christian Desire for a Transcendent God: Is a Meaningful Dialogue Possible?
86. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Charbel Niño El-Hani, Sami Pihlström Emergence Theories and Pragmatic Realism
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The tradition of pragmatism has, especially since Dewey, been characterized by a commitment to nonreductive naturalism. The notion of emergence, popular in the early decades of the twentieth century and currently re-emerging as a central concept in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, may be useful in explicating that commitment. The present paper discusses the issue of the reality of emergent properties, drawing particular attention to a pragmatic way of approaching this issue. The reality of emergents can be defended as a pragmatically-useful ontological commitment; hence, pragmatism can be employed as a tool in the debate over the structure and reality of emergence. This strategy of justifying ontological commitments is examined through historical and systematic discussions of the pragmatist tradition. It turns out, among other things, that while classical pragmatists did not specify any technical notion of emergence in the contemporary sense, their non-reductively naturalist views are relevant to the more recent emergence discussions -- especially because they rejected the metaphysical realism typical of today’s ontologically-oriented emergence theories.
87. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Gregory M. Fahey The Idea of the Good in John Dewey and Aristotle
88. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Kevin Decker Habermas on Human Rights and Cloning: A Pragmatist Response
89. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Mark McEvoy Naturalized Epistemology, Normativity and the Argument Against the A Priori
90. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Brian E. Butler Legal Pragmatism: Banal or Beneficial as a Jurisprudential Position?
91. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
D. S. Clark Pragmatism’s Instrumental View of Moral Reasoning
92. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Steven Schroeder Review of Kierkegaard After MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue, ed. John J. Davenport and Anthony Rudd
93. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert Review of Kant Trouble: The Obscurities of the Enlightened, by Diane Morgan
94. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Clancy W. Martin Review of Philosophy and Tragedy, ed. Miguel de Beistegui and Simon Sparks
95. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Leo Zaibert Review of Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem, ed. Steven E. Aschheim
96. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Lawrence Udell Fike Jr. Review of The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, ed. Chenyang Li
97. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Zsolt Bátori Review of Having Thought, by John Haugeland
98. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 3 > Issue: 2
Susan Armstrong Review of Utopias, Dolphins and Computers: Problems of Philosophical Plumbing, by Mary Midgley
99. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
Dennis R. Cooley Medical Research Ethics: Introduction
100. Essays in Philosophy: Volume > 4 > Issue: 2
David Rudge Do Unknown Risks Preclude Informed Consent?
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Allen Buchanan and Daniel Brock, in a widely influential account, Deciding for Others (1990), advocate a sliding scale approach to the determination of whether a patient is competent to make a decision regarding his/her health care. An analysis of two critiques of their position (Beauchamp and Childress (1994), Wicclair (1991 a,b)) reveals a tacit presumption by all of these authors that the greater cognitive challenge often posed by high risk therapies constitutes grounds for an elevated standard of competence. This presumption cannot be consistently maintained in cases where the patient's decision involves experimental therapies. It implies either that informed consent can never take place in such situations, or, perhaps even more counter-intuitively, that a lower standard of competency should be used than when the patient is asked to choose only among standard therapies.