The paper is intended as a study in the philosophy of interpretation of Michael Krausz in relation to the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. The idea is to throw some new lights on Schopenhauer’s philosophy by critically examining thc works of Schopenhauer in the light of Krausz’s philosophy of interpretation. We shall examine the extent to which Krausz’s philosophy of interpretation could provide a framework of interpretation of the more or less enigmatic parts of constructive realism in Schopenhauer’s The World As Will and Representation and On the Fourfold Root. In particular, I have discussed in my paper the specific problems of (i) bridging the gulf between the object-as-such and the object-of-interpretation in Krausz’s philosophy and (ii) the Will and the Representation in Schopenhauer’s philosophy.

The article reflects upon Michael Krausz’s account of contemporary debates between singularity and pluralism in the determination ofrightness, and uses that occasion to ask after the larger course of which these debates are a part. Looking to the companion effort to determine truth and rightness at law, it finds telling echoes of those debates in the modem history of legal thought, and sketches that history to the end of drawing out its implications for the project at determining rightness more generally. These sobering implications, itsuggests, call us to rethink the question of the relation of rightness to ontology.

The paper develops a view of interpretative cultural practice as a complex system of dynamically changing constituents which stand in definite relations to one another. These constituents are the Object of Interpretation (O), Result of Interpretation or interpretation itself (I), the Process of interpretation (P) and the interpreting Subject (S). It is argued that if such a view as this is adapted, ‘singularism’ as a norm for cultural practices necessarily gives way to ‘multiplism’. Singularism and multiplism are terms used by Michael Krausz in Rightness and Reasons (1993). Krausz also talks of certain interpretative practices as imputational, in the sense that the object of interpretation changes, is ‘imputed upon’ during the course of the practice. This paper contends that all cultural practices are imputalional, for each such practice leaves its effect on the object. Not only does practice affect the object, but it affects the subject too The evolution of the subject, the self, through imputational interpretative cultural practices is explored as a major element in the making of a human individual.

This paper suggests certain differences between the interpretation of Indian classical music and the interpretation of Western classical music. In Indian music the work is constituted in the moment of a recital. The performer is the maker of the music. Accordingly, the performer simultaneously produces a work and interprets it. Further, in the Indian tradition. music is a path of “bhakti yoga,” or a path of devotion.

In this contribution, a scientific interpretation of musical harmony is understood as a description in an adequate frame of symbolic forms (in the sense of Cassirer), rather than as a final explanation. I describe different interpretations of musical harmony from the time of the Pythagoreans until the present times. It is noted that a symbolic interpretation of Helmholtz (in the sense of his theory of signs), which was criticized as incomplete by Ernst Mach, is recognized as adequate by Arnold Schönberg.

The central thesis of this paper is that technological artifacts essentially depend on a special type of interpretation. Starting fom thedifference between science and engineering on the one side and between artifacts of fine arts and technological artifacts on the other side, it is shown that the latter ones need a ‘teleological interpretation’ which is singular and excludes a multitude of interpretations.

The authors suggest that it is the indeterminate limits of biotechnology that invite a multiplicity of interpretations of it. They note that incongruent interpretations of biotechnology arise from competing long-term human interests and from competing uses of language. They propose to resolve the opposition between incongruent interpretations by being more precise about what exactly is being debated in the name of biotechnology.

The paper offers an overview of, and critical comments on, Michael Krausz’s Limits of Rightness. It focuses on three key aspects of the book’s intellectual framework: the ideals of interpretation, the objects of interpretation, and the ontological commitments of interpretation. The paper discusses how exactly these aspects are related Krausz’s views on constructive realism, in particular its relation to objects of interpretation, become crucial. His comments on Paul Thom’s theory of interpretations provide a context for examining the role of ‘construction’ in objects per se and in works of art and a tripartite distinction between object, work and interpretation is proposed.

Common goods are notoriously vulnerable to destructive overuse. Indeed, certain online activities, such as spam, can jeopardize the very existence of the Internet. We defend an account of the net as a common good that provides the grounds for assessing various strategies for spam reduction.

I argue that artworks are of public value because aesthetic experience of them contributes to the development of our aestheticjudgement. I use two accounts of aesthetic judgement to explore how it might do so and how the private ownership of artworks could affect the development of our aesthetic judgement.

My aim in this paper is to describe some of John Stuart Mill’s views about property rights in land and some implications he drew for public policy. While Mill defends private ownership of land, he emphasizes the ways in which ownership of land is an anomaly that does not fit neatly into the usual views about private ownership. While most of MiII’s discussion assumes the importance of maximizing the productivity of land, he anticipates contemporary environmentalists by also expressing concerns about excessive exploitation of land for productive use. I extrapolate from these remarks to suggest changes that Mill might have favored regarding ownership rights ina world in which people aimed to decrease productivity. And, I suggest, it is a virtue of utilitarianism that it so readily supports changes in important principles when circumstances change significantly.

In this paper I explore the limitations of liberal political theory in relation to the notions of public property and public interest. I argue that the fundamentally atomistic and individualistic ontological foundations of the liberal tradition preclude any coherent notion of public goods and public interest.

In this paper I argue that the potentially environmentally destructive scope of a libertarian property rights regime can be narrowed by applying reasonable limits to those rights. I will claim that excluding the right to destroy from the libertarian property rights bundle is consistent with self-ownership and Robert Nozick’s interpretation of the Lockean proviso.

Is genetic technology a special case, for which patents are inappropriate? I discuss concerns about commodification of human genes that are the common heritage of humankind. Genetic technology has the potential to irreversibly change the basis of our humanity. Public ownership of genetic technology is a democratic alternative to patenting.

I develop an account of private property that preserves public participation and access. A focus on the initial state of common ownership, labour, and the proviso reveals that standard Lockean defences of property ignore important common interests. In consequence, property rights over environmentally significant goods must be less strong than full liberal rights, and I show how these will be designed.

I analyze Ojibway objections to genomics and genetics research on wild rice. Although key academic and industry participants in this research have dismissed their objections out of hand, my analysis supports the conclusion that the objections merit serious consideration, even by those who do not share the Ojibway’s religious beliefs.