According to the “fitting-attitudes” (FA) account of value, for a thing to be valuable is for it to be the fitting object of a pro-attitude. Value here is analyzed in terms of reasons for and against favoring, admiring, desiring, preferring, loving, etc. a thing. Whichever particular FA analysis you prefer, the basic idea is just that a thing’s value depends on extant reasons to be favorably (or disfavorably) disposed toward it. Of course, proponents of FA analyses deny that just any such reasons suffice to ground a thing’s value. The reasons must be of the right sort. If I threaten to stab you in the face unless you become favorably disposed toward Rob Schneider movies, you now have a reason to do just that. But it seems clear that while my threat does make Rob Schneider movies to you worth liking, it does not make them valuable or good. The difficulty then is to distinguish the right kind of reasons from the wrong kind. Several writers have recently tried to offer principled ways of resolving the so-called “wrong kind of reasons” (WKR) problem, though I will not closely examine them here. Instead I wish to focus on one particular FAaccount of value whom some have suggested is immune to WKR-style problems, specifically the one Michael Zimmerman offers in The Nature of Intrinsic Value. I argue that even Zimmerman’s account incurs WKR difficulties, and that it can actually help illustrate a certain deep problem with FA accounts in general.

Solidarity is a valuable tradition of Vietnam Communist Party and Vietnamese people and Ho Chi Minh is the personification of the great national Solidarity. Ho Chi Minh Solidarity is reflected by tolerant, which is not tight in national matter but also extends to the contemporary world. This is the foundation of national Solidarity as well as international Solidarity to the liberating, building and developing carier of a country. It is difficult to reach a common point between 54 minority ethnics in all around Vietnam with different culture, custom, religious beliefs. However, Ho Chi Minh, by his thinking and action, he was successful in establishing a great united bloc of all the minority ethnics in Vietnam. It leads to a happy, comfortable and peaceful life. That is the reason why people said that: “In the past, there were few men could be a part of legend when he was still alive, but Ho Chi Minh extremely did it”.

In recent decades few moral concepts have suffered as much neglect at the hands of ethicists as the notion of conscience. My paper argues that this neglect is largely in reaction to an ‘authoritarian’ conception of conscience that is outdated and based on a naïve faculty psychology. When construed in terms of a narrative of self-integration, in which conscience designates our struggle to balance the affective and cognitive dimensions of moral experience, its neglect appears unjustified. It is my contention that the phenomenon of conscience discloses the experience of moral agency in a way that is highly instructive, and that we miss a valuable window into moral behavior by ignoring it. In order to make this case I argue that the most serious criticisms of conscience—that it has no justifiablemoral criteria, clear distinguishing ‘identity,’ or motivating power—are leveled against a largely obsolete and essentialist reading of conscience. Once we see that ‘having a conscience’ refers to how people contend with the multiple moral warrants that anchor their own sense of accountability, and not some timeless moral intuition, the indispensability of the concept becomes clear.

The most frequent charges brought against moral relativism are probably that it is inconsistent, that it has morally repugnant implications, and that it leads to amoralism, or the breakdown of morality altogether. A less frequent but still common objection is more conceptual in nature: relativism cannot make any sense of a certain species of comparative moral judgment, namely those that morally compare two moral codes. The general form of this kind of judgment is: ‘Moral code A is morally superior to moral code B.’ Stace lodges this objection, and others have as well. Is it cogent? Using Stace as a springboard for discussion, I critically examine three related arguments against relativism that claim that comparative judgments of the sort in question are impossible on relativism.

In his influential work War and Self-Defense, David Rodin ably challenges the view that the moral right of national defense can be grounded in the right of self-defense. He rejects the “reductive strategy” on which national defense is viewed as a “collective form” of self-defense. He also objects to the “analogical strategy” on which national defense is analogous, rather than reducible, to self-defense. Under the analogical strategy, the end of the right of national defenseis the common life of the state. I argue that while Rodin has fully refuted the reductive strategy, there is a promising analogical strategy he overlooks for grounding national defense in self-defense. On this strategy the end of the right of national defense is not the common life of the state but the state itself. This strategy is wholly consistent with our pre-theoretical intuitions concerning the right of national defense.

In this paper I explore the possibility of reading Immanuel Kant’s metaphysics of morals as a proposal of global ethics, that is, ethics of the globalizing world. We have a good reason to undertake this exploration because Kant suggests that the earth being a globe with a finite spherical surface is a fundamental condition ofrealization of the universal principle of right among the world citizens. Unfortunately, however, Kant did not develop a theory of cosmopolitan rights as far as he could have. The reason is that he faced with a serious question which originated from his realistic judgment of his time, that it would be almost impossible to establish a cosmopolitan constitution without constraint of power. Today, however, we can hope to find an answer to this question in the development of global civil society and by virtue of this hope we can conceive global ethics which is further developed from Kant’s metaphysics of morals.

The main aim of the paper is to reflect the problem of the concept of human rights as well as to make analysis from the perspective of human security. The principal attention is paid to the fundamentals of human rights, first of all, to the human security. Only the world that ensures personal and national security and creative development for its entire people can be world of the real embodiment of human rights. Author considers the education as one of the backbones of human security due to the fact that education fulfils its true purpose by allowing individuals to make their own decisions and take control of their own lives; and creates persons identity. The possibility to develop a human and social identity means a real implementation of human rights. Human rights, based on human security and development, is a permanent process that takes its point of departure in human and social needs within cultural characteristics. So it means that human rights can not be defined once and for all.

To ensure the protection of the human rights, the role of world community, confronted with a new kind of military violence and terrorism, is discussed under the concepts reaction and prevention, for on the one hand there is the attempt to protect human rights by humanitarian interventionism, that leads to so called“human rights wars” (Beck), on the other hand the UNO shows increasing efforts in preventative means like “human rights education”. These two aspects shall be discussed in the article by analyzing particularly the report The Responsibility To Protect (2001) by the International Commission on Intervention and StateSovereignty (ICISS) as well as the latest activities and plans of the United Nations concerning human rights education.

This paper is dealing with a contradiction in the theory and policy of minority rights: on the one hand the claims for such rights are justified by recognizing the value of the cultural identity of minority groups, on the other – the recognition of such a value implies an acceptance of a conservative and isolationist view onminority identities. Characterizing the latter view as essentialist I explore several alternatives for approaching the issue of minority rights in a different way and finally I reach the conclusion that one more convincing method of identifying the cultural needs of minority groups and the rights necessary for satisfying these needs could be the technique of public deliberation. Its application for this purpose could make the negotiating of group-specific rights much more flexible and politically unproblematic than at present.

This paper is a sketch of the politically pluralistic conception of human rights. The conception will be illustrated by a basic characteristic of human rights under the constraint of the fact in the political. It is pluralistic because it is compatible with different moral values and cultures with qualification. It is also political because it considers political actions in practice and it does not follow from any moral doctrine which may be more generally or intrinsically related to human rights. I attempt to propose that the politically pluralistic conception of human rights can response to a challenge from the fact of reasonable pluralism in international discourse and practice. The steps of my argument will be constructed as follows: first, I will propose that the point in the political is to solve the first political question (Q) whether we consider the situation of a state or of international societies; secondly, I will identify that the most important characteristic of human rights is that individuals should be treated equally in certain proper ways (C), and will argue that C can make a contribution to solve Q; thirdly, I suppose human rights can be accepted by different political arrangements or cultures with C qualification if they do not become part of the problem while solving Q; finally, I will propose that political arrangements or cultures with C qualification do not have to limit to liberalism. If these four steps are successful, then there is a politically pluralistic conception of human rights which is constructed without a moral doctrine and is compatible with reasonable pluralism in human rights practice.

Many philosophers agree that human rights are helpful for defining poverty (poverty is a violation of human rights) and for overcoming poverty (human rights provide a standard for measuring progress). I briefly examine the recent contributions of Paul Ricoeur, who sees human rights declarations as the occasion for aconversation leading to practical wisdom, and Thomas Pogge, who argues for a reform of the global institutional order that has done much harm and prevented billions of people from having secure access to the objects of human rights. As a complement to the important contributions of Ricoeur and Pogge, I pose the question, Who should be the actors in the struggle against poverty? My answer, drawing on recent work by the United Nations Human Rights Commission, is that it is a violation of the human rights of those living in poverty if they are not full participants in the working for the eradication of poverty.

In this paper I submit that, if one takes seriously the distinction between citizenship rights and human rights, the list of the latter must be minimized. Many of the rights that we are used to call human rights are, in fact, citizenship rights and they belong to a history of citizenship in some specific states around the world. Thelist of human rights must be much shorter than the list of citizenship rights, whatever that list may be in accordance with the grounds attributed to human rights by different philosophical approaches. My plea for a qualification of which rights should count as human rights and the idea of a short list challenges the consensus among international lawyers. Nevertheless, it does not aim at a critique of human rights as such. On the contrary, the general intention of the very idea of a short list is to strengthen the moral force of human rights in order to make them meaningful in different political contexts.

International Human Rights Law is clear in holding only states or state-like entities responsible for human rights abuses, yet activists and philosophers alike do not see any rational basis for this restriction in responsibility. Multi-national corporations, individuals and a whole array of other 'non‐state actors' are capable of harming vital human interests just as much as states, so why single-out the latter as human rights-responsible agents? In this paper I distinguish two ways of looking at human rights responsibility. One is simply in terms of the outcomes that are deemed desirable to avoid (or secure), and the other is in terms of the relationships one sees these moral standards as governing. I argue that the peculiar form of responsibility and responsiveness (the way of 'holding to account')inherent to human rights principles is directed at establishing a particular type of relationship: one in which individuals are empowered in the face of a very special form of communal power. Other kinds of relationship and potential transgression are more appropriately governed by different kinds of moral principles, such as those relating to criminality. The outcomes view fails to incorporate this insight and for that reason fails to see the distinct role played by human rights standards in our moral reasoning: they are precisely valuable because they provide a way to judge the relationship of individuals to the peculiar kind of power exercised by the state. Part of this project is a re-assessment of the methodology employed by philosophers in establishing moral principles and concepts, such as those relating to human rights standards.

Human Rights are fundamental. Rights should be considered natural to all human beings. Man, is born with some rights. These rights exist irrespective of the fact whether they are recognized by the society or not. Some rights of man are eternal to man and they are prior to States. These rights are known as “natural rights”. Para 3 of the Preamble to Universal Declaration of Human Rights says that whereas it is essential, if man is not be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human right should be protected by the rule of law. All men and women, everyone in the world, are entitled to the rights and freedom contained in the Declaration without any discrimination. The human rights contained in the Universal Declaration may be divided intotwo categories: civil and political rights, which are usually insisted upon in the western liberal democracies; and economic, social and cultural rights, which are generally emphasized in the socialist democracies. The Constitution of India has issued two broad mandates to the Parliament, the Legislatures of the States and to all institutions of the Government. They are: (1) not to take away or abridge certain rights described as fundamental rights; and (2) to apply certain principles described as Directive Principles of State Policy. Both are interrelated. The social and economic obligations of the State are to protect the rights of the citizens prescribed in the ancient texts. To show the importance of human rights and to protect it, the President of India promulgated an Ordinance on September 28,1993 with a view to provide for the setting up of a National Human Rights Commission for better protection of Human Rights and for matters connected therewith.

In the film Conte d’hiver directed by Eric Rohmer in 1992, the heroine is passionately in love with her boyfriend who is missing. She has faith in his reappearance. According to Stanley Cavell, she has found her existence within her desire to see him again, irrelevant to the world’s existence. However, her faith materializes in her way of living every day. She wagers her real life on the encounter and thus situates her existence in the world’s existence. At the ending,she really encounters him in the bus. According to Cavell, an encounter is an everyday event, because the world consists of strangers passing and we are destined to be passers-by who are coincidentally here and now with others. This can be seen when she moves from place to place among the crowd, including the scene ofthe encounter. Furthermore, in the scenes of her being in the transportations, the views from the windows look passing against passengers, as also in the scene of the encounter. The view, the world, looks itself passing in film, because its medium specificity is motion. Then film can show: we as passers-by encounter someone and something here and now in the world itself passing. That we choose how to live in the coincidental situation is our existence in the world’s existence.

Based on the Kantian aesthetics, Modernist critics insisted that an art experience is disinterested aesthetic experience different and independent from cognitive experience, and excluded the cognitive dimension from the art experience. But since 1960s, many art practices and theories that were challenging Modernismappeared. As a result, contemporary arts accept the cognitive dimension as an essential part of art experience. Minimalism made a great contribution to this change and established a new paradigm of art. Emphasis on the active and complicated experience of the viewer is representative. A land artist Robert Smithson used a symbol, a map to achieve that kind of experience. This thesis considers how he made use of a symbol in his work and how that symbol played in theexpansion of art experience.

In the poetics of Gaston Bachelard, the natural images, especially the four elements (fire, water, air, earth), occupy the eminent place for literary imagination. Under this main frame, this paper tries to present the relation of ethics and aesthetics in focusing on the ethical image as a synthetic concept. It also argues that the poetic imagination in Bachelard presupposes a metaphysical base managing the being, the force, the will, and the action. There is a dynamic structure in this metaphysics of imagination. Notwithstanding the usual separation of different spheres in philosophy, Bachelard urges a primary fusion in the cosmic scale, i.e.the world and the human are communicative and correspondent. Taking these principles into consideration, this paper explores the topological dimension in those poetic images of elements and space. The ontological sense of being-there is evaluated by the dynamic function of “there” in restoring its ethical meaning. Likewise, the terms “in front of the fire”, “before the water”, “in the water” are given the topological accents. The verticality indicating the dynamic function of the flight, of the falling, and of standing upright is topologically effective. In accordance to the verticality, the concept of survival contains an effect of surpassing the existential conditions, the prefix “sur-“ means that tentative of the higher degree. In sum, the cosmicity as the very place of ethical and ontological unificationreveals Bachelard’s concern on the imaginative transformation of the personality, the appropriation in the cosmos.

The world is a unification of matter, energy and information. Subjectivity information is such information that subject receives, deals with and expresses. Subjectivity information can be classified to two categories by form: image and symbol. On the basis of ontology of ‘matter, energy and information——triunity’, this paper presents the definitions of symbol and image, points out the origin of them and brings forward the mechanism that men cognize symbols. Also, the paper classifies symbols in two ways: In one way, according to essence, origin and function, symbols can be classified to three categories: image symbols, appellation symbols and digit symbols. In the other way, symbols can be classified to two categories: static symbols and dynamic symbols, according to the carriers. Moreover, the author discussed the respective advantages and characteristics of image and symbol, especially presented four important characteristics of symbols: 1) be derived from definitions; 2) rely on manifold brain activities; 3) discretization; 4) meaning congruence. In the end, the author pointed out the epoch-making significance of symbols in the process that animals evolved into men.