In this essay I take issue with Derrida's interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology of intemal time-consciousness in Speech and Phenomena. Derrida's critique of Husserl's phenomenology of time also forms the basis for what Derrida regards to be an undermining of phenomenological philosophy itself. After first disagreeing with Derrida's interpretation of Husserl's understanding of time I proceed to object to his „undermining" of phenomenology. I attempt to illustrate that his critique of phenomenology is unconvincing.

This paper asks whether Brandom has provided a sufficiently clear account of the basic normative concepts of commitment and entitlement, on whichhis normative inferentialism seems to rest, and of how they contribute to explain the inferential articulation of conceptual contents. I show that Brandom's claim that these concepts are analogous to the concepts of obligation and permission cannot be right, and argue that the normative character of the concept of commitment is dubious. This leads me to replace Brandom's conception of inferential relations as relations between deontic statuses with one according to which they are to be seen as relations between entitlements and acknowledgements of commitments.

In his Insight, Lonergan presents a general form of the argument for the existence of God: „reality is completely intelligible, therefore, God exists." Its framework may be characterized as a Leibnizian version of the cosmological argument from the contingency of empirical reality to the unrestricted act of understanding.The acceptance of Lonergan's argument presupposes familiarity with his theory of being and objectivity. In my analysis, since Lonergan uses heuristic(second order) definitions and dialectical method in his justification of the complete intelligibility of reality, the argument invites continuous examination of theproposed alternative metaphysical theories.

This short paper provides a tentative formalization of Czezowski's ideas about axiological concepts: Good and Evil are conceived of as modalities ratherthan as predicates. A natural account of the resulting „ethical logic" appears to be very close to standard deontic logic. If one does not resolve to become an anti-realist regarding moral values, a possible way out is to become a revisionist about deontology: convert to intuitionism or some other kind of revisionism in deontic logic, and remain classical in ethical logic.

The natural sciences reveal the existence of a constant process of cosmic evolution, in which new forms of matter emerge. The continuity of the non-Organic and biological evolutionary processes, their assignment to the laws of nature, as well as the fact that the appearance of a human being constitutes theirculmination, all this shows that a human being is an element of the material structure of the world. From the evolutionary point of view, it could be argued thatI human being is „the ultimate form of life," a very interesting but, in many respects, still very mysterious idea.

The author identifies selected implicit or not fully explicit assumptions made by Noam Chomsky in his theory of language. Through a careful examinationof Chomsky's work, she aims to present the solutions this linguist proposes with respect to two fundamental questions: the question of methodology and thequestion of the ontological status of language. After reviewing the central theses of Chomsky's theory in the first part of the paper, she tums to the question that ismentioned in the title of this paper, that is, the reservations regarding the assumptions underlying Chomsky's work.

The conception of time, presented by St. Augustine, unites within itself the physical-philosophical views of Aristotle, and its own psychological view concerning the lived experience of the flow of sensory impressions from the past towards the future. H. Majkrzak (1999) underlines, in Augustine, the existential moment of time. The time of a human life is limited: it is situated within borders stretching from the day of birth to the day of death. This faithful and precise representationof the Augustinian conception of time, nevertheless brings the reader up against a problem: What value does it have today?

The Polish researcher in the field of logic and philosophy, Jan Woleński, in one of his recent articles, „Metalogical Observations About the Underdeterminationof Theories by Empirical Data," logically formalized two weak and strong versions of the underdetermination of theories by empirical data (or UT by abbreviation)and with these formalization has metalogically analyzed these two versions. Finally he has deducted that the weak version is defensible while the strong version is not. In this paper we will critically study Woleński's analysis of the strong version of UT.

Simone Weil's ideas on affliction and sacrifice have been interpreted by some as though they are the product of psychological problems. I will approachher writings on necessity and affliction through G. M. Hopkins' little prose masterpiece. Later I will suggest that she may be profitably related to some French spiritual writers in the 17th Century, who develop a link between the necessity of offering sacrifice to God and the radical contingency of created existence.

Science or myth? This question contains the basic problem, arising from the analysis of evolutionary psychology. The problem in question refers to the status of the interpretations of reality promoted by the evolutionists, in particular in reference to the human being. This article is an attempt to present an argument for the following thesis: firstly, that there are no scientific criteria for evaluating hypotheses in evolutionary psychology; and secondly that the theses of the discipline contain certain cultural contents - which until present times were carried by myth.