81.
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Dennis R. Cooley
Review of What We Owe To Each Other, by T.M. Scanlon
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82.
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David Boersema
Review of Reconsidering Logical Positivism, by Michael Friedman
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83.
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David Boersema
Introduction: Pragmatism and Neopragmatism
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84.
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Heidi Salaverria
Who is Exaggerating? The Mystery of Common Sense
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85.
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Hendrik R. Pieterse
Neopragmatism and the Christian Desire for a Transcendent God:
Is a Meaningful Dialogue Possible?
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86.
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Charbel Niño El-Hani, Sami Pihlström
Emergence Theories and Pragmatic Realism
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The tradition of pragmatism has, especially since Dewey, been characterized by a commitment to nonreductive naturalism. The notion of emergence, popular in the early decades of the twentieth century and currently re-emerging as a central concept in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, may be useful in explicating that commitment. The present paper discusses the issue of the reality of emergent properties, drawing particular attention to a pragmatic way of approaching this issue. The reality of emergents can be defended as a pragmatically-useful ontological commitment; hence, pragmatism can be employed as a tool in the debate over the structure and reality of emergence. This strategy of justifying ontological commitments is examined through historical and systematic discussions of the pragmatist tradition. It turns out, among other things, that while classical pragmatists did not specify any technical notion of emergence in the contemporary sense, their non-reductively naturalist views are relevant to the more recent emergence discussions -- especially because they rejected the metaphysical realism typical of today’s ontologically-oriented emergence theories.
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87.
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Gregory M. Fahey
The Idea of the Good in John Dewey and Aristotle
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88.
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Kevin Decker
Habermas on Human Rights and Cloning:
A Pragmatist Response
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89.
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Mark McEvoy
Naturalized Epistemology, Normativity and the Argument Against the A Priori
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90.
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Brian E. Butler
Legal Pragmatism:
Banal or Beneficial as a Jurisprudential Position?
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91.
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D. S. Clark
Pragmatism’s Instrumental View of Moral Reasoning
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92.
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Steven Schroeder
Review of Kierkegaard After MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue, ed. John J. Davenport and Anthony Rudd
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93.
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Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert
Review of Kant Trouble: The Obscurities of the Enlightened, by Diane Morgan
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94.
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Clancy W. Martin
Review of Philosophy and Tragedy, ed. Miguel de Beistegui and Simon Sparks
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95.
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Leo Zaibert
Review of Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem, ed. Steven E. Aschheim
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96.
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Lawrence Udell Fike Jr.
Review of The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, ed. Chenyang Li
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97.
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Zsolt Bátori
Review of Having Thought, by John Haugeland
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98.
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Susan Armstrong
Review of Utopias, Dolphins and Computers: Problems of Philosophical Plumbing, by Mary Midgley
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99.
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Dennis R. Cooley
Medical Research Ethics: Introduction
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100.
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David Rudge
Do Unknown Risks Preclude Informed Consent?
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Allen Buchanan and Daniel Brock, in a widely influential account, Deciding for Others (1990), advocate a sliding scale approach to the determination of whether a patient is competent to make a decision regarding his/her health care. An analysis of two critiques of their position (Beauchamp and Childress (1994), Wicclair (1991 a,b)) reveals a tacit presumption by all of these authors that the greater cognitive challenge often posed by high risk therapies constitutes grounds for an elevated standard of competence. This presumption cannot be consistently maintained in cases where the patient's decision involves experimental therapies. It implies either that informed consent can never take place in such situations, or, perhaps even more counter-intuitively, that a lower standard of competency should be used than when the patient is asked to choose only among standard therapies.
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