81.
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Facta Philosophica:
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Joseph Margolis
Anticipation of a Final Reckoning: American Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century
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82.
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Naci Mehmet
Ayers on Substances
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83.
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Pascal Engel
Intentionality, Normativity and Community
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84.
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Chris Swoyer
The Autonomy of Relations
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85.
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Yakir Levin
Criterial Semantics and Qualia
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86.
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Christopher Norris
Making for Truth: Some Problems with Virtue-based Epistemology
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87.
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Anne Bezuidenhout
Indexicals and Perspectivals
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88.
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Andrea Iacona, Diego Marconi
Petitio Principii: What's Wrong?
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89.
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Facta Philosophica:
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Ned Markosian
Against Ontological Fundamentalism
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90.
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Clotilde Calabi, Alberto Voltolini
Should Pride of Place be Given to the Norms? Intentionality and Normativity
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Reasons motivate our intentions and thus our actions, justify our beliefs, ground our hopes and connect our feelings of shame and pride to our thoughts. Given that intentions, beliefs and emotions are intentional states, intentionality is strongly connected with normativity. Yet what is more precisely their relationship? Some philosophers, notably Brandom and McDowell, contend at places that intentionality is intrinsically normative. In this paper, we discuss Brandom and McDowell’s thesis and the arguments they provide for its defence. In contrast to what they hold, we argue that neither reference intentionality nor content intentionality are intrinsically normative, although at least content intentionality has normative implications. More precisely, we argue that neither species of intentionality are normative from a semantical viewpoint, because being in an intentional state is not being in a state that is semantically correct or incorrect. Nevertheless, being in a state endowed with content may be a reason for believing or acting. Thus, we argue that content intentionality has normative implications. More precisely, we argue that any content is such that, if it is the content of a state that is sensitive to reasons—as judging paradigmatically is—then it entitles the subject of that state to have further states or to act in certain ways.
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91.
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Robert G. Hudson
Managing Underdetermination Issues in Science
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92.
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William Child
Wittgenstein and Common-Sense Realism
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93.
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Robert B. Brandom
Fighting Skepticism with Skepticism:
Supervaluational Epistemology, Semantic Autonomy, and Natural Kind Skepticism
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94.
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Phil Dowe, Mitch Parsell
Jung’s Concept of ‘Coincidence’
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95.
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Max Kistler
Source and Channel in the Informational Theory of Mental Content
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96.
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Eduard Marbach
On Depicting
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97.
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Terry Horgan, Matjaž Potrč
Biobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence
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98.
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Dean W. Zimmerman
Shoemaker’s Argument for his Theory of Properties
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99.
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Uwe Meyer
Do Pseudonormal Persons Have Inverted Qualia? Scientific Hypotheses and Philosophical Interpretations
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