This study is divided into three main parts, and additionally includes an introduction, conclusion, footnotes and reference books.The first part deals with the historical development of the social philosophy in the period of the Republic of China. It begins from the revolutional ideology created by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1895, through the revolution in 1911, and ended in 1949, when the republic government escaped from mainland China to Taiwan on the one hand, it propounded by scholars on the other.The second part examines the essential contents of the social principles, prohlems and praxis during this century. Finally in the third part the author attempts a critique onthe values and the limitations of this study of the social philosophy in this period.

In his Essay, John Locke contends, “since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, ... our knowledge is only conversant about them." But it is inconsistent with his realisrn, since the object of human knowlege is the external world itself rather than the idea in the mind. Thus, how can he be sure that he has knowledge of the world?In this paper, the author deals with Locke's concept of knowledge by an investigation of the problem in ideas which is related to criteria of truth.The paper is divded into two parts. The first part deals with Locke's metaphysics. The author contends that Locke develops his theory of knowledge in order to justify his religious faith and metaphysics. Locke is a realist. He establishes his theory of knowledge by way of way of idea. But he does not trust the ability of senses. Mind cannot know the real essence of the material substance. Thus, how can he claim that he knows things, since his theory of truth is of correspondence rather than of cohence?The second part of the paper clarifies Locke's problem of certainty in terms of origin, nature and division of idea. The author contends that Locke holds a causal theory of perception, since he uses the correspondence theory of truth. But It does not help Locke to get rid of the challenge of scepticism in natural science. In mathematics and morals, Locke believes that the human knowledge can be certain.

In studying the problems of personal identity, we found there are many imaginary cases. Philosophers used these imaginary thought experiments to decide who we are. They used these thought experiments to find out whether the criterion of personal identity is bodily identity or is constituted by psychological factors.But when they described these thought experiments, they have presupposed some criterion of personal identity. J. Perry's story is the good example. It can be described as' body change', it also can be described as' character and personality change'. The way we describe is dependent on what we assume about the criterion of personal identity. It is circular. Therefore, we cannot use these imaginary thought experments to decide who we are and the criterion of personal identity.

This essay contains of two parts. The first is show that the hermeneutical model, referred to as "the ontology of man as subject", on which the most popular contemporary interpretations of {Mencius} and {The Doctrine of the Mean} are based, is inappropriate. I further point out that this ontological assumption is incoherent with the main themes of the works under investigation. In the second part, I propose a new hermeneutical model, "the ontology of Heaven as subject," and I show that the main principles in {Mencius} and {The Doctrine of the Mean} can be well interpreted in this model. Finally, the relationship of these two models is briefly analysed.

Hegel' s concept of education in its development has three aspects. In " Das Leben Jesu", Hegel tries to find in the Gospel, from Platonic and Kantian point of view, a heuristic method of education, based upon a metaphysic of morality a priori. It is in effect a synthetic interpretation of the idea of education in Greek and Hebrew culture. In "Phanomenologie des Geistes", the metaphysic of morality a priori was deepened into a theory of the immanence of "weltgeist", and the heuristic method of education was enlarged to an idea of the education of well-rounded, integrated person. In his Nurnberg period, Hegel considered some actual practices of the educational institution and conteds that the low level vocational education may not achieve such ideal of education and that we should develop the general middle school education as universalas possible. The curriculum of philosophy in middle school is indispensable to the education of the individual person in its entirety, and it is also the best way to develop philosophy.If the middle school has the curriculum of philosophy, evidently the course of introduction to philosophy in Studium Generale should be not a course in beginning philosophy, but must be more advanced and differentiated. The theory of the immanence of "Weltgeist" implies the infinite potentiality of the rnental development of human nature, and therefore expects a complete liberation and freedom of all opportunities of education. In such situation, the form of the course of introduction to philosophy in Studium Generale may be a minor or a second major in philosophy.

It is unquestionable that “rationality" is one of the most important terminologies used in modern philosophy. Philosophers do usually criticize other's statements or acts as“rational" or “irrational". Owing to its tremendous influences on academic discussions and even on ordinary conversations, we are enthusiastic to know what is its meaning and what is the standard when we possess the word to judge.In most cases, people take the logical consistency as a key criterion of rationality. Charles Taylor adjusted this opinion in his paper titled "Rationality". He thought consistency is plainly a necessary condition of rationality.Though logical inconsistency may be enough to explain the most accusations of the irrationality that bandied around in western civilization, rationality involves more than avoiding inconsistency. Peter Winch also mentioned us , in his paper "Understanding a Primitive society", that standards of rationality may differ from culture to culture and we must beware of applying them crossculturally. Charles Taylor did not agree with Winch's plurality of standards of rationality. He still opens the door for transcultural judgments of rationality and insists that the concept of rationality we use is richer.I am not quite satisfied with Taylor's resolution on the problem of rationality. He did not tell us what is the standard we possess to make the judgments of rationality betweentheoretical and atheoretical societies. The only message we got from him is consistency is not enough to explain all the judgments of rationality, especially in transcultural occasions. So I try to review some more comments on rationality. Through the distinction between formal rationality and substantive rationality, Max Weber tried to help people escape from the confusion of making this kind of judgment. In a book "Reason, Rationality, Reasonableness", the author, Tran Van Doan, alleged that these three words should be applied in different aspects of human life. Reason expresses the metaphysical dimension of man. Rationality reflects human technical interest of dominating nature and of deciding human fate. And reasonableness is constructed on human daily life. People become confused only when they misplace these words in improperarea. As to the standard of judgments, Tran said that acceptance or agreement could be the criterion of reasonableness.Contrasting with Taylor's arguments, this paper tries to argue that logical consistency is still the main criterion of judgments of rationality. Consistency is concerned only in itslogical formulation, and is nothing to do with a whole theoretical structure. Things interfering one's judgment are usually happened to be in the theoretical structure or in the presupposition the debater possesses. The confusion of judgments of rationality originates from the different theory people hold, not from the common logical structure they have.

In this paper I discuss whether Lehrer' s theory of justification is able to overcome the isolation problem which purpots to show the internal relations do not guarantee truth about the world. Lehrer defends his coherence theory by claiming that our acceptance system contains not only what we accept about the external world but what we accept about our relationship to that world, including what we accept about the conditions under which we are reliable or trustworthy. This is to say that complete justification involves the reliability of the acceptance system and the acceptance of that reliability. I argue that Lehrer's defense is not successful.

What are Confucius' thoughts at his old age really like? This is a question which has been brought out for discussion ever since. In this paper the author has addressed himself to the relation between Chou-i and Confucius' thoughts in his later life in five chapters, that is1. Preface2. Development of Confucius' thoughts thru his whole life3. Discussion on the relation between Confucius and C'hou-i4. Speculation on Confucius' thoughts on the doctrine of Heaven at his late age5. Conclusion.As the author has acquired a new understanding of the implication in chapters relative to analect (5:12) and 'Hsu-Tuan Hsi-hsiang Shuo-Kuo Wen-Yen' of Shih Chi Kung-Tze-ShihChia, the I-Chuan in silk recently unearthed and the results of academic research over the past decade have further provided him with room for even more profound thinking as to make him realize that Confucius had once reorganized, researched, addressed and written about Chou-i. In his entire life, Confucius learned Chou-i when young but delighted in it during his later days. His attitude toward Chou-i had changed from “No prognostication" to “introducing prognostication" to moral teaching. All of these have shown that Confucius' lifelong thoughts had undergone a substantial change. In a word, Confucius did develop the thoughts on the doctrine of Heaven as recorded in “Ten Wngs." Futher more, I-Chuan of today's version was not entirely a work of Confucius', however, it did have some bearing on Confucius. For this reason, the author has refuted in the paper the arguments put forward in the past which completely denied the relation between Chou-i and Confucius and considered “Ten Wings" anything but a work full of Confucius' thoughts. The author believes that we cannot help focusing on the T'uan-Chuan with the aid of "Hien-y en Chuan, Hs'i-tz'u Chuan when we discuss theConfucius' thoughts at his old age to understand Confucius' thoughts on the doctrine of Heaven, order of Heaven and human nature.

The article is divided into four sections, i.e.,Section I: Traditional Metaphysics on TruthSection II: A Response from Gabriel MarcelSection III: Truth as Seen from the Perspective of LoveSection IV: The Interconnectedness between Love and TruthThomas Aquinas, as the representative of classical metaphysicians, proposes that truth is the adequation between one's intellect and its object. From the perspective of the object known, truth has its foundation in the intelligibility of the thing itself. Whereas, from the perspective of the knower, truth is the conformity of one's knowing, (especially one's judgment), to the actual content of the known object. Moreower, from the perspective of the Ultimate Being, truth has its highest manifestation in God's Noesis Noeseos.To such a thesis, Marcel has the following responses:1. Truth is not only an adequation between the intellect and the thing known, it is also a value I cherish so that I may even give up my life in order to bear witness to truth, as inthe case of Bruno's martyrdom.2. The intelligibility of the thing known can be regarded as its process of unconcealment, as explained by Martin Heidegger.3. As to the person who knows, the process of unconcealment also includes the courage to 'face' the truth on the part of the subject, as in the case of the parents' final willing to admit that their child is abnormal.4. From the perspective of the Divine Being, Marcel would be willing 10 emphasize that man's exigence for transcendence reveals the fact of God being the Ultimate Source of Truth and Light.If we reflect on the essence of truth from the eye of love, we may come to know that the more we love a being, the deeper we may penetrate into the core of her existence. Thelove from the part of the lover makes possible the beloved to manifest herself in a possitive manner. And, the love one has enables the lover to open his heart to the beloved so that he may allow himself to receive the revelation of the beloved to the fullest possible extent. Furthermore, from the inner life of the Divine, His Noesis Noeseos is no difference from His perfect love of Himself and of His creatures, since God is Truth and Love as such.Hence, we may conclude that the names of ' truth' and 'love' are convertible to one another; and, love can be regarded as a Transcendental Attribute on the par of the One, the True, the Good , and the Beautiful.

In this essay, I address a holistic account of the ontological commitment of Gadamer's conception of play. The analysis consists of three parts. The first is to point out that certain basic characteristics of play are in essence some characteristics of Being. On the basis of this observation, as I further argue, an approach to a preliminary view of Being can be figured out. Secondly, I show the relationship between Being and man in virtue of an analysis of the relation between play and man. And finally, I argue that the play of Being is in some sort of sense a language game; and Being and man are to be mediated as a phenomenological unity in a language game of this type. Details of this holistic account of the ontological commitment of Gadamer's conception of play are discussed.

The two objects of moral judgement are man and conduct. there are accordingly two kinds of rnoral judgement. In order to distinguish these two categories some ethicist introduce the two terms “moral goodness" and “moral rightness": “moral-goodness" for the judgement of man's morality; and “moral rightness" for describing the moral quality of conduct. Such distinction can be traced back to G. E. Moore's “Principia Ethica". German scholar B. Schuller also adopted it to his study of moral theology.These two terms are widely used by modern ethicists nowadays. Nevertheless, there are few systematic discussions about them, and some ethicists still doubt about their plausibility and even their necessity. Therefore, it is essential to discuss the issue in width and depth before we use them. To this purpose this artical is divided into three parts: firstly, historical background of the distinction; secondly, detailed clarification of the definitions of “moral goodness" and “moral rightness" and their relationship: lastly, the importance of this distinction in foundamental ethics.

Ronald Dworkin introduces a tripartite classification into political theories, viz., duty-based, goal-based, and right-based theories. J. L. Mackie extends this classification into moral theores. He argues that in addition to duty-based moral theories (e.g. , Kant's theory) and goal-based moral theories (e.g., Utilitarianism), a right-based moral theory is both conceptually possible and morally more desirable. This paper first attempts to analyze the characteristics of Mackie's right-based nioral theory in particular, and any right-'based moral theory in general. The present author then contends that there are three major weaknesses of such theories: (1) They over-simplify the relation between duties and rights;, (2) they fail to provide adequate guidance to moral life; (3) they cannot account for the true moral significance of supererogation and virtue. Accordingly, the present author agrees that a right-based moral theory is morally truncated and impoverished. It captures only a minimalist ethics. This is because there is a two-fold fundamental error of a right based moral theory, viz., it misplaces the moral subject, and it captures the point or object of morality only partially.The rejection of a right-based moral theory does not imply a rejection of rights. On the contrary, this paper continues to argue for the importance of rights in moral life, andthe priority of rights over duties in some cases. In other words, though rights cannot furnish the sufficient basis of morality, it does provide its necessary basis.

D. Lewis asserts that 'We can agree with Parfit...that what matters in questions of personal identity is mental continuity or connectedness...At same time we can consistentlyagree with common sense...that what matters in questions of personal identity is identity', but D. Parfit believes that this cannot be done. The aim of this paper is to re-examinewhether Lewis's thesis, ‘the I-relation and the R-relation coincide', had been justified. In sections 2 and 3, I summarized Lewis' and Parfit's arguments separately. And the related cohabitationist's theory is introduced in section 4. After the discussion in section 5, I argue that Lewis's thesis cannot be justified.

This paper will do two things. First to argue that the logical connectives are used to express mental acts, to do speech acts and propositional acts. They are used to expreepropositional ties. Second, from the first things to to say that every sentence or proposition must contain at least one logical connective, and every relation must intrinsically contain a direction. Several relevant theories are also examined.

As Dewey came to Chcago in 1894, there were many conflicts of educational thoughts in the academic world. With Hegelian dialetic, Dewey has synthesized successfully the antithesis of the viewpoint of the individual and that of the society， the emphasis on the subject-matter of the curriculum and that on the contents of the child's own experience. The teaching methods of "pouring in" and "drawing out "are shown to be both justified and equally one-sided.With functional analysis, the conflict of the theory of amusement and that of effort can be synthesized dialectically by a theory of genuine interest. Dewey puts constructive activities as unifying center of all curricula and contends that the genuine interst consists in the interpretability of the subjectmatter for child or the adaptability of the child's impulses, habits and experience to the new environment.Dewey reinterpreted the evolutionary method as a genetic or historic method and applied it, being methodically different from Hegelian dialectic, but in the same spirit of harmonious unification as the Hegelian dialectic, to solve the conflict of new education and old education by removal or reform of the institutional conditions.

Theories of reference are the most salient objects of philosophical reflection in the areas of the analytic philosophy, the philosophy of language, applied logic, cognitive psychologg as well as linguistics. It is very natural to expect that every teachers, expert, philosopher, and every graduate student in these areas should be enlightened by such topics. We take a bird-eye view of recent theories of reference ( and name ) in this article, i.e., Millian theory/'Fido'-Fido theory, Fregean theory of sense and reference, Russellian theory of definite description and its modified theory (the cluster theary/the description theary), the rigid designation theory, the direct reference theory, the historical Chain theory/Causal theory and Minimalism. These theories are reviewed from their philosophical and historical aspects.Some of philosophic problems (which have been related to the research program of each theory, twenty problems in total) and their intended Solutions are briefly sketched by the author. The difficulties of all theories except the historical chain theory are presented and criticized. The difficulties of the latter 'will be discussed in a forthcoming paper. Finally, We present twenty useful problems/exercises for graduate students in the areas of the philosophy of language/theoretical linguistics/applied logic.

Confucius, being regarded as the greatest teacher in Chinese hisfory, is well-known for his teaching method, such as "to teach according to student's talent", “to teach without classification," etc. What really matters, however, is the substance of his teaching, and this inevitably leads one to consider his philosoophy.The present article, by connecting Confucius' philosophy and his teaching method, intends to describe the stages and qualifications in Confucius educational scheme. Four steps can thus be discerned, they are: 1) to establish a positive self-esteem and life goal; 2) to cooperate with others in following the path of goodness; 3) to properly and wisely deal with all kinds of situation; and 4) to rest with oneself in a peaceful and elegant way. Each step draws sufficient supports from the “Analects" and finds a correspondent place in the philosophical system of Confucius.