The paper discusses interpretations of Aristotle’s modal notions by modern commentators (J. Hintikka, J. Lukasiewiez, M. Mignucci). It is shown that the semantics of modal notions which the above mentioned authors attribute to Aristotle is based on the algebraic idea of multiplier.

The aim of this article is to reconstruct the theory of simple apprehension held in the Kiev-Mohyla Academy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. We start from Aristotle’s idea of two kinds of knowing and from the Thomist theory of the two operations of the intellect in view of the ontological distinction between essence and actuality. In dealing with the theory of the activities of the intellect in the Kiev-MohylaAcademy, we consider simple apprehension as a form of Aristotle’s immediate knowledge. We conclude by introducing the notion of non-representational simple apprehension.

The paper seeks to schematize some fundamental characteristics of the conflict situations by means of modal (intensional) logic. Conflict is considered a deviant interaction as well as an intersubjective process of delegitimizing an activity on realization of interests. Interpreting a normal interaction as a symmetry of certain type, the author constructs a special model of a symmetric situation and applies it tothe analysis of a conflict. The paper examines theoretic schemes for legitimization of deviations as well as for legitimization of social asymmetry, and ascertains a general relationship between symmetrization and deduction (deductive legitimization) by means of the operation C of “deductive closure” (consequences addition).

The aim of this paper is to present a description of change in the framework of tense logic. After considering some examples of using the intervals, we present the main principles of the logic of inconsistent reasoning. Then we built a tense interval paraconsistent semantics and discuss some of its possible applications.

This article is an extension of the author’s previous work on this subject. Primarily it outlines the main directions of this mode of analysis and possible fields to which it could be applied. The first chapter demonstrates a specific method of understanding emotions. The second chapter examines the concept of emotions as a source of the specific modes of “internal” rationality of an agent. The third chapter isdevoted to a comparison between various emotions and the two basic intentional states - belief and desire. The fourth chapter will present the instrumental typology of certain emotional concepts. The final chapter represents preliminary logical schema of the meanings of emotional concepts.

Through the mental experiment that I suggest, it is possiblc to demonstrate that Hugh Everett’s quantum interpretation, known as of the “many universes”, is incongruent with the special theory of relativity.

What I hope to do in this paper is to see whether Laudan’s normative naturalism may suggest a third alternative to normativism-naturalism dilemma in the analytical philosophy of science. In criticizing the view that all methodological rules are to be specified in the form of hypothetical imperatives, I offer the idea that a theory of scientific rationality (including its normative dimension) must go beyond the usual analytical format of “rational reconstruction”. It is precisely this idea that opens the door for a hermeneutic alternative to normative naturalism. On this alternative, one has to pay attention to the contextual normativity of doing scientific research, if one wants to give an account of the articulation of methodological rules and norms.

The paper explores the handling of singular analogy in quantitative inductive logics. It concentrates on two analogical patterns coextensive with the traditional argument from analogy: perfect and imperfect analogy. Each is examined within Carnap’s λ-continuum, Carnap’s and Stegmüller’s λ-η continuum, Carnap’s Basic System, Hintikka’s α-λ continuum, and Hintikka’s and Niiniluoto’s K-dimensional system. Itis argued that these logics handle perfect analogies with ease, and that imperfect analogies, while unmanageable in some logics, are quite manageable in others. The paper concludes with a modification of the K-dimensional system that synthesizes independent proposals by Kuipers and Niiniluoto.

We define two extensions of Lewis’ S3 with two versions of Peirce’s Law. We prove that both of them have the Ackermann Property.

The scientist’s decision of accepting a given proposition is assumed to be dependent on two factors: the scientist’s ‘private’ information about the value of that statement and the proportion of colleagues who also accept it. This interdependence is modelled in an economic fashion, and it is shown that it may lead to multiple equilibria. The main conclusions are that the evolution of scientific knowledge can be path-dependent, that scientific revolutions can be due to very small changes in the empirical evidence, and that not all possible equilibria are necessarily efficient, neither in the economic nor in the epistemic sense. These inefficiencies, however, can be eliminated if scientists can form coalitions.