The paper discusses the Kantian legacy in modern views about scientific theories. The aim of this paper is to show how Einstein’s philosophy of science,which was inspired by his physics, offers a specialized version of the Kantian synthesis of Empiricism and Rationalism. In modern physical theories (relativityand quantum theory) Kant’s a priori conditions become ‘constraints’, as shown in Einstein’s use of principle theories. Einstein’s use of principle theories showshow constraints are used to steer the mapping of the rational onto the empirical elements of scientific theories.

The classical paradox of the stone, namely, whether an omnipotent being can create a stone that the being itself cannot lift is traditionally circumvented bya response propounded by Thomas Aquinas, that even omnipotent beings cannot accomplish the logically impossible. However, in their paper ‘The New Paradox of the Stone’, Alfred R. Mele and M.P. Smith attempt to reinstate the paradox without falling foul of the Thomistic logical constraint. According to Mele and Smith, instead of interpreting the paradox as posing a competition between a pair of omnipotent beings – represented by God at two different times – the paradox can be reformulated as posing a question about simultaneous competition between a pair of omnipotent beings. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to probe the possibility of the simultaneous existence of two omnipotent beings in view of the theological arguments for the „unicity of the omnipotent”.

Affective knowledge of God is a kind of knowledge which follows human affectivity. This knowledge takes place on two levels: the level of the natural inclination of man towards God and the level of the religious bias of man towards God. What is the nature of affective knowledge of God? It seems there are three problems in question. First of all, as there is a natural inclination towards God in man, one will be restless unless one recognizes or finds God. Secondly, one who loves God has a new deeper knowledge of the divine things through connaturality and inclination. Thirdly, as the result of one’s encounter with God and of uniting with Him, man experiences certain subjective states which cannot be expressed by words.

The aim of this paper is the exploration of Heidegger’s interpretation of the phenomenon of technology against the background of his new vision of reality. It can be said that in this context sin which was formerly moral and religious became in our age, as it were, technological. Because man has distanced himself from the Nature, he finds himself at the same time alienated and guilty, contemplating, like a child brazen in the brainlessness of what he has done and waiting in anguish the imminent punishment of a mother who does not forgive. Cum multis aliis, it is not only ugliness with which Heidegger reproaches technoscience but aggressiveness as well.

According to two critics, Georgia Warnke and John Caputo, Gadamer’s hermeneutics is inherently „conservative” insofar as he appeals to tradition asa constituent in understanding. They insist that he simply preserves the ideals, norms and values of the Western metaphysical tradition without criticallyexamining them. I do not agree and will argue that views like this depend upon several false assumptions – for example, that Gadamer reifies the text as a „thingin-itself” (Sache selbst) and remains trapped in subjectivism. I will begin by examining some of the ways in which these charges might be warranted beforeproceeding to defend him.

Saint Anselm’s Ontological Argument is perhaps the most intriguing of all the traditional speculative proofs for the existence of God. Yet, his argument has been rejected outright by many philosophers. Most challenges stem from the basic conviction that no amount of logical analysis of a concept that is limited to the bounds of the “understanding” will ever be able to “reason” the existence in “reality” of any thing answering such a limited concept. However, it is not theintent of this paper to prove or disprove Anselm’s argument. Rather, in this paper we concern ourselves with arriving at a sound interpretation of Anselm’s leadingcritic – Immanuel Kant. Kant put forth perhaps the most vaunted criticism of Anselm’s argument. However, Kant has been perhaps the most misunderstood objector to Anselm’s argument. This paper confirms that charge, simultaneously offering what I believe to be a sound interpretation of Kant’s criticism.

Philosophy vs. myth; argument vs. narrative. Are these oppositions out-dated clichés or are they realistic dichotomies with universal application? Definitionsof myth are often confronted with exceptions. Mythic themes and elements regularly surface in philosophy, and vice versa. The boundary separating myth andphilosophy continues to be redrawn and the status of the two continually reevaluated. By moving away from an all-encompassing definition of myth I aim to propose a foundation upon which an interdependent relationship between myth and philosophy can be interpreted. New possibilities for interconnection between the two will be suggested along with more compelling questions on which to base inquiries.

This article is about the religious roots of violence, in particular religious terrorism. The author argues that there is a great reluctance to study this relationship. This is unfortunate because only on the basis of a realistic estimate of the facts can a successful counterterrorist strategy be developed. One of the problems with religious violence is that holy scriptures, in some passages, exhort believers to violent acts. In combination with a theory of ethics that is known as “divine command morality” this is problematic. Even if the holy book contains only a small percentage of passages invoking violence they pose a problem if the whole book is considered to be holy and the word of God.

A new version of the incompatibilist argument is developed. Knowledge is (at least) justified true belief. If God’s divine knowledge must be justified knowledge, then humans cannot have the “alternative possibilities” type of free will. This incompatibilist argument is immunized against the application of the hard-soft fact distinction. If divine knowledge is justified, then the only kind of facts that God can know are hard facts, permitting this incompatibilist argument to succeed.

The objective of the paper is to seek clarification on the relationship between epistemic relativism and scepticism. It is not infrequent to come across contemporary discussions of epistemic relativism that rely upon aspects of scepticism and, vice versa, discussions of scepticism drawing upon aspects of relativism. Our goal is to highlight the difference(s) between them by illustrating (1) that some arguments thought to be against relativism are actually against scepticism, (2) that there are different ways of understanding the relationship between relativism and scepticism, and (3) that a commitment to either relativism or scepticism does not entail commitment to the other. The paper focuses upon the works of Peter Unger and Paul Boghossian to show how this terrain can be variously conceived and to illustrate that Boghossian’s conception of the landscape is incorrect.

In the last two decades, the question of religion has become a central concern of many philosophers belonging to the Continental philosophical tradition.As the interest in religion has grown within Continental philosophy, so also has the question of Martin Heidegger’s relationship with religion. This paper posesthe question of what religion meant to Martin Heidegger in the development of phenomenology as ontology; how he preconceived the notion of religion and whyhe eventually denied any authenticity to religion. In engaging with this question, the paper will also attempt to disclose some delimitations of Heidegger’s approach to religion.

Leibniz’s claim that this is the best of all possible worlds has been subject to numerous criticisms, both from his contemporaries and ours. In this paper I investigate a cluster of such criticisms based on the existence, abundance or character of worldly evil. As several Leibniz-inspired versions of optimism havebeen advanced in recent years, the aim of my investigation is to assess not just how Leibniz’s brand of optimism fares against these criticisms, but also whetheroptimism as a philosophy has the resources to meet these challenges. I show that none of the criticisms considered has sufficient force to pose a threat to Leibniz’s version of optimism or to one modelled on it.

This paper concentrates on the issue of what happens to the confidence one has in the justification of one’s belief when one discovers an epistemic peerwith conflicting higher and/or lower order evidences. Certain symmetries surface during epistemic peer disagreement, which tend to make one less confident. The same happens in religious disagreements. Mostly externalist perspectives are considered. The epistemology of ordinary disagreements and that of religious ones behave similarly, such that principles used in the former can be seen to apply also in the latter.

Thomas Hobbes bequeathed to us a comprehensive system, the interpretation of which remains a matter of disagreement even today. In his politicaltheory, he pays most attention to the state community. He deliberates over the reasons for its origin, its decline and fall. Among the more detailed issues dealt within his reflections, the more important ones are the following: the concept of the state of nature, human motivation, the state of war and peace, as well as considerations concerning the social contract. In order to be consistent in his argument, Hobbes also deals with the analysis of the structures of the state, the division of power and with the functions a state should perform. Due to these deliberations, he finally arrives at the secret of the state’s durability. Though it is certainly the case that, since his times, the socio-political situation and circumstances have changed, many of the solutions postulated by Hobbes have not lost their value.

The analysis, which aims at the interpretation of the three theophanies from Exodus presents – from the metaphysical and epistemological points of view– three fundamental ideas. First, the idea of the absolute unknowability of the essence of God; second, the idea of the real difference between essence and energies in God’s Being; and third, the idea of the real difference between the one essence, three persons (hypostases) and many uncreated divine energies (the powers or names) of God. One must say that the absolute unknowability of the essence of God means that God is forever the unknown God.

In this paper I will take into account the historical, religious and philosophical aspects of the examination of conscience, penance and satisfaction, as well as ritual confession and cure, in Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism. I will also take into account the difficulties that baptized Chinese Christians met in sacramental Catholic confession. Human history proves that in every culture and religion, man has always had a need to be cleansed from evil and experiencemutual forgiveness. What ritual models were used by Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism? To what degree did these models prove to be true? What are the connections between a real experience of evil, ritual confession, forgiveness and cure in Chinese religions and philosophies?

This paper considers three accounts of the relationship between personal immortality and materialism. In particular, the pagan mortalism of the Epicureansis compared with the Christian mortalism of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. It is argued 1) that there are significant similarities between these views, 2) thatLocke and Hobbes were, to some extent, influenced by the Epicureans, and 3) that the relation between (im)mortality and (im)materialism is not as straightforward as is commonly supposed.

It is a commonplace assumption that there are realities and types of experience words are just not able to handle. I find the recourse to ineffability to bean evasive tactic and argue that there is inherently nothing beyond words and that this fact has ethical implications. I offer three theoretical considerations in support of my claim. The first two deal with the infinite nature of language itself, as understood first in Chomsky and then Derrida. The third deals with the linguistically structured nature of human experience. Expanding on Heidegger, I then draw some ethical implications from language’s inexhaustibility.