This paper is concerned with the political philosophy of Richard Price, analysing the way this author has developed the concept of liberty and the problem of human rights. The theme of liberty will be interpreted in a double perspective: a) in a private dimension, that sets liberty in the inner side of the individual; b) in a public dimension, that places it in the domain of a manifest action of the individual. We will try to show how this double outlook of liberty is conceived under the optics of a necessary complementarity, since liberty, which is primarily understood as a feature of the subject taken as an individual, acquires only a full meaning when she becomes efective in a comunitary field, as a social and political expression. The concept of human rights will appear located in this analysis, being defined simultaneously as condition and expression of the human dignity and happiness, at the same time natural attributes of an individual that should be cultivated and public effectiveness that contributes to the development of society.

In this article, Susanne Langer’s and Antonio Damasio’s theories are presented as candidates for the validation, both scientific and philosophical, of two different perspectives conceming the complexity of the animal mind. Despite their initial agreement about which kind of animais are incapable of producing mental activity (such as insects and other lower animals), they diverge when it cornes to the study of more developed animals, namely mammals. The present article sides with Damasio against Langer: Langer rejects the idea of ascribing to any animal complex human mental capacities (sense of individuality, extended memory and foresight, altruistic motivation, conceptualization and symbolic language); in turn, Damasio’s neurobiological theory (along with some etological data) gives us good reasons to attribute these same capacities to, at least, some species of mammals.

The main aim of this essay is to defend Don Marquis’s “future-like-ours“ argument against abortion from David Boonin’s recent critique to it. In the first two sections I show that Marquis’s FLO argument is much more plausible than the traditional argument against abortion, grounded on an appeal to the humanity of the fetus. The third section explains Boonin’s critique to the FLO argument. In the last section I show that: (1) Boonin’s critique rests on a misunderstanding conceming the content of Marquis’s moral principle; (2) We can restate Boonin’s position in order to avoid that misunderstanding, but such restatement leads to the (unacceptable) conclusion that infanticide, and not only abortion, is morally permissible.

Predication is a complex entity in Aristotelian thought. The aim of the present essay is to account for this complexity, making explicit the diverse forms it assumes. To this end, we tum to a crucial chapter of the Posterior Analytics (1 22), where, in the most complete and developed manner within the corpus, Aristotle proceeds to systematize this topic. From the analysis, it will become apparent that predication can assume, generically, five forms: 1) the predication of essence (τὸ αύτᾢ εἶναι κατηγορεἲσθαι), that is of the genus and the specific difference; 2) essential predication (τὸ αύτᾢ εἶναι κατηγορεἲσθαι), that is either of the genus or of the differences (or their genera); 3) the predication of accidents per se 4) and of simple accidents (ώς συμβεβηκότα κατηγορεἲσθαι); and 5) accidental predication (κατἁ συμβεβηκός κατηγορεἲσθαι). However, only types 2-4 are forms of strict predication (άπλὢς). In effect, the “predication” of essence is not a genuine predication, but a formula for identity, constituting, technically, the statement of the essence of the subject (or its definition). On the other hand, accidental “predication” can only be conceived of as such equivocally, since it results from a linguistic accident through which the ontological subject of the attribution suffers a displacement to the syntactic position of the predicate, which is not, by nature, its own. In neither case does the phrase bring about any legitimate predication. The study concludes with a discussion of Aristotle’s thesis according to which no substance can be a predicate, which is implied by its notion of accidental predication, a thesis which has been - and in our opinion wrongly so - challenged in modem times.

In Aristotle’s thought, dialectic results not only from a consolidated historical-philosophical tradition, but also from his own original conception of the virtualities of speech in general, as well as those of the philosophical and scientific speech in particular. In this essay I try to describe synthetically the history of the pre-aristotelic dialectic, and to draw up an inventory of the various acceptions that dialectic takes in the works of the Stagirite. It is possible to identify four dialectics in Aristotle, that is to say, four levels of application of the language and knowledge theory that the Stagirite develops in the Topics and other logic treaties. In its critic - or peirastic - dimension Aristotle’s dialectic seems, mainly as praxis of contradiction, somehow to reach the universality proper to sapiential knowledge.

Il s’agit d’abord d’éclairer le motif d'ousia, à partir de trois principes qui rendent possible de comprendre le mouvement des vivants, les étants qui le sont «par eux-mêmes», puis selon les quatre sens du «motif» qui donne ce mouvement et enfin selon la pair dunamis / entelecheia. Ensuite, on considère son double rapport au temps, celui qui le lie au mouvement et celui qui l’oppose aux accidents, rapport qui a été masqué dans la traduction latine des deux sens d'ousia dans les Catégories par substance et essence respectivement, devenues ‘intemporelles’. Dans une deuxième partie, on pose la question de la place de la Physique d’Aristote (qui s’occupe de l’être de l’étant en tant que se mouvant) dans l’ensemble de son oeuvre : c’est en elle qui sont définis et argumentés ces motifs, lesquels, d’une part, rendent possibles ses divers traités scientifiques et, d’autre part, sont repris dans les livres de la Métaphysique (s’occupant de l’être de l’étant en tant qu’étant). La Physique est ainsi l’une et l’autre, une philosophie - avec - sciences. Les considérations finales concernent la façon dont, à travers nommément d’Aquin et d’Occam, l’infidélité à Aristote de l’aristotélisme médiéval et européen a rendu possible que la pensée européenne se fasse à partir de lui et contre lui.

Book Lambda of the Metaphysics by Aristotle presents us a mysterious expression: τὁ κινοὒν άκίνητον, which most of the translators render as the Unmoved Mover. Our aim is to prove that that translation is false, because it is not aware, in our view, of the difference established by Aristotle between “the god” and this movens immobile. Therefore, based on excerpts of Metaphysics Book Lambda we try to set light upon two different styles (grammatically, syntactically speaking, etc.) used by Aristotle: one when referring to an abstract principle (the so called “unmoved mover”), a physical explanation for the movement, and another when talking about “the god”. In the last case it is possible to experience a somehow passionate description, almost an expression of faith which compared to that “ cold” movens immobilis, makes us wonder if, as tradition suggests without questioning, “the god” and movens immobilis are for the philosopher the same being.

The concept of eudaimonia put forward by Aristotle in the first Book of his Nicomachean Ethics reflects an attempt to synthesize and clarify a well known concept in the Greek society, in popular as well as in more restricted intellectual circles, giving it a new scope and conceptual consistency. Ordinarily translated as happiness, well-being or prosperity, this concept frequently had a subjective sense, describing the lives of those who lived well or were eudaimon; but it also had an objective sense, establishing a life conducting rule for everyone who wanted to be happy or eudaimon. In the present paper we give an account of the meaning and operative range of the concept of eudaimonia and show the eudaimonia's guiding role in the Aristotelian ethical project, namely as its founding principle and final horizon, its relations with the good and virtue, as well as with the nature of man and the generation of a new modality of being. Finally, we establish that the concept of eudaimonia is central to an ethics seen as a life project.

Aristotle’s practical philosophy should be seen as an organic whole, in which ethics and politics are intimately connected, in a relation of mutual dependency. This happens for several reasons, of which I shall mention two: first, because man is a political animal by nature, since it is inside a community that conflicts are created that lead to questions about right and wrong; second, because it is inside a community that these conflicts are solved, and character formation takes place, through the legal imposition of a certain conduct. These are the two topics discussed on this essay.

In the Treatise On the Heavens II, 1 [ 40 ], Plotinus rejects the explanation of Aristotle who, in De caelo I, 2-3, considers the “fifth body”, ether, the incorruptible matter of celestial bodies and heavens and, hence, different from the sub-lunar world’s four elementary bodies (fire, air, water and earth). Plotinus’ argument at tempts to found the kind of perpetuity which numerical identity implies -the identity which is proper of heavens and celestial bodies- on the harmony that reigns between their body and soul. This way, the Plotinian exeges is of the Aristotelian Treatise integrates the themes already raised in the Platonic Phaedrus and Timaeus. In this article I attempt to expound: 1 ) the concepts of perfection and the cosmological dualism in Aristotle, 2) the problem of the cosmos’ perpetuity, 3) the Plotinian search of a more satisfactory explanation, and 4) the theme of the two regions: sub-lunar and supra-lunar.

The aim of this paper is to show the connection between the desire and the experience of the One, in Plotinus. Our main conclusion is that, in spite of the language of the solitary evasion towards the One and Only, we can indeed find in Plotinus works the search and the living experience of the most universal and intimate principle and origin of all and every being, which appears everywhere. This is not a separated transcendent but the transcend of all existential, vital and intellectual duality in an experience of eternal union. Beyond all thought and expression, there’s the source of all philosophical truth, meaning and eloquence.

In this paper, making use of the constitutional comparison method introduced by Aristotle, I aim to argue on the similarities and differences that can be established between, on the one hand, the process that led to the approval of the American Federal Constitution and its consequences and, on the other hand, the process of approval and respective consequences of the Treaty that establishes a Constitution for Europe. To accomplish the aforementioned aim I have used criteria such as the relation ship between federated States and the federal central power, the acquisition of citizenship, the possibility of secession, the checks and balances’ system, the relationship between the Constitution and other laws and the extent of federal integration. The most recent European Union political process is looked into, in the light of issues related to philosophy, law and political science. The standpoint is that Europeans could learn from the complex and contradictory process that occurred more than two centuries ago, as well as from the thought contained in the vast literature produced at the time. Many of the questions and issues that confront Europe nowadays have already been raised and discussed and we should be looking at the different answers they provided, thus enriching our current choices, and improving our decision making process.

Ce texte expose le concept de citoyenneté dans son double aspect - descriptif et prescriptif. Aux dimensions civiles, politiques et sociales de la citoyenneté il faut ajouter deux autres: l’économique et la culturelle. Ce qui fait tenir en compte le problème du multiculturalisme et de la citoyenneté multiculturelle. Il faut trouver des réponses qui permettent aux différentes éthnies une façon de vivre ensemble. Dans ce but, l’article analyse critiquement trois possibilités: le libéralisme multiculturel de Klymcka; le libéralis me intolérant de Sartori et le libéralisme radical interculturel. Ce dernier est la position choisie et soutenue dans le texte qui vise souligner le caractère dynamique des différentes cultures, bien que l’influence bénéfique qu’elles provoquent les unes sur les autres.

Pour éviter que le destin de l’humanité soit «la prison ou l’hospice d’aliénés» il faut faire attention aux mutations théoriques et pratiques qui puissent développer l’interculturalité. Celle-ci est es sentielle pour la survie du planète. La thèse soutenue dans cet article est que l’alternative à la multiculturalité est la barbarie. Il faut modifier le travail d’investigation et les pratiques habituelles développées sur ce thème. On doit proposer d’autres orientations philosophiques et d’autres pratiques, qui ne s’inscrivent pas sur des vérités absolues et sur des lois universelles, des orientations qui rejettent les implications d’uniformité de la globalization néo-libérale. Le recours à la théologie de la libération et à l’antropologie philosophique critique est importante.

This paper examines the philosophical conflict arisen by theodicy in western culture. After the exposition of Simon Blackburn and Richard Swinbume’s contentions views, we sustain that the only credible solution to the problem entails a new philosophical concept of God based on a non-anthropocentric vision of reality.