J’élaborerai dans ce texte une interprétation de la pensée politique de Negri en tant qu ‘elle est geste, et que je formule de la manière suivante: (1) La pensée politique d’Antonio Negri est principalement, dans son effet le plus important et le plus immédiat, et dans son intention même, thérapeutique ; (2) Une telle lecture permet d’élucider dans cette pensée politique un certain nombre de paradoxes apparents, notamment la question de I’immanence et de la révolution ; (3) Ce geste thérapeutique de transvaluation ontologique relève, à plusieurs égards, d’un mode d’action symbolique qui peut se comprendre comme paradigme de la créativité matérielle et symbolique caracteristique d’une certaine philosophie politique émancipatrice que I’on retrouve chez Socrate, Jésus de Nazareth et Étienne de la Boétie.

Au lieu d’intervenir dans le debat sur la nature du temps present en créant une nouvelle schématisation de notre âge, nous proposons ici une intervention sur ce débat en esquissant les coordonnées conceptuelIes qui déterminent I’espace des possibles de la controverse. Il s ’agil alors d’une réflexion sur la logique historique, sociale et normative qui structure le débat sur le temps présent, et plus particulièrement la controverse postmoderne. Loin pourtant d’être une simple analyse «externe», cette interrogation sur les paramètres conceptuels et pratiques qui déterminent d’avance la nature même des interventions dans le débat postmoderne est aussi I’occasion d’examiner de près des prises de position spécifiques, comme celles d’Alex Callinicos, Fredric Jameson, Jean-Franç;ois Lyotard, IhabHassan, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty et Gianni Vattimo.

In this essay we offer an interpretation of Alain Badiou’s theorisation of Paul the Apostle as a “universal singularity.” Our aim is to explore the extent to which Badiou’s articulation of political subjectivity provides a radically different locus and topos for the “political”—one that is rooted not in a concept of the abstract individual but rather in the material and generative process of individuation (“subjectivation”). Following Badiou, we explore the implications of the ontological shiftthat Paul represents—the shift from an external “body politic” (that of the polis, political crew or community) to an internal “body politic” (based on complicitous bodies, embodiments, incarnations—here a ‘body politic’ complicitous with the Christ-event). In this respect, Badiou’s reading of Paul establishes “the political” as “the subjective” precisely in the sense that the locus of the political is the complicitous subject as such rather than an externalised abstraction such as “thestate.” Paulitics manifests itself in and as this subject subjected to the event—the “militant subject” that embodies and endures its “process,” its “truth procedure.”

In Le Sens du monde, Nancy argues that “some value of scintillating phenomenality remains invincibly attached” to Badiou’s notion of the event. This paper examines to what extent Nancy’s comments still apply to Badiou’s phenomenology of the event developed in Logiques des mondes. In particular, although Badiou provides a thorough account of the event from the perspective of the consequences it enables, I show on the basis of Nancy’s suggestion that he tends to neglect an account of the event from the perspective of its occurrence and its passage.

While Alain Badiou’s resuscitation of the subject has provided continental philosophy with new possibilities for political activism, its reliance on rare events has also paved the way for a potentially paralysing pre-evental situation. The aim of this paper is to examine Badiou’s own writings for hints of a theoreticallyjustified pre-evental politics—one that not only works within the ambit of his philosophical project but is also capable of explaining Badiou’s practical engagements in the politics of France. Two solutions are offered through an examination of the implications of heterogeneous situations: a repetition of events and apre-evental mobilisation of the uncounted.

The essay addresses the main shifts in Badiou’s conception of the event and the subject as they unfold in his late Logiques des mondes. In this text he develops an objective phenomenology of appearing in view of specifying the logical character of real change. The main focus of the essay is how Logiques des mondes stipulates a set of directives for an “ethics of living with an Idea,” that is, a subjective incorporation to truth as exception. How does Badiou’s text write what is excluded from the inertia of a restricted economy of Being? I show that in order to account for this exception, Logiques des mondes must resituate the notionof site, prevalent in Being and Event, and that it does so in terms of the notion of world and of the localisation of appearing (both of which entail the formulation of an objective phenomenology of appearing or logic of appearing). This logic posits the articulation of a new transcendental regime whose major coordinates unfold as a true war machine against cultural relativism, or what Badiou calls “democratic materialism” and to which he contraposes a “materialist dialectics”(dialectique matérialiste).

In this paper I re-evaluate Merleau-Ponty’s use of the term “measurant.” I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s “body as measurant” (VI 249/297) describes embodied perception as a tuning into and a dis-covering of a world that is never completely in its grasp. I dis-cover in the world objects and other persons, which sweep me away from the centre of the world and which offer me new perceptual dimensions. This relation does not necessarily imply agreement and harmony, but it suggests that all our interactions, even those that are disharmonious and ambiguous, take place in a back-and-forth of response and transformation.

Alain Badiou’s reception in the English-speaking world has centred on his project of a “mathematical ontology” undertaken in Being and Event. Its reception has raised serious concerns about how mathematics could be relevant to concrete situations. Caution must be taken in applying mathematics to concrete situationsand, without making explicit the equivocal senses of “consistency” as it operates in Badiou’s thought, this caution cannot be precisely applied. By examining Being and Event as well as looking backwards at his first philosophical work, The Concept of Model, some key distinctions on the meaning of “consistency” will be clarified.

Alain Badiou’s theory of the subject has consistently opposed a vision of History as meaning and totality, for the sake of an internal, subjective and discontinuous grasp of the periodisation of political “sequences.” This article examines the theoretical trajectory that leads Badiou to dislocate the historical dialectic, generating a comprehension of political time which is no longer bound to an ordered matrix of expression and development; it also considers Badiou’s relation tovarious strands of anti-humanist anti-historicism and tackles the theoretical tensions that inhere in his disjunction of nature and history. The article concludes by discussing the effect of Badiou’s notion of periodisation on the very historicity and mutability of his own philosophical apparatus, and the immanent threat posed to his thinking of the event by an ‘absolute historicism.’

Alain Badiou argues in “Rancière and Apolitics” that Rancière has appropriated his central idea of equality from Badiou’s own work. We argue that Badiou’s characterisation of Rancière’s project is correct, but that his self-characterisation is mistaken. What Badiou’s ontology of events opens out onto is not necessarily equality, but instead universality. Equality is only one form of universality, but there is nothing in Badiou’s thought that prohibits the (multiple) universality he positsfrom being hierarchical. In the end, then, Badiou’s thought moves in a Maoist direction while Rancière’s in an anarchist one.

This article examines Heidegger’s account of existence by proceeding through one of his early accounts of our historical being and then looking at two of his later treatments of our historical being. Throughout his whole work, Heidegger seeks to show that destiny, das Geschick, is the essential constituent of history, die Geschichte. My own argument—--which is intended as an extension and application of Heidegger’s, not merely an exegesis--—is to formulate a still broader concept derived from das Geschick, which I call civilisation. I conclude with the claim that civilisation is a normative principle as well as a descriptive one, and can take on the role of justifying thelaws and institutions of our communities.

Contemporary scholars have generally labelled Adolf Reinach, a founding member of early phenomenology’s Göttingen Circle, a Platonist. Because Reinach conceives of states of affairs as neither real nor ideal, as involved with timeless essences and necessary logical laws, many have hastily concluded that states of affairs are Platonic entities. In this essay, I analyse Barry Smith’s argument that Reinach is a Platonist. Smith’s widely accepted argument often becomes utilised to show that Reinach and other phenomenologists, including Husserl, are Platonic realists (or, simply, Platonists). A closer look at Reinach’s text indicates, however, that he is notcommitted to Platonic realism.

How might we think about equality in a non-hierarchical fashion? How might equality be conceived with some degree of equality? The problem with the presupposition of liberalism is that, by distributing equality, liberals place most people at the receiving end of the political operation. There are those who distribute equality and those who receive it. Once you start with that assumption, the hierarchy is already in place. It’s too late to return to equality. Equality, instead of being the result of a political process, must be conceived as the presupposition of those who act. It must be the expression of political actors rather than the possession of a political hierarchy. In the formulation of Jacques Rancière, whose ideas form the framework of my thinking in this paper, “Politics only happens when these mechanisms are stopped in their tracks by the effect of a presupposition that is totally foreign to them yet without which none of them could ultimately function: the presupposition of the equality of anyone and everyone.”

In this paper, I shall present an argument against Deleuze’s philosophy of painting. Deleuze’s main thesis in Logic of Sensation is twofold: [1] he claims that painting is based on a non-representational level; and [2] he claims that this level comes out of the materiality of painting. I shall claim that Deleuze’s theses should be rejected for the following reasons: first, the difference between non-intentional life and the representational world is too strict. I submit that the nonintentional relation that painting opens up is itself part of andemerges out of the representational force of painting. If this would not be the case, then the criterion for differentiating between paintings and other objects cannot be developed. Indeed, Deleuze fails to give us a criterion. Second, Deleuze’s way of dealing with materiality in painting remains unsatisfactory insofar as he is unable to take into account how materiality is charged with an “attitude toward the world.” In sum, materiality can only be painting’s materiality if we understand it as being formed and disclosed in representation.

This essay examines the nexus of politics and ethics in Theodor W. Adorno’s thought. First, the essay takes issue with emphaticethical readings of Adorno that overlook both the societal reach and the inherent limitations to his politics. These limitations arise from his neglecting questions of collective agency and societal normativity. Then, the essay shows that such neglect creates problems for Adorno’s moral philosophy. It concludes by suggesting that to do justice to the insights in Adorno’s thought a democratic politics of global transformation is required.

Gianni Vattimo occupies the relatively rare position of being both a prominent philosopher and an engaged politician. This article outlines Vattimo’s philosophy of “weak thought” and his democratic socialist politics, and argues that there is a “gap” between them: his stated political positions seem at odds with aspects of his philosophy. This gap between the philosophical and the political is examined with reference to the topic of globalised capitalism. I then apply Vattimo’s own strategy in reading other philosophers to his thought, attempting to draw out the possible political implications of weak thought against his own stated position. I do this through theapplication of one of Vattimo’s central concepts, Verwindung (“twisting-free”), to globalised capitalism. I conclude with some reflections on the prospects for a politics of weak thought.

Absent within Jean-Luc Marion’s theory of selfhood is an account of psychosis that displaces standard phenomenological and psychoanalytic models. Working primarily with Book V of Being Given, my paper sketches the formal possibilities exhibited in a self who cannot manage the superabundance of the given and, swept away by an uncontrollable flood of givenness, thereby falls into a hysteria of self-experience and loses its ipseity. Then, contrasting psychosis with positive figures of the self, I explore the dynamic relationship between givenness and the gifted highlighted by the phenomenological diremption and effacement of selfhood displayed in both.