PHILOSOPHY RESEARCH ARCHIVES

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MICROFICHE SUPPLEMENT (in pocket of inside back cover)

34. David James, Longwood College What is Professional Ethics?

ABSTRACT. Both the writings of moral philosophers and of reflective professionals are employed to answer the title's question. A rule-utilitarian moral theory is defended and the alleged relativism of role-specific duties is argued to be a badly posed issue. Alternative theories of the foundations of professional ethics are criticized, and a sorting scheme is developed to clarify differences among types of moral rules. Finally, a theory of virtue is defended as a way of incorporating the most significant aspects of virtue ethics into an overall ruleutilitarian framework.

35. Thomas McClintock, Temple University Scepticism and the Basis of Morality

> ABSTRACT. Part 1, Skepticism, is devoted to an analysis of ethical skepticism and culminates in an account of what must be proved to refute it. Part 2, The Basis of Morality, develops the methodology for its refutation and then proceeds to its actual refutation, which consists fundamentally of the proof and elucidation of the rational basis of morality: the one and only true or correct supreme principle of morality.

> I have had to strike out entirely on my own in Part 1 and largely on my own in Part 2, though I learned a great deal that I draw upon, especially in Part 2, from the following moral philosophers whom I regard as the greatest in our tradition: Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Butler, Rousseau, Hume, Kant, Mill and Moore. I have sifted through their works--in comparative fashion--saving, integrating and developing what I found to be methodologically or/and substantively sound and discarding what I found to be otherwise. The result is a moral philosophy whose principal strands, though they can be found, at least in embryo, in the works of predecessors, are woven into a tapestry that I think will be found to be substantially now and original--at least in overall design.

> > BOTH 34 AND 35 ARE FULL-SCALE MONOGRAPHS.