

## A New Look at Linguistic Analysis

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Wittgenstein's votaries embrace the sentiments expressed in the *Investigations* as ardently as a young violinist might grasp a Stradavarius:

... we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all *explanation*, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose—from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize these workings: *in despite of* an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by rearranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.<sup>1</sup>

Thus speculative and normative philosophy is abortive at best and befuddling at worst; its weapons have proven to be but wooden lances and plaster swords in its battle against ill-advised human ideals and apparently irrational human experience, and the battlefield litter has cluttered men's minds. Now, only the use of linguistic paradigms by analytical philosophers can remove this rubbish by rearranging the knowledge in those minds befuddled by the dreams of traditional philosophers, for the battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence is to be fought only with words by an army whose sole weapon is description.

What the analytical philosophers apparently forget, however, is that just as the trunk, branches, and leaves of an oak imply the existence of hidden roots, statements have implications which are sometimes philosophical. Consider, for instance, the word 'truth.' That there are three prominent philosophical definitions of it, all advanced students of philosophy know. Each of these theories can be understood as a logical consequence of certain philosophical statements. Advocates of the correspondence theory, for instance, state that truths match reality while falsehoods mismatch it; true statements picture facts and true ideas mirror objects while false statements and ideas are distorted images of facts and objects. Man when imbued with truth becomes nature's dressing table in whose mirrors are to be found images of what is while when imbued with falsehood becomes a carnival's fun house in whose mirrors are to be found grotesque reflections. This definition is dualistic, for both a thing and its image are postulated, and since epistemological dualism is the philosophical proposal that a numerical difference exists between the content immediately present to the knowing mind and the object known in non-inferential cognition, this proposal implies such a dualistic definition of 'truth.' Thus the correspondence theory can be under-

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