

Abhandlungen

Articles

William J. RAPAPORT: How to make the World Fit Our Language:  
 An Essay in Meinongian Semantics . . . . . 1  
 Natural languages differ from most formal languages in having a partial, rather than a total, semantic interpretation function; e.g., some noun phrases don't refer. The usual semantics for handling such noun phrases (e.g., Russell, Quine) require syntactic reform. The alternative presented here is semantic expansion, viz., enlarging the range of the interpretation function to make it total. A specific ontology based on Meinong's Theory of Objects, which can serve as domain on interpretation, is suggested, and related to the work of Castañeda, Frege, Katz and Fodor, Parsons, and Scott.

Daniel HUNTER: Reference and Meinongian Objects. . . . . 23  
 Terence Parsons has recently given a consistent formalization of Meinong's Theory of Objects. The interest in this theory lies in its postulation of nonexistent objects. An important implication of the theory is that we commonly refer to nonexistent objects. In particular, the theory is committed to taking fictional entities as objects of reference. Yet it is difficult to see how reference to fictional entities can be established if Parsons' theory is correct. This difficulty diminishes the attractiveness of the theory and also raises questions as to the ability of the theory to give a satisfactory account of intentional attitudes towards fictional entities.

Eike von SAVIGNY: Das sogenannte "paradigm case argument": Eine Familie von antiskeptischen Argumentationsstrategien . . . . . 37  
 Grundgedanke des paradigm case argument ist, Skepsis gegenüber Ansprüchen auf Tatsachenwissen durch Appell an den Sprachgebrauch zu widerlegen. Die naivsten Formen der Argumentation sind nicht schlüssig; in ihrer weiteren Verwendung und Diskussion ist sie daher in drei unterschiedlichen Richtungen modifiziert worden: durch sprachtheoretische Ergänzungen (zur Rolle von Standards, Lehrbeispielen, Hinweisdefinitionen, Verwendungskriterien, semantischen Beziehungen, Unterscheidungsfunktionen), zu ad hominem-Strategien sowie zu quasi-transzendentalphilosophischen Varianten (Bedeutung impliziert Wahrheit; Sprachbenutzung impliziert Überzeugung; Sprachspielbeherrschung enthält Wissen).

Peter M. SIMONS: Unsaturatedness . . . . .	73
<p>Frege's obscure key concept of the unsaturatedness of functions is clarified with the help of the concepts of dependent and independent parts and foundation relations used by Husserl in describing the ontology of complex wholes. Sentential unity in Frege, Husserl and Wittgenstein: all have a similar explanation. As applied to linguistic expressions, the terms 'unsaturated' and 'incomplete' are ambiguous: they may mean the ontological property of <i>Unselbständigkeit</i>, inability to exist alone, or the property of being what categorial grammar calls a functor. Separation of these two senses resolves a dispute between Dummett and Geach on the nature of predicates.</p>	
Herlinde STUDER: Conditions of Knowledge . . . . .	97
<p>Since Edmund L. Gettier's famous paper a series of counterexamples has been raised against the traditional analysis of knowledge in terms of justified true belief. Some of these (not only Gettier-type) counterexamples can be ruled out by adding a fourth condition to the traditional account which demands a causal connection between the belief of a person and the fact the person believes. This causal connection is specified in a particular way so that counterexamples put forward against causal accounts of knowledge are likewise eliminated.</p>	
Wilhelm VOSSENKUHL: Free Agency. A Non-Reductionist Causal Account . . . . .	113
<p>Free agency can be explained causally if the causal approach does not imply reductionism. A non-reductionist account of action is possible along the lines of Davidsonian 'anomalous monism'. Mental events, i.e. propositional attitudes activated by indexical beliefs, are the causes of actions. Free agency presupposes a special type of causes to be analysed as rational causes allowing human agents to be self-determinant, autonomous agents in Kantian terms. An action is free if it has rational causes not to be ruled out by natural causes. With causes of actions being activated propositional attitudes their rationality is analysed in terms of the coherence of propositional attitudes. Principles of rational choice are not the basic ingredients of free i.e. rational action but have to conform to the propositional attitudes of the human agent.</p>	
George ENGLEBRETSSEN: A Journey to Eden: Geach on Aristotle . . .	133
<p>Peter Geach has charged Aristotle with the sin of corrupting logic by initiating a process which led to the view that a sentence consists logically of just two names. This charge can only result from a clearly mistaken view of Aristotle's theory of logical syntax. Aristotle, unlike Geach, was careful to distinguish subjects from subject-terms</p>	

and predicates from predicate-terms. He took both subjects and predicates as syntactical complexes. Geach, following Frege, holds a very different theory of logical syntax which takes predicates, but not subjects, as syntactically complex.

Robert J. RICHMANN: Because God Will It . . . . .	143
A divine approval theory in ethics may be construed as one of a class of <i>subjective-reaction</i> theories, those which hold that the rightness or wrongness of actions is <i>constituted</i> by the response to these actions (e.g., approval or disapproval) on the part of some person or persons, actual or ideal. There are <i>peculiar</i> difficulties connected with a divine approval theory, arising from God's omnipotence. But waiving difficulties which apply especially or peculiarly to a divine approval account, we can see by a simple argument that the entire set of subjective-reaction theories is subject to the logical difficulty that taking attitudes as definitive or otherwise constitutive of ethical value is self-defeating.	

Besprechungen

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