

INHALTSVERZEICHNIS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abhandlungen

Articles

A. Zvie BAR-ON: A Bio-Bibliographical Note	1
Nathan ROTENSTREICH: Between Construction and Evidence	3
<p>Bergman's approach to epistemology has deep roots in the Prague School of philosophy, particularly in the philosophical system of Bolzano and an interest in the problem of inner perception. In his criticism of Kant's system, however, we also find an emphasis on faith as an attitude of trust and confidence between man and God. This move is not meant to present faith as superior to knowledge or replacing it. The trend is rather in the direction of a complex co-existence of the two attitudes. This co-existence comes to the fore in the relation between construction and evidence and a certain delineation of the spheres to which these concepts can be applied. The suggestion is that in spite of the presence of evidence in the inner realm of human perception, that realm is open to the immanent sphere. Paradoxically self-certainty exhibited in faith goes beyond the self, while construction as a liberate activation of the self remains within the empirical.</p>	
Rudolf HALLER: The Philosophy of Hugo Bergman and the Brentano School	15
<p>The paper attempts to give an outline of the main doctrines of the Brentano-School and to mark the place of Bergman's contributions to descriptive Psychology. The idea of an immanent object is rejected by Marty and Bergman and was criticized by Bergman in the framework of the 'concept-intuition'-distinction. It is shown that Bergman's critic leads to an interesting defense of the thesis of the privacy of mental contents.</p>	
A. Zvie BAR-ON: From Prague to Jerusalem	29
<p>Two stages are discernible in S.H. Bergman's philosophical development. The <i>early</i> Bergman differs from the <i>later</i> Bergman as much in the philosophical method as in the choice of the fields of research and problems to deal with. The early Bergman acted predominantly</p>	

as a philosopher of science, focussing his attention on the ultimate presuppositions of scientific thinking. In the second stage this gave way to speculations of a rather anthropological character. The later Bergman sought to solve the riddle of human existence by a theory centering on the social nature of human rationality and claiming a theological explanation of its emergence.

- Joseph AGASSI: On Hugo Bergman's Contribution to Epistemology 47
 Approximationism – science approximates the truth as an ideal – is the view of science implicit in all of Einstein's major works, heralded by Hugo Bergman in Hebrew in 1940 and expressed by Karl Popper in 1954 and 1956. Yet Bergman was not sufficiently clear about it, and even Popper is not – as shown by their not giving up certain remnants of the older views which approximationism replaces, even when these remnants are inconsistent with approximationism. Nor are the approximationist theories of these authors satisfactory solutions to all the problems which traditional epistemologies purported to solve. Approxiamtionism still is a program rather than a fully blown theory.
- Yirmiyahu YOVEL: Reason as Necessary and Insufficient . . . 59
 Bergman's views on the relation between philosophy and religion are critically examined by following his discussions of the Neo-Kantians and, among others, of Nicolaus Cusanus, Kierkegaard, Buber and Sri Aurobindo. Thereby his thesis that philosophy and religion form a unity is criticised together with his attempt at abandoning philosophy in view of its idealistic results which deprive men of actual reality. Finally it is argued that reason has to be reestablished since despite its being insufficient there is nothing to replace or complement it.
- Gershon WEILER: Bergman as a Historian of Philosophy 85
 Bergman's view on the History of philosophy can be characterised as a heuristic doctrine which helps the philosophical pedagogue. Some problems arising from Bergman's religious way of thinking are revealed as underpinning the objections to it, as there are: the multiplicity of systems, the possibility of acquiring final truth, etc. In spite of these objections Bergman's ideas can be maintained as a very efficient means for a teacher of academic philosophy.
- Joseph HOROVITZ: A Criticism of Shmuel Hugo Bergman's Account of Nicolaus Cusanus 95
 Bergman's account of Cusanus's view of the relationship between God and the world leaves room for reservations. Bergman maintains

that Cusanus is either a pantheist or a panentheist. This view, at variance with Cusanus's explicit theism, is hardly tenable in the light of a suitable interpretation of his apparently pantheistic or panentheistic formulations. Bergman's treatment of enfolding and unfolding, and especially of the arithmetical illustration of those relations, is deficient. His ascription of manifest Platonism to Cusanus's theory of enfolding is objectionable, since, for Cusanus, the enfolding entities are not universals and need not even be existents. The way in which Bergman compares Cusanus with Goethe and with Rudolf Otto is misleading. So is his account of Cusanus's principle of the coincidence of opposites.

Ze'ev LEVY: S.H. Bergman on the Relation between Philosophy and Religion. 115

The relations between philosophy, science and religion preoccupied S.H. Bergman for many years. He wanted to corroborate, by *belief*, a personal God *to* whom, and not only *about* whom, one can speak. This should follow from authentic religious experience, making it independent from philosophy. Furthermore, according to Bergman, religion can do what philosophical reasoning is incapable of doing since he considers belief to be stronger than knowledge. A critical scrutiny of these assumptions involves some interesting implications concerning toleration, freedom-of-thought and dogmatism. The final conclusion consists in that belief cannot refute philosophical knowledge but can reject it while philosophy can refute belief but cannot reject it.

Besprechungen

Review Articles

Thomas NAGEL: <i>Über das Leben, die Seele und den Tod</i> , aus dem Englischen von K.E. Prankel und R. Stöcker, Königsstein: Hain 1984. (Kurt BAIER).	135
Derek PARFIT: <i>Reasons and Persons</i> , Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984. (H.G. ZILIAN).	159
Colin MCGINN: <i>The Subjective View. Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts</i> , Oxford: Clarendon Press 1983. (Jennifer CHURCH)	175
Wolfgang STEGMÜLLER und Matthias VARGA VON KIBED: <i>Strukturtypen der Logik</i> , Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer Verlag 1984. (G. KREISEL).	185

Wolfgang KÜNNE: <i>Abstrakte Gegenstände – Semantik und Ontologie</i> , Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 1983. (Wolfgang CARL)	197
Bruce R. WHEATON: <i>The Tiger and the Sark. Empirical Roots of Wave-Particle Dualism</i> , Cambridge: University Press 1983. (Manfred STÖCKLER)	205
Alan RYAN: <i>Property and Political Theory</i> , Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1984. (U. STEINVORTH)	215

Buchnotizen

Critical Notes

Risto HILPINEN (ed.): <i>New Studies in Deontic Logic: Norms, Actions and the Foundation of Ethics</i> , Dordrecht/Boston/London: Reidel 1981. (Thomas CORNIDES)	225
Elisabeth LIST: <i>Alltagsrationalität und soziologischer Diskurs. Erkenntnis- und wissenschaftstheoretische Implikationen der Ethnomethodologie</i> , Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag 1983. (Josef F. MERAN)	228
Albert MENNE und Niels ÖFFENBERGER: <i>Über den Folgerungsbegriff in der aristotelischen Logik</i> , Hildesheim: Georg Olms 1982. (Wolfgang L. GOMBOCZ)	232