

Midwest Studies in Philosophy

Volume X

Studies in the Philosophy of Mind

Why Paramecia Don't Have		
Mental Representations	Jerry A. Fodor	3
Just What Do We Have in Mind?	Lynne Rudder Baker	25
Consciousness	Brian O'Shaughnessy	49
Consciousness and Self-Identity	Peter Unger	63
Introspection and the Self	Sydney Shoemaker	101
Unconscious Mind or Conscious Minds?	Eddy Zemach	121
Intentionality	David M. Rosenthal	151
Intention and Evaluation	Michael Bratman	185 —
Rationality and the Range of Intention	Hugh J. McCann	191 —
Intentional Actions and Plans	Myles Brand	213 —
The Logical Status of Mind	George Bealer	231
Bodily Movements, Actions, and		
Mental Epistemology	Jennifer Hornsby	275 —
Kripke's Belief Puzzle	Igal Kvart	287
Is It Possible to Have		
Contradictory Beliefs?	Richard Foley	327 —
What Is a Belief State?	Curtis Brown	357 —
Seeing Surfaces	Avrum Stroll	379
The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes:		
Love Is Not Love Which Alters Not When It		
Alteration Finds	Amelie Oksenberg Rorty	399
Love <i>De Re</i>	Robert Kraut	413
The Indeterminism of Human Actions	Richard Swinburne	431
Free Will and the Structure of Motivation	David Shatz	451 —
Cartesian Interaction	Mark Bedau	483

'I Think': Some Reflections on Kant's		
Paralogisms	Jay F. Rosenberg	503
Concepts of Mind	Godfrey Vesey	531
Other Minds after Twenty Years	Bruce Aune	559
Troubles with Fodor's Nativism	Jerry Samet	575
Solipsistic Semantics	Ernest LePore and Barry Loewer	595
Advertisement for a Semantics for		
Psychology	Ned Block	615
Contributors		679