

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN 1909.¹

GERMAN philosophy during the year 1909 presents a fundamentally unitary character, in spite of the differentiation and manifoldness of its active factors, factors that to some extent are mutually hostile. The movements which we characterized in our earlier reports continue in evidence, movements that appear to converge towards a common goal: the epistemological interest continues to impress itself on philosophical thought; Kant continues to be the central figure for philosophical orientation, and attempts are constantly renewed to move beyond the Kantian position, to re-travel the line of development, although in a new manner and on a new basis, that led from the founder of Criticism to Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The neo-romantic movement, in the wide sense of the term, has lost little in intensity. Partly in connection with these phases of thought and partly independently of them, a new turn has manifested itself, preparation for which has been making for some time, although lately it has made more rapid and decisive progress—I mean the turn from epistemology to metaphysics. Metaphysics has come so prominently into the foreground, that there is reason to believe it will shortly occupy the chief place in philosophical discussion. Its introduction was brought about by that movement which, in its official program, repudiated metaphysics—neo-Kantianism.

If Kant's significance consists chiefly in the establishment of the transcendental logic, the logic that concerns itself with the laws of being, of the real, in contradistinction to the old formal logic, and not with the laws of thought in general; if the problem of the external world, of mathematical physics, is especially un-

¹Translated from the German by Professor Wm. A. Hammond.