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## METAPHYSIC AND PSYCHOLOGY.

IN a former number of this *Review*<sup>1</sup> Professor Andrew Seth makes a praiseworthy effort to mark out the province of Psychology in bold and clear outlines, distinguishing it on the one hand from Epistemology, and on the other from Metaphysic. Whatever view may be taken of the correctness or incorrectness of the distinctions there drawn, it must be admitted that they have all the appearance of that simplicity which is usually regarded as a mark of truth. Superficially, at least, they are clear and distinct, and no one who is untroubled by a desire to comprehend the deeper relations of things will hesitate to pronounce them satisfactory and illuminating; for what they amount to in substance is, that Psychology deals with the Self, Epistemology with the World, and Metaphysic with God. "How simple! how admirably simple!" one naturally exclaims. "We have been looking for truth afar off, when, in Plato's phrase, it was 'tumbling out at our feet.'"

The problem of Psychology, if I understand Mr. Seth aright, may be stated somewhat in this way. It is a fact that I am conscious, and that my consciousness takes the form of a series of states. The reality of these states as facts of my consciousness is beyond doubt, and I am therefore building upon solid rock, when I affirm their reality as such facts. Doubt can only arise, when, going beyond these states themselves, I ask whether they are signs or symbols of a reality other than themselves. But the psychologist, if he values his own peace of mind, will resolutely refuse to be moved from his impreg-

<sup>1</sup> March, 1892, pp. 129 ff.