

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.

THE EXPERIENCE-PHILOSOPHY.

THE object of this paper is to make clear what I conceive to be the fundamental fallacy of the experience-philosophy. Under 'experience-philosophy' I include all those theories which describe the world as exclusively a 'world of experience.' This, indeed, covers nearly all the philosophy of the present day and recent times, the subjective idealism of Berkeley, the phenomenalism of J. S. Mill, the empiricism of recent science, the present-day theories of pragmatism, humanism, and personal idealism, and the radical empiricism of Professor James. All of these deny that there is a world beyond experience; all, in substance, hold with Berkeley and Schopenhauer, that 'the world is my idea.'

In thus associating pragmatism and subjective idealism, I am conscious of ignoring the protest of those pragmatists who claim that the experience upon which they build is not subjective but prior to the distinction of subjective and objective. As my chief purpose is to show that experience is found only within this distinction, and exists only by virtue of this difference, I must leave the justification of this point to rest upon the argument as a whole. In the meantime, I may point out that, whatever be the distinction between experience and subjective experience, yet in practice, for both pragmatists and subjective idealists, reality is always precisely coextensive with the latter. The chair, when it disappears from thought, ceases also to be. And this limitation is all that preserves pragmatism — which is jealous of its idealism — from falling into the arms of naïve realism.¹

¹ See A. W. Moore in *THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW*, May, 1905. Mr. Moore wonders why, in the critics' conception of pragmatism, it should be always the ob-