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GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN 1910.¹

IF one studies the principal movements of German philosophy in recent years, one will find that in 1910 the development has been continued along the previous course. It is true that in philosophy more than in any other field the temporal succession coincides with the logical order. We recognize thus that during the past year the same characteristic motives and internal conflict have been at work. On the one hand, there is philosophical *analysis*, which in epistemology and logic brings about an ever finer sifting and separating of the various elements of thinking, a movement embodying the principle of limitation and differentiation. On the other hand, there are attempts,—they are not yet much more than attempts,—at a new metaphysical *synthesis* of all existence. The fundamental deficiency of contemporary philosophy lies just in the fact that these two functions, the analytical and the synthetical, from whose union and interpenetration alone a great *Weltanschauung* can arise, do not co-operate, but pursue their aims each for itself and independent of the other. Analysis, which in its progress of making subtle distinctions has accomplished astonishing results, is in danger of losing its positive contents and of degenerating into mere play with definitions; while synthesis, on the contrary, is still in need of critical formulation and so fails to present its results in finished form and with the power of conviction. Nevertheless, the era of Critical Idealism from Kant to Hegel, which still has the strongest influence upon present German philosophy, is best fitted to exemplify this union of the two modes of reflection. The

¹ Translated from the German by Dr. L. R. Geissler.