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THE DOCTRINE OF SPACE AND TIME.

V. THE REAL WORLD IN SPACE AND TIME.

THE preceding papers<sup>1</sup> have, I hope, made it clear that the real world in space and time is not a something given in intuition, but is a construct from what is thus given. The real world is, as it is sometimes expressed, a conceptual world. It is of no small importance to realize just what this statement means, and to avoid drawing from it unwarranted conclusions.

Are we justified in holding that space and time are conceptions? That depends upon the meaning that we give to the term conception. The statement that they are conceptions may very easily be misunderstood. In trying to make clear in what sense the statement may be accepted as true, I cannot do better than go back for a while to that wonderful little old philosopher of Koenigsberg, whose sagacity often led him to hit upon truths which his followers would see with clearer vision could they overcome the amiable weakness of turning him into a fetish, and could they consent to criticize him with the same freedom with which they criticize living writers who propound epistemological theories.

Kant strenuously maintains that space and time are not conceptions, but are intuitions. Now, we have seen<sup>1</sup> that he uses the word intuition in two senses, one of which is a very dubious sense, and the other not applicable to *real* space and time at all.

<sup>1</sup> See the PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, March to September, 1901.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, March, 1901.