We explore the possibility of teaching philosophy through the teaching of computer programming. It is pedagogically useful to use programming because it is extremely popular (especially due to the recent breakthroughs in machine learning), and it can provide a novel, interesting, and clear introduction to a variety of classic philosophical issues. We discuss two examples. The first is using programming to solve digital image manipulation tasks as a way of introducing and clarifying debates over external world skepticism. The second is programming a simulation of a simple 2-D cellular automaton as a way of introducing and clarifying debates over determinism and free will.

Epistemic injustice occurs when people are harmed as knowers, especially when we lack the conceptual and interpretive resources to recognize people as knowers of their own experience. This essay addresses the ways in which concerns about epistemic injustice create a positive obligation to include diverse knowers of ethics within the academy and models a community-based alternative. This is ethical enfranchisement, by which we mean expanding the range of people included within ways of knowing ethical concepts, reflecting on the way people’s experiences are represented in ethical discourse, and allowing priority ethical conversations to be identified by community research. The goal of teaching ethics through enfranchisement is the creation of social infrastructure and exchange between community and classroom. We describe our Re-envisioning Ethics Access and Community Humanities (REACH) Initiative at Salisbury University as an example; a community-based research partnership between public philosophy and community psychology in descriptive ethics. We also explore the obligation held by ethics professionals and academics to enfranchise community members in their conceptualization of ethical concepts, priorities, and knowledge.

This article proposes that children’s voice is important. It also suggests that one way in which children’s voice might be supported is through Philosophy with Children. However, when teachers undertake Philosophy with Children to promote children’s voice, it is important that they reflect on their role and the practice to consider how that role and practice enable children’s voice. One way in which teachers might do this is by considering the seven factors for enabling children’s voice identified through the Look Who’s Talking project. The seven factors are as follows: definition, power, inclusivity, listening, time and space, approaches, processes and purposes. The article takes each element in turn to consider the ways in which Philosophy with Children might align with them and offers questions teachers may ask of themselves and their practice. As there is a range of approaches to Philosophy with Children, the article focuses on one model: Community of Philosophical Inquiry.

There is a significant lack of diversity in philosophy, including an underrepresentation of women and people of color, and a dearth of philosophy programs that offer classes exploring philosophy outside the Western canon. This problem is further compounded by institutional racism, sexism, and ableism within philosophy pedagogy and practice and the perception that philosophy is an abstract subject suitable only for academically advanced students. If philosophy were made more accessible to a diverse group of students before they entered college, would it be possible to recruit more individuals from underrepresented groups into the field? In 2018, PLATO and the APA surveyed their members about their first exposure to philosophy. It was clear that early experiences—conversations with friends and family, books in grade school, and classes in high school—were pivotal moments that generated interest in philosophy. In this paper we describe some of these experiences and suggest that P4C programs, if done well, have the potential to help build a robust and inclusive K–12 to college philosophy pipeline by tapping into the natural interest children have in philosophical wondering.

In 2020, the University of Pennsylvania instituted a graduate certificate in public philosophy. In many ways, this certificate formalized and recognized the public engagement work that graduate students in the philosophy department and beyond had been involved with for some years. One element of the certificate, however, was pivotal in moving our work in public philosophy forward in important ways. This element is the research seminar in public philosophy. In this paper, we recount the motivation for the creation of the certificate and especially the motivation for the inclusion of the research seminar. We also explore ways in which such a certificate, along with the deliberately self-reflective work of the research seminar, might help us reimagine the nature and value of philosophy and its connection with human life and flourishing. We focus on metaphilosophical themes such as the very nature of philosophy and the philosopher as well as the importance of cultivating a new generation of academic philosophers committed to transcending the distinction between the academy and the public and, relatedly, between academic philosophy and public philosophy.

The Flying University, a prison education and reentry program that brings university students inside the prison for mutual and collaborative study, convenes with the assumed understanding that incarcerated peoples bear rich critical perspectives on the state of our communities as well as a philosophical potential to muster the resources necessary to heal communities in the wake of historical violence and transgenerational trauma. Rather than bringing incarcerated students into the purview of academic philosophy, the Flying University reverses these roles by recognizing that incarcerated peoples engage in daily philosophical scrutiny about a whole range of topics that traditional academic philosophy too often fails to comprehend with any depth. The Flying University enacts precollege philosophy as public practice by facilitating semester-long seminars that bring professional philosophers and university students into the prison—not so they can teach prisoners but listen to them. The guiding critical assumption of this practice follows Antonio Gramsci’s argument that what distinguishes “philosophers” from their opposite has less to do with intellectual activity and perspective and more to do with social status and credentials. A genuinely restorative philosophical praxis must solicit, within our community dialogues, the stories and voices of our incarcerated neighbors as “organic intellectuals.”

In this article, I provide an overview of the arguments for reparations for Black Americans, a topic that has gained significant steam in recent years, and offer a criticism of how reparations are commonly understood as financial compensation. I begin by providing the basic argument in support for reparations: Systemic racial injustices committed against Black Americans violated their rights; these violations should be considered an ongoing, enduring injustice; and such violations require restitution in the form of reparations. I argue that there are unforeseen problematic results of economic-repair-centered reparations programs, most concerning that the resources offered ignore the social or economic status of large portions of the Black communities they acknowledge harming. Offering two legislative attempts at reparations as examples, I argue that reparatory policies for Black Americans should utilize the framework of rectificatory justice in order to best attempt to set an unjust situation right.

Philosophy for Children (P4C) practice and its distinctive method of cultivating communities of philosophical inquiry model two main functions of democratic civil society. Civil society makes explicit the implicit agreement of communal membership and common belonging and mediates the diverse interests and values of community members. An essential principle of civil society that underlies these two functions is that its members possess intrinsic and political equality, fostering a unique space for civic engagement and democratic will-formation. P4C programs enact these functions of civil society: as children encounter philosophical questions, speak their minds, listen to one another, disagree, and puzzle out the reasons for their disagreements, the main aim is that they engage in collaborative inquiry. I argue that free and open-access P4C programs at public libraries are microcosms of civil society in the serendipitous accidental coming together of strangers. These programs enact civil society insofar as they motivate and exercise civic virtues of collaboration and critical reflection by practicing community of inquiry through self-correcting dialogue.

This paper examines the impact of a week-long philosophy summer camp on middle and high school-age youth with specific attention paid to the development of intellectual humility in the campers. In June 2016 a university in Texas hosted its first philosophy summer camp for youth who had just completed sixth through twelfth grades. Basing our camp on the pedagogical model of the Philosophy for Children program, our aim was specifically to develop a community of inquiry among the campers, providing them with a safe intellectual space to be introduced to philosophy and philosophical discussion. In 2017 we launched a formal longitudinal study to determine what impact a week-long philosophy summer camp would have on teens and tweens. Examining quantitative and qualitative data collected from 2016–2020, we found that the camp has had a significant impact on the teenagers who have attended. In particular, we found that intellectual humility increased over the duration of their camp experience and that this increase correlates with an increased affinity for philosophy and philosophical discussion.

The philosophy for children (P4C) and public philosophy movements seek to extend philosophy to traditionally marginalized groups. Yet public perceptions of philosophy as an elite activity provide an obstacle to this work. Such perceptions rest, in part, on further assumptions about what philosophy is and how it is conducted. To address these concerns, I look to the early philosophical dialogues of Augustine of Hippo (Contra Academicos, De beata vita, De ordine, Soliloquia), which present an experimental philosophical community composed of teenagers, illiterate adults, and Augustine’s own mother. I begin with the question, “who can do philosophy?” and walk through the dialogues’ discussion of race, gender, educational background, age, and class. I then turn to teaching techniques on display in the dialogues’ discussions, which flesh out what philosophical study looks like for nonelite students. I close by using my own experience of teaching nonelite students to reflect on how Augustine’s experimental philosophical community can help reframe thinking about P4C and public philosophy today.

In my article I offer an argument in favor of philosophy as a practical activity that is intrinsically educative. In responding to the crisis of our discipline, I make a case for a beneficial relationship between philosophy and the community, especially from the point of view of the discipline itself. I propose that the practicality of philosophy needs to be experienced in concrete activities involving others, therefore recasting the relation of theory to practice in the modality of translation as a never-completed task to take on. I suggest that philosophizing could be characterized by a position of vulnerability, which complicates notions of inside/outside, belonging, home, and dialogue. I offer examples drawn from my experience of integrating philosophical discussion with children (inspired by P4C pedagogy) in my college courses to suggest that philosophizing with others in varied contexts should be an integral part of education. By emphasizing the benefits accruing to undergraduate students and to the discipline itself from the practice, I do not intend to downplay or marginalize the voices and experiences of the children and teachers who are such an essential part of the practice. Rather than being a zero-sum game, the engagement of philosophy with the world expands and lifts the experience of everybody involved.

As an outgrowth of experiential and critical pedagogies, and in response to growing rates of student anxiety and depression, educators in recent years have made increasing efforts to facilitate curiosity and mindfulness in the classroom. In Section I, we describe the rationale and function of these initiatives, focusing on the Right Question Institute and mindfulness curricula. Although we admire much about these programs, here we explore ways to complicate and deepen them through a more socially grounded and ethically informed theoretical framework. In Section II, we provide that framework by sketching a sociopolitical account of curiosity and of mindfulness. We propose a curiosity mindful of social location and a mindfulness curious about political structures and historical contexts. In Section III, we then offer concrete suggestions for modifying the curricula of the Right Question Institute and various mindfulness programs. We show how a more nuanced understanding of curiosity and mindfulness strengthens these program offerings. Ultimately, facilitating mindful curiosity and curious mindfulness, we argue, helps educators a) provide more robust learning environments, b) address growing mental health challenges, and c) support global citizenship in the classroom and beyond.

Many professional philosophers are hesitant about “public philosophy”—unsure about what it is and how it’s done, and downright pessimistic about whether it is an important and valuable philosophical practice. In response to this hesitancy and in support of public philosophy, I argue that most of these philosophers already find at least one form of public philosophy important and valuable for the discipline and profession: teaching. I offer and defend a broad conception of public philosophy in order support this controversial claim. I continue by briefly offering some reasons to think that public philosophy is of value for society generally (i.e., “the public”), and argue that we, as a profession, need to fully recognize our standing commitment to public-facing philosophical work; and to engage in serious discussion and debate to better examine the various types of public philosophy, clarify the broad range of public-facing activities, and encourage/reward further public work of value.

Public philosophers have tended to think of their audience as the public, or perhaps a public or counterpublic. In my work on the Ask a Philosopher booth, however, it’s been helpful to think of our audience as made up of a handful of characters—types defined by the way in which they engage (or decline to engage) with the booth. I describe the characters I’ve encountered at the booth: orbiters, appreciaters, readers, monologuists, freethinkers, scholars, and peers. By reflecting on these characters and their needs, we can both imagine other forms of public philosophy that might better serve them, and better articulate the values that inhere in public philosophy projects like the Ask a Philosopher booth. I conclude with a brief case for the philosophy of public philosophy.

Can we learn about philosophical practice, and philosophical teaching, by examining an apparently very different discipline—improvisational theater? The short answer: yes! In particular, a consideration of improvisational theater reveals four values—play/playfulness, physicality, ensemble, and inclusivity—all of which have a role in philosophical practice and pedagogy. First, we can think of philosophy as a form of intellectual play, where theatrical techniques demonstrate that play can deepen the focus of our students. Second, philosophical teaching can be done in ways that productively utilize physicality in order to maintain focus or allow students to express their ideas through their bodies. Third, philosophical practice, and teaching, should aim to establish ensemble, which can be understood as a social configuration which establishes equality in terms of mutual dependence and responsiveness. Finally, inclusivity in the philosophical classroom can be heightened through the use of appropriately adapted improvisational techniques. In addition to laying the conceptual groundwork to understand the connection between improvisational theater and philosophy, this essay includes a number of specific exercises for instructors who wish to introduce these techniques to the classroom.

In this paper we present an empirical case study into the effects of attending a philosophy conference on social skill development in 15- to 18-year-old students. We focus on the impact that the conference had on their communication skills, sociability, cooperation and teamwork skills, self-confidence, determination, social responsibility, and empathy. These are social skills previously studied in 2017 by Siddiqui et al. who found student development in these areas as a result of Philosophy for Children (P4C) sessions in primary schools. In this paper, we ask whether our conference—Pursuit of Knowledge—brought about comparable results. Overall, attendees reported that they felt that the conference had improved their communication skills, sociability, cooperation and teamwork, self-confidence, determination, social responsibility and empathy. We conclude that further research into the potential of models of philosophy akin to the model employed by the conference should be conducted. We discuss the potential of this model as a means of educating for social skills.

While summer break presents educational and recreational opportunities for some students, students from depressed socioeconomic groups may face significant obstacles in the summer, including learning loss. In general, these students also lack access to a wide range of intrinsic and instrumental benefits attached to the study of philosophy. While there are currently existing philosophy programs, this contribution highlights the connections between summer experiences and the overall achievement gap, while identifying specific practices shown to yield successful summer programs. Philosophy provides an impressive set of benefits, including academic skills and opportunities for personal growth and development. Incorporating best practices while focusing on the methods and content of philosophy should, therefore, yield particularly rewarding programs. Due to these benefits, summer philosophy programs should be researched, developed, and expanded.

The purpose of this paper is to reimagine philosophy programs in schools, such as philosophy for/with children, through a critical analysis of the work of Hannah Arendt and Judith Butler, especially in light of their understanding of the space of appearance and plurality. ​Drawing on a critical reading of Hannah Arendt along with Butler’s critique, I argue that during the enactment of the community of philosophical inquiry (CPI), the classroom becomes a space of appearance through the collective willingness of those present to be exposed to and recognize unknown others and matters in the condition of plurality. I begin by summarizing Arendt’s notions of the space of appearance and plurality. Next, I introduce Butler’s critique and reading of Arendt to focus on sociopolitical aspects of the space of appearance. Finally, I synthesize both Arendt’s and Butler’s analyses to show the phenomenological and sociopolitical aspects of the CPI.

Virtues are standardly characterized as stable dispositions. A stable disposition implies that the virtuous actor must be disposed to act well in any domain required of them. For example, a politician is not virtuous if s/he is friendly in debate with an opponent, but hostile at home with a partner or children. Some recent virtue theoretic accounts focus on specific domains in which virtues can be exercised. I call these domain-variant accounts of virtue. This paper examines two such accounts: Randall Curren and Charles Dorn’s (2018) discussion of virtue in the civic sphere, and Michael Brady’s (2018) account of virtues of vulnerability. I argue that being consistent with the standard characterization of virtue requires generalizing beyond a domain. I suggest four actions the authors could take to preserve their accounts while remaining consistent with the standard characterization. I also discuss how virtue education could be enhanced by domain-variant accounts.

I provide three types of dialogue found in everyday life. I then show how the latter dialogical model is ideal for public philosophical engagement. I refer to it as ‘liberatory dialogue’—a theoretical framework that shapes my public philosophy practice and provides invaluable benefits. In liberatory dialogue, characters are subjects, active, teachers and students, creative and critical, and collaborative. Influenced by the work of Paulo Freire, I argue that knowledge, mutual humanization, and liberation are some of the benefits that liberatory dialogue provides. I then highlight several ways in which I incorporate liberatory dialogue in my work as well as some of the challenges of doing so.

In the sixteenth-century book Utopia, Thomas More argues that philosophers can play an effective role in the public sphere. This article builds from More’s argument to develop a theory of public philosophy centered on dialogue or rhetoric. It contrasts this public philosophy with the disciplinary form of philosophy that emerged in the twentieth century. The discipline constitutes philosophers as experts and limits them to a dialogue only with their peers. By contrast, public philosophers can be in dialogue with anyone involved in a public issue. The article discusses some key challenges to doing public philosophy. It then gives an account of the methods and central features of field philosophy, one kind of public philosophy.

For the past two years on my podcast, Hi-Phi Nation, I have been experimenting with using storytelling to increase audience and engagement with contemporary academic philosophy. I offer this paper as a motivation and guide for philosophers interested in how to use storytelling to increase audience engagement in public-facing work. The key is to use the narrative structure to tie a philosophical issue to a character whose changes in fortune over time arise because of a conflict in philosophical ideas, the resolution of which requires the examination of those ideas.

In this paper, I explore how Philosophy for Children (P4C) classes can contribute to decolonization efforts. I begin by describing what I mean by both “coloniality” and “decolonization.” Second, I provide a sketch of what P4C classes frequently entail and motivate the case for P4C as a “decolonizing methodology.” Third, I engage a series of decolonial critiques of P4C classes. Finally, I explore ways in which P4C can contribute to decolonization efforts if reformed in response to these critiques. Throughout this paper, I shall draw upon examples from my experiences teaching P4C at the Mexico-U.S. border and in Oaxaca.

The Ethics Bowl is a new debate format that is taking hold in high schools, colleges, and universities across the country. It emphasizes constructive, respectful dialogue about difficult contemporary problems in applied ethics. This paper argues that the Ethics Bowl is a particularly promising program for incarcerated students. Through a discussion of my experiences doing the Ethics Bowl with incarcerated students, a discussion of the transformative possibilities of philosophical dialogue, and an examination of other anti-recidivism programming, I argue that programs fostering philosophical reflection and dialogue, such as the Ethics Bowl, should play a key role in programming for education programs inside prisons.

The social domain theory approach to moral education has focused on discourse between peers as a way of stimulating complex reasoning and fostering a critical moral orientation towards the norms of society. In this paper, we use the work of Anthony Laden and Mikhail Bakhtin to further refine our goals for using dialogue in the classroom. For Laden, “reasoning” is not simply thinking, but a social, dialogical activity. For Mikhail Bakhtin, “dialogue” is not simply talk, but the foundation of relationship and fundamental to becoming open to change. We argue that high-level reasoning in peer discourse is not an adequate end-goal for moral education—we must consider the intentions behind the discourse (e.g., deliberation, debate), and a young person’s willingness to change his or her beliefs. We point to contemporary examples of young people engaging in this kind of heteroglossic, engaged reasoning through media and civic action.

This paper serves as a call to philosophers both to create more precollege philosophy programs, and to push back against the instrumentalization of the value of philosophy. I do not intend to defend the intrinsic value of philosophy in this paper, though in an indirect way I will offer a defense of the value of precollege philosophy. I discuss the history, theory and practice behind the Utah Lyceum, a precollege philosophy summer camp program I helped create in rural Utah. I argue that philosophy summer camps such as the Lyceum are in a unique position to push back against the increasing vocationalization of education by building a curriculum on what I call “reasonableness.” In short, reasonableness is a form of rationality that necessarily includes a social component. Focusing on this social aspect, I distinguish three levels at which philosophical dialogue occurs: interpersonally, intratextually, and intertextually. I argue that by employing this distinction we can facilitate better philosophical dialogue and better aid our students in becoming reasonable.