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Displaying: 1-10 of 28 documents


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1. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 26
Zhamgyrbek Bokoshov Work as an Ontological Problem
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The “matter” should be an independent subject of philosophical inquiry. Our preliminary design shows that the historical and philosophical reflection is sufficient indication of the existence of theoretical interest in “issues of the case” that a special study of the subject as the most important phenomenon of social life in a new light allows you to examine and reflect on such traditional categories of metaphysics, as ‘being’ “world”, a “thing”. Through pragmalogical triangle you may see almost all aspects of the philosophical study of language. In this case for us it is fundamental distinction between things and matter.
2. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 26
Jaime del Val Ontology of Becoming: Ontokinethics
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Ontokinethics is an ontology of movement and becoming that inverts western metaphysics of identity by generating an understanding of movement as incipient (virtual) and relational: movement not as activity of the already given, but as generative of all that is, within a metahumanist conception of the world as immanent field of forces. Amorphogenesis is a process where priority lies in the permanent formation of potentials that exceed their actualisations, inverting the traditional account of nihilism, that appears now related to the fixation of identity and form, which negates the creative forces of becoming. Ontokintehics thus interprets the nihilistic or creative wills implicit in movement according tendencies to replication and homogenisation, or emergence and differentiation.
3. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 26
Vladimir N. Dubrovsky The Laws of Philosophy: A Contemporary Viewpoint
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Since there is a hierarchy in levels of the organization of the world (in, for example, its social, biological, physical and cosmic aspects) there is a plurality of aspects of scientific philosophy, each of which takes its bearings from this or that level of the organization of the world. This means that when speaking about the laws of philosophy, it is necessary to specify which aspect is being spoken about. In the course of my argument my guideline is the highest, or cosmic world, but I shall also use examples from the physical world. The first law of philosophy of the cosmic world is: each being has a single basis. (It realizes this basis of itself, i.e. it is a primary basis). The first law of the philosophy of the physical world can be stated as follows: all physical being is unique. The second law of philosophy of the cosmic world is: the basis of all being is active to the point of self-excitement. It is manifest and demonstrable of itself, fracturing unity into multiplicity. The second law of the philosophy of the physical world can be stated as follows: all physical being is active and excitable. The third law of the philosophy of the cosmic world is: the basis of all being excites itself unevenly. The third law of philosophy of the physical world can be stated as follows: every physical being changes by a conversion leap. These then are the three laws of the philosophy of the cosmic and physical worlds: uniqueness, activity, and leap. I end by showing how laws of cosmic ethics and a cosmic aesthetics follow from the laws of the philosophy of the cosmic world.
4. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 26
Maarten Franssen Artefact Kinds as Structural-cum-historical Kinds
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I has been argued, foremost by David Wiggins (but the argument has a long history), that artefact kinds are defined in a way that makes the existence and persistence of their members, say clocks, dependent on human pragmatic considerations. This supposedly sets artefact kinds apart from natural kinds of things, say tigers, for which some inherent principle determines their existence and persistence. Consequently, artefact kinds would not be acceptable as real kinds in the sense that natural kinds of things are real, i.e. included in the ‘furniture of the universe’. I argue against this position that the stated differences between natural kinds and artefact kinds are not as categorical as claimed. Natural kinds are to some extent similarly subject to ‘ontological vagueness’. The argument for the ‘overall’ indeterminateness of artefact kinds depends largely on their conception as functional kinds. I show that if artefact kinds are conceived as historical subkinds of structural kinds, they can be considered as in relevant respects similar to natural kinds of things, and therefore ontologically on a par with them. The combination of historical and structural determination is one, moreover, that we are well acquainted with for some paradigmatically real kinds of natural things: biological organisms.
5. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 26
Maren Jung An Ontology of Objects without Social and Natural Objects
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In this paper I assert that the distinction between social and natural objects is obsolete. We do better when we describe the differences between objects regarding two kinds of reference which I am going to distinguish and present here. Regarding what distinguishes natural kinds from artifacts, some authors, such as Thomasson, assume that a fundamental difference is the fact that the identity conditions of artifacts in contrast to the identity conditions of natural objects depend on the intention and the concept of the subject which has produced the object (Thomasson 2007). Below I will argue that the existence of natural objects depends on the intention and the concept of a subject as well. For this I will show, that individuation of objects is a basic way to produce objects and that it is based on intentions (Jung, 2012). Then I will show that this does not imply that each of our terms refers to an entity whose existence depends on subjects’ intention and concepts. Finally, I will propose that the difference between referring to entities that are dependent and entities that are not is a good difference to distinguish between two meaningful kinds of objects without making a distinction of natural and social objects.
6. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 26
Anastasija Medova Modal Ontology of the Buddhism and the Advaita-Vedanta: The Concept ‘All in Everything’
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The “All in Everything” conception has the oldest history among the models of integrity of Being that were developed in philosophy. It had already taken place in myth consciousness where it was expressed in principles of a “mystical participation”, syncretism and “whole instead of part”. This idea was developed in ancient Greek doctrines in connection with the problem of Onenes and Dozens. But the most fundamental role of the “All in Everything” principle is for ontologies of the Buddhism and the Advaita-Vedanta, that approves tripartite identity of all consciousness, the world of objects and the first principle of Being. In this article we consider the logic of coincidence at all levels of a universe, as it is presented in the doctrines of the Mahayana (the Yogacara and Huayan schools) and the Advaita-Vedanta. The principle of universal coincidence of physical and mental objects is analyzed by means of the concept of modus, which is understood as a measurement, a side, a projection of primordial essence. The structure of the hologram is considered and analogies to the quantum theory of D. Bohm as a way of illustration “All in Everything” conception.
7. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 26
Tudor Moise Is Ontology Still Possible?
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If we agree with Kant’s assertion that the thing-in-itself cannot be known, then ontology automatically becomes a debatable notion. Given the fluid nature of reality, man’s representation of his world can be only fragmentary and hence contextual. The same can be said of the nature of essence and necessity, which reflect only a particular stage or instance of knowledge. Under the circumstances, it can legitimately be stated that ontology transforms into epistemology, as the human mind builds a filter that helps it organize the knowledge of his environment. Ontology can be fully preserved only by taking a Platonic view. Both phenomenology and the logical formal approach operate on the way man builds huge taxonomic schemata to satisfy his cognitive needs, instead of providing a true description of being. The latter should be actually left to sciences, which patiently and contextually add to our knowledge of the world. Since the big ontological questions – origin, scope, the infinite dimensions in both time and space - are bound to remain unanswered, philosophy’s role is quite limited to indicate this state of permanent relativism.
8. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 26
Yasuo Nakayama Ontology and Epistemology for Four-dimensional Mereology
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There are several forms of four-dimensionalism. In this paper, I propose a version of four-dimensionalism called four-dimensional mereology (4DM). To investigate ontological problems, it is important to clarify epistemological problems that are closely related to ontological positions. According to the static view of time, change takes place within time, but time itself doesn’t change, and time merely separates events temporally, as space separates them spatially. However, according to the dynamic view of time, time really does pass, and the world is caught up in a process of purely temporal change. In this paper, I show that the static view of time is right from the ontological viewpoint (i.e. the external viewpoint), whereas the dynamic view of time is right from the epistemological viewpoint (i. e. the internal viewpoint). You may ask which of these two views are real. However, this question is misleading. The universe can be described from several different viewpoints. The internal and the external description give important information about certain parts of the universe and these two descriptions can be correlated and combined. They do not conflict each other, when we compare them in a proper manner. Both descriptions help us to understand the reality of the universe and to interpret ourselves as parts of the universe.
9. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 26
Anatoly Borisovich Nevelev Existence: Dialectics of Objectivity and Energevity
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A man is an objective creature, because his existence is marked out by culture. He is also an energevic creature, because he is preoccupied with the objective world, is undergoing the energy (active ability) of desires. Between these sides of existence (the objective and the energevic) there is a reverse dependence: the more objective determinacy is, the less is the level of energevic intension of existence, and vice versa. At its limits, when the objectivity reaches the level of ‘irrelative non-’, energevity becomes a spirit, i.e. extremely focused energy of love.
10. Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 26
Vesselin Petrov The Ontology of the Future from a Process Philosophical Point of View
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The topic of the paper is the ontology of the future from the process philosophical point of view. The author takes up an attitude to the claim of the Hegelians that Hegel’s ontology will be the ontology of the future and argues that this can be accepted only to the extent to which Hegel’s ontology is a kind of process ontology. The author’s thesis is that process ontology will be the ontology of the future. Whitehead has developed a more contemporary form of process ontology than Hegel’s one. Whitehead’s process ontology is not dialectic and his scheme of development relying on ‘concrescence’ and ‘transition’ differs from Hegel’s triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis corresponding to a greater extent to contemporary science. There are also other attempts after Whitehead to develop process ontology that represents further steps in the generalization of processes. The author’s own expectation is that in the nearest future process ontology will arrive at the elaboration of the idea of variable categories. That stage of development will synthesize Hegel’s idea of changing categories with Whitehead’s process ontology and the other contemporary forms of process ontology. Namely this synthesis will be the ontology of the future.